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Abstract	My	 dissertation	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 question	 of	 which	 political	 decision-making	institutions	 real-world	 democratic	 societies	 ought	 to	 adopt.	 Following	 a	 brief	introduction	in	chapter	one,	it	is	structured	around	three	sub-issues.		Part	one	considers	how	citizens’	conduct	in	elections	ought	to	be	regulated.	Chapter	two	offers	a	defence	of	compulsory	voting,	by	appeal	to	the	wrongness	of	free-riding,	and	responds	to	many	of	the	objections	raised	by	compulsory	voting’s	critics.			Chapter	three	offers	a	defence	of	bans	on	vote	buying.	I	show	that	recent	arguments	in	favour	of	permitting	vote	buying	are	implausible.	I	then	go	on	to	criticise	existing	accounts	of	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying,	and	offer	a	novel,	respect-based	account	of	the	wrongness	of	the	practice.		Part	 two	considers	whether,	 and	how,	persons	conventionally	excluded	 from	the	franchise	ought	to	be	included	in	the	democratic	process.	Chapter	four	argues	that	the	 disenfranchisement	 of	 children	 is	 unjust.	 I	 argue	 that	 all	 major,	 plausible	approaches	to	the	justification	of	voting	rights	converge	upon	a	requirement	that	children	 from	 around	 the	 age	 of	 twelve	 be	 enfranchised,	 and	 that	 none	 of	 the	principal	objections	raised	to	child	enfranchisement	are	persuasive.			Chapter	five	considers	the	position	of	the	cognitively	disabled.	I	argue	that,	contrary	to	 hopes	 expressed	 in	 the	 literature,	 enfranchising	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 is	unlikely	to	make	any	difference	to	the	democratic	processes’	under-responsiveness	to	such	persons.	Ensuring	adequate	consideration	for	the	cognitively	disabled	will	require	deeper	 institutional	 reform.	 I	 consider	a	 range	of	possibilities,	ultimately	arguing	for	the	creation	of	a	deliberative	citizens’	assembly	to	address	the	issue.		Part	three,	finally,	considers	whether	the	institutions	presupposed	in	parts	one	and	two	 –	 universal	 suffrage,	 and	 decision-making	 via	 the	 aggregation	 of	 citizens’	expressed	 preferences	 –	 can	 be	 justified	 in	 light	 of	 two	 significant	 challenges.	Chapter	six	considers	the	competence	objection,	advanced	by	Jason	Brennan.	I	show	that	Brennan’s	objection	is	reliant	upon	a	naïve	account	of	citizens’	rights	against	
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risk-impositions,	and	cannot	be	sustained	on	any	more	plausible	view.	I	also	criticise	Brennan’s	preferred	‘epistocratic’	alternative	to	democracy.		Finally,	 chapter	 seven	 considers	 the	 ‘lottocratic’	 challenge.	 Several	 authors	 have	recently	argued	 that	 substituting	universal	 suffrage	and/or	aggregative	decision-making	with	some	chance-based	device	would	either	preserve,	or	improve	upon,	the	egalitarian	appeal	of	democracy,	while	realising	higher-quality	results.	I	argue	that	the	positive	egalitarian	case	for	lottocracy	is	implausible,	and	that	the	comparative	egalitarian	 and	 instrumental	 merits	 of	 appropriately	 structured	 democratic	arrangements	will	generally	be	superior.		 	
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1.	Introduction		1.1.	Three	Questions	in	Democratic	Theory		In	 the	period	 immediately	prior	 to	 the	First	World	War,	 the	basic	 institutions	of	democratic	 government	were	 to	 be	 found	 only	 in	 Finland,	 France,	 Great	 Britain,	Italy,	 Norway,	 Sweden,	 Switzerland,	 and	 a	 small	 number	 of	 former	 European	colonies	–	most	notably,	the	United	States	(Solomon	and	Malone,	2011,	pp.	13-5).	Following	 the	conclusion	of	 the	war,	however,	democratic	 institutions	and	 ideals	spread	 at	 an	 extraordinary	 pace.	 By	 1926,	 29	 countries	 had	 democratised	(Huntington,	 1991,	 p.	 12).	 In	 1948,	 the	 United	 Nations	 adopted	 the	 Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	Article	21	of	which	states	that	“[t]he	will	of	the	people	shall	be	the	basis	of	the	authority	of	government;	[and]	this	will	shall	be	expressed	in	periodic	and	genuine	elections	which	shall	be	by	universal	and	equal	suffrage…”	By	1973,	Freedom	House	classified	44	out	of	151	countries	as	‘free’,	indicating	that	democratic	norms	were	widely	upheld,	and	42	as	‘partly	free,’	indicating	a	moderate	commitment	 to	 democratic	 norms.	 The	 collapse	 of	 the	 USSR	 saw	 the	 number	 of	countries	classified	as	free	or	partly	free	jump	from	99	out	of	167	in	1987-1988	to	141	out	of	183	in	1991.	Numbers	peaked	in	2008,	with	151	out	of	193	countries	classified	as	free	or	partly	free	(Solomon	and	Malone,	2011,	p.	20).1	Over	the	same	period,	those	societies	already	possessed	of	basic	democratic	institutions	came	to	more	fully	embody	democratic	ideals	(Keane,	2009).	Women	gained	the	right	to	vote	in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 nations.	 Plural	 voting	 was	 abolished	 in	 Britain	 in	 1948.	Indigenous	Australians	were	gradually	enfranchised	between	1949	and	1965.	The	passage	 of	 the	Voting	 Rights	 Act	 in	 1965	 ended	 the	most	 egregious	 cases	 of	 the	disenfranchisement	of	African	Americans	in	the	United	States.		Most	 of	 us	 regard	 these	 developments	 very	 favorably.	 Global	 survey	 data	consistently	shows	strong	support	for	democracy	in	all	parts	of	the	world	(Inglehart,	
																																																						1	 Progress	 has	 stagnated	 in	 recent	 years.	 Diamond	 (2015,	 pp.	 144-7)	 counts	 25	 breakdowns	 of	democracy	 between	 2000	 and	 2014,	 only	 10	 of	which	 have	 been	 followed	 by	 the	 restoration	 of	democracy.	What	democratic	hopes	there	were	in	movements	such	as	the	Arab	Spring	and	Umbrella	Revolution	have	largely	been	disappointed.	Things	are	changing	for	the	worse	in	many	nations	which	remain	fundamentally	democratic.	In	the	US,	for	example,	evidence	suggests	that	the	political	process	has	become	skewed	in	favour	of	socioeconomic	elites	(Gilens,	2012;	Hacker	and	Pierson,	2011).		
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2003;	Shin,	2007).	There	is	virtual	unanimity	in	the	academy	that	democracy	is	the	sole	legitimate	form	of	government.	Democratic	theory	is	replete	with	sophisticated	accounts	 of	 the	 value	 of	 democracy.	Democracy	 is	 said	 to	more	 robustly	 protect	individuals’	human	rights	(Christiano,	2011),	better	protect	against	humanitarian	disasters	(Sen,	1999),	realise	better	quality	decisions	(Estlund,	2008;	Landemore,	2013b),	or	better	respect	fundamental	values	like	freedom	(e.g.	Gould,	1988;	Pettit,	2012;	 Philpott,	 1995)	 and	 equality	 (e.g.	 Beitz,	 1989;	 Christiano,	 2008;	 Kolodny,	2014b),	than	any	feasible	alternative	means	of	making	political	decisions.	Amartya	Sen	(1999,	p.	5)	captures	the	prevailing	mood	nicely;		 While	democracy	is	not	yet	universally	practiced,	nor	indeed	uniformly	accepted,	in	the	general	climate	of	world	opinion,	democratic	governance	has	now	achieved	the	status	of	being	taken	to	be	generally	right.	The	ball	is	very	much	 in	 the	court	of	 those	who	want	 to	rubbish	democracy	 to	provide	justification	for	that	rejection.			This	 familiar	 narrative	 of	 a	 popular,	 political,	 and	 academic	 consensus	 over	democracy	is	perfectly	right,	at	least	at	a	certain	level	of	abstraction.	Yet	it	also	tends	to	 obscure	 the	 fact	 that,	 on	 at	 least	 three	 important,	 interconnected	 questions,	democratic	theorists	remain	deeply	divided.	These	are	the	questions	of	definition,	
justification,	and	institutions.			The	definition	question	asks,	simply:	what	is	democracy?	The	concept	of	democracy	is	clear	enough:	rule	by	the	people.2	But	there	are	many	conflicting	conceptions	of	what	rule	by	the	people	properly	consists	in.3	Many	democratic	theorists	think	that	equal	 voting	 rights	 are	 constitutive	 of	 democracy	 (e.g.	 Arneson,	 2004,	 pp.	 44-6;	Christiano,	2008,	p.	102;	Dahl,	1989,	pp.	108-20;	Estlund,	2008,	p.	65;	Pogge,	2008,	pp.	152-3;	Rawls,	1971,	pp.	222-3;	Riker,	1982,	p.	1).	Others,	however,	disagree.	John	Stuart	Mill	(1861,	ch.	8),	for	example,	held	that	democracy	is	consistent	with	unequal	distributions	 of	 voting	 rights.	 Some	 deliberative	 democrats	 offer	 conceptions	 of	democracy	 on	 which	 voting	 plays	 no	 necessary	 role	 at	 all	 (e.g.	 Gutmann	 and	
																																																						2	The	term	‘democracy’	is	derived	from	the	Greek	demokratia	–	the	people	(demos)	rule	(kratos).	3	See	Hart	(1961,	pp.	155-60)	and	Rawls	(1971,	pp.	5-6)	on	the	concept/conception	distinction	in	political	philosophy.		
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Thompson,	2004,	pp.	18-9).4	Many	theorists	hold	that	majority	rule	is	constitutive	of	democracy	(e.g.	Arneson,	2004,	pp.	44-6;	Christiano,	2008,	pp.	103-4).5	Others	deny	this	(e.g.	Dahl,	1989,	pp.	109-11;	Novak,	2014;	Saunders,	2010a).	Still	others	insist	that	democracy	requires	respect	for	individual	rights	(e.g.	Dworkin,	1996),	or	practices	 of	 mutually	 respectful	 reason-giving	 (e.g.	 Cohen,	 1989b;	 Gutmann	 and	Thompson,	 2004),	 while	 yet	 more	 democratic	 theorists	 (e.g.	 Przeworski,	 1999;	Schumpeter,	 1950,	 ch.	 23)	 resolutely	 deny	 that	 democracy	 necessarily	 involves	either.	And	so	on.	What	there	is	supposed	to	be	consensus	over	in	democratic	theory,	then,	is	unclear	to	say	the	least.		The	justification	question	asks:	which	fundamental	value,	or	values,	ground	our	basic	
normative	commitments	to	democracy?6	Why	is	it	that	citizens	have	claims	that	the	political	decisions	to	which	they	are	to	be	subject	be	made	democratically?	What	justifies	the	practical	authority	of	democratic	governments?	Instrumentalists	hold	that	democracy	is	justified	on	that	grounds	that	“…over	the	long	haul	it	gives	rise	to	results	 that	 are	 morally	 superior	 to	 the	 results	 that	 any	 feasible	 alternative	procedure	 would	 produce”	 (Arneson,	 2003,	 p.	 123).7	 Critics	 of	 such	 accounts,	however,	point	out	that	that	proposition	is	desperately	hard	to	believe.	Plato	(1974,	p.	282)	famously	thought	democracy	akin	to	a	ship	taken	over	by	an	incompetent,	drunken	crew	with	no	interest	in	listening	to	the	‘true	navigators’	aboard.	Modern	political	 science	 lends	some	support	 to	Plato’s	 scepticism.	The	probability	of	any	individual’s	being	decisive	over	any	democratic	decision	is	always	asymptotically	close	 to	zero	 (Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	 ch.	4).	This,	 in	 turn,	gives	 rise	 to	 the	phenomenon	of	‘rational	ignorance’.	Since	individual	citizens	cannot	hope	to	have	any	 impact	 on	 political	 outcomes,	 it	 is	 irrational	 to	 incur	 the	 costs	 of	 gathering	information	 (Downs,	1957;	Schumpeter,	1950,	 ch.	21).	The	 result	 is	a	 shockingly	uninformed	public.	79%	of	Americans	cannot	name	either	of	their	state’s	senators,	for	 example	 (Hardin,	 2006,	 p.	 180).	 It	 seems	 likely	 that,	 in	many	 circumstances,	
																																																						4	Though,	deliberative	democrats	(e.g.	Cohen,	2009)	do	usually	acknowledge	that	voting	is	at	least	
consistent	with	 democratic	 principles	 and	will,	 in	 practice,	 need	 to	 be	 employed	 to	 resolve	 post-deliberative	disagreements.	5	What	is	meant	by	majority	rule	is	often	left	obscure.	There	are	many	plausible	aggregation	methods,	whose	verdicts	can	conflict	(Coleman	and	Ferejohn,	1986;	Riker,	1982,	ch.	4).	6	For	a	clear	exposition	of	the	justification	question,	see	Kolodny	(2014a,	p.	197).	7	Prominent	 instrumentalists	 include	Arneson	(2003;	2004;	2009),	Landemore	(2013b),	and	Wall	(2006).	Estlund	(2008)	is	also	an	important	instrumentalist.	His	view,	however,	is	more	constrained.	Democracy	 is	 justified,	 Estlund	 claims,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that,	 of	 procedures	 which	 could	 not	 be	reasonably	rejected,	it	realises	the	highest-quality	results.	
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alternatives	to	democracy	–	epistocracy	(rule	by	the	knowledgeable),	for	example	–	would	realise	higher-quality	results	(Estlund,	2008).8		Non-instrumentalists	hold	that	democratic	procedures	themselves,	independent	of	their	results,9	are	constitutive	of	 the	requirements	of	some	fundamental	value	or	other	–	freedom	or	equality,	for	instance.10	Arguments	of	this	kind,	also,	face	heavy	criticism.	 Freedom-centric	 approaches	 confront	 the	 apparently	 devastating	
incompatibility	objection	(Christiano,	1996,	pp.	24-6).11	In	general,	to	enjoy	freedom	in	 a	 choice	 is	 to	 exercise	 control	 over	 that	 choice	 –	 to	 wit,	 for	 the	 outcome	 to	counterfactually	depend	upon	one’s	will,	and	one’s	will	alone.	Democratic	decisions,	however,	are	inherently	collective;	a	function	of	the	will	of	all	citizens	(or,	at	least,	all	 voters).	 Political	 decisions,	 then,	 can	 either	 respect	 individual	 freedom,	 or	 be	made	democratically.	They	cannot,	however,	do	both.	Equality-centric	accounts,	by	contrast,	 face	 the	 apparently	 devastating	 lottery	 objection	 (Estlund,	 2008,	 ch.	 4).	Chance-based	decision-procedures	(tossing	coins,	drawing	lots,	and	so	on)	do	not	involve	any	obvious	affront	to	individuals’	equal	moral	standing.	They	do	not,	 for	example,	establish	social	hierarchies,	express	inegalitarian	attitudes,	or	distribute	political	power	unequally.	Yet,	 surely,	we	do	not	 think	 such	procedures	are	on	a	moral	par	with	democracy.		To	be	clear,	the	point	here	is	not	that	any	of	these	objections	succeeds.	Indeed,	in	the	pages	 to	 follow,	 I	 engage	 critically	with	 several	 of	 these	 objections.	 The	 point	 is	simply	that	even	if	most	theorists	agree	that	democracy	is	justified,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	disagreement	over	the	grounds	of	that	justification.		Finally,	 the	 institutions	 question	 asks:	 which	 institutional	 arrangements	 ought	
democratic	 societies	 adopt,	 in	 practice?	 Here,	 too,	 controversy	 reigns.	 Should,	 for	example,	democracies	limit	the	decisional	power	of	the	legislature	via	rights-based	
																																																						8	 Brennan	 (2011b;	 2016)	 positively	 embraces	 this,	 arguing	 against	 democracy	 and	 in	 favour	 of	epistocracy.	I	respond	to	his	arguments	in	chapter	six.	9	Though	non-instrumentalists	–	with	the	exception	of	Waldron	(1999,	pp.	107-16)	–	do	generally	accept	that	the	instrumental	merits	of	democratic	procedures	must	also,	in	practice,	play	a	crucial	role	in	their	justification.	10	Prominent	freedom-centric	accounts	are	defended	by	Gould	(1988)	and	Pettit	(2012).	Prominent	equality-centric	accounts	are	defended	by	Beitz	(1989),	Christiano	(2008),	and	Kolodny	(2014b).	11	See	also	Altman	and	Wellman	(2009,	pp.	17-20),	Brennan	(2016,	pp.	59-60),	Buchanan	(1998),	Kolodny	(2014a,	pp.	17-8),	and	Richardson	(2002,	pp.	59-60).	
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judicial	review	(Dworkin,	1996),	or	not	(Waldron,	2006)?	Should	voting	be	optional	(Brennan,	 2014),	 or	 compulsory	 (Hill,	 2014)?	 Should	 the	 voting	 age	 be	 set	 at	eighteen	(Chan	and	Clayton,	2006),	sixteen	(Peto,	Forthcoming),	ten	(López-Guerra,	2014,	ch.	3),	or	abolished	altogether	(Cook,	2013)?	Should	–	as	in	most	democracies	(Beckman,	2014)	–	the	cognitively	disabled	be	disenfranchised	(Dahl,	1989,	pp.	124-31),	or	 should	 such	 restrictions	be	abolished	 (Barclay,	2013)?	Should	citizens	be	permitted	to	buy	and	sell	votes	(Freiman,	2014),	or	not	(Archer	and	Wilson,	2014)?	Should	 we	 work	 towards	 global	 institutions	 of	 democratic	 decision-making	(Valentini,	2014),	or	not	(Miller,	2010)?	Should	we	seek	to	make	democratic	politics	more	 deliberative	 by	 holding	 regular	 mini-publics	 (Dryzek,	 2010,	 ch.	 8),	 or	 not	(Lafont,	2015)?	Should	the	better-educated	be	given	an	increased	number	of	votes	(Caplan,	2006,	pp.	197-8),	or	not	 (Beitz,	1989,	pp.	36-40)?	And	so	on.	Consensus	(such	 as	 it	 is)	 over	 the	 value	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 abstract	 has	 yielded	 little	agreement	over	how	democracy	should	be	realised	in	practice.			Democratic	 theory,	 then,	 is	 a	 far	more	 contested	 and	 contentious	 field	 than	 the	‘consensus-narrative’	suggests.	As	Robert	Dahl	(2006,	p.	1)	puts	it,		 …there	is	no	democratic	theory	–	there	are	only	democratic	theories.		1.2.	The	Institutions	Question	in	Focus		Democratic	 theorists	 working	 within	 philosophy	 have	 (with	 some	 notable	exceptions)	 tended	 to	 concentrate	 their	 efforts	 upon	 issues	 arising	 out	 of	 the	definition	and	justification	questions.	That,	I	think,	is	a	shame.	Whatever	democracy	ultimately	 is,	 and	 whatever	 fundamental	 values	 ground	 our	 normative	commitments	 to	 it,	most	of	us	are	going	 to	 live	 in	societies	 that	are	more	or	 less	democratic	(at	least,	as	the	term	is	conventionally	employed).	These	societies	face	pressing	questions	over	how	their	political	processes	ought	to	be	structured.	The	answers	 to	 these	 questions	 often	 depend,	 in	 part,	 upon	matters	 of	 philosophical	controversy.	Whether	voting	should	be	compulsory	partially	 turns	upon	whether	there	is	a	moral	right	not	to	vote.	Whether	democracies	should	permit	individuals	to	buy	others’	votes	partially	turns	upon	whether	it	is	morally	permissible	to	convert	material	wealth	into	political	power.	And	so	on.	Philosophers,	though	not	silent	on	
	6	
such	 matters,	 have	 contributed	 far	 less	 to	 such	 discussions	 than	 they	 might	otherwise	have	done.	In	my	view,	debates	over	such	issues	have	been	impoverished	in	 consequence.	 Moreover,	 such	 debates	 have	 an	 obvious,	 immediate	 practical	relevance.	 In	 focusing	 upon	 more	 abstract	 issues,	 philosophers	 have	 missed	important	opportunities	to	contribute	to	efforts	for	progressive	democratic	reform.		For	 these	 reasons,	 my	 dissertation	 is	 focused	 squarely	 –	 and	 solely	 –	 upon	 the	institutions	 question.	 I	 will	 have	 little	 to	 say	 on	 the	 definition	 and	 justification	questions.12	 This	 raises	 two	 potential	 worries	 about	 the	 project.	 It	 is	 worth	addressing	these	at	the	outset.		The	 first	 worry	would	 hold	 that	 the	 project	 is	 incoherent.	 How	 is	 it	 possible	 to	address	 the	 institutions	 question	 without,	 first,	 developing	 an	 answer	 to	 the	definition	 question?	 The	 institutions	 question,	 after	 all,	 is	 about	 democratic	societies.	This,	however,	misunderstands	my	project.	We	obviously	cannot	proceed	without	a	 definition	of	democracy	 if	 there	 is	 to	be	any	clarity	about	 the	kinds	of	societies	whose	institutional	arrangements	we	are	concerned	with.	Yet,	my	interest	is	 not	 in	 attempting	 to	 offer	 institutional	 recommendations	 for	 democracy	 as	 it	
should,	ideally,	be	conceived.	Rather,	my	interest	is	in	the	institutional	arrangements	
real-world	societies	conventionally	regarded	as	democratic	ought	to	adopt.	We	need	simply	adopt	a	definition	of	democracy	which	picks	out	those	societies.	I,	therefore,	adopt	the	following	definition;		
Democracy:	A	system	for	 the	making	of	political	decisions	 in	which	all	sufficiently	competent	adult	citizens	have	the	right	to	vote,	and	decisions	are	 made	 by	 the	 aggregation	 of	 voters’	 equally	 weighted	 expressed	preferences,	or	by	their	elected	representatives.		This	definition	is	very	inclusive.	It	is	compatible	with	decision-making	by	a	range	of	aggregation	 methods	 –	 plurality	 rule,	 simple	 majority	 rule,	 Borda	 count,	proportional	representation,	and	so	on.	Though	it	requires	the	enfranchisement	of	all	 sufficiently	 competent	 adult	 citizens	 (universal	 suffrage,	 as	 conventionally	
																																																						12	Though,	of	course,	given	the	interconnections	between	all	three	questions,	much	of	what	I	say	may	be	relevant	to	other	discussions.	
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understood),	it	does	not	require	the	enfranchisement	of	all	and	only	such	persons.	On	 my	 definition,	 democracy	 is	 compatible	 with	 enfranchising	 children,	 the	cognitively	disabled,	resident	aliens,	and	even	foreigners.	It	requires	that	political	decisions	 be	made	 by	 voting,	 but	 not	 that	 those	 decisions	 remain	 unchecked	 by	other	branches	of	government.	Accordingly,	it	is	compatible	with,	though	does	not	require,	 constitutional	 constraints	 upon	 legislative	 authority,	 and	 rights-based	judicial	review.	It	is	compatible	with	representative	democracy,	direct	democracy,	or	a	mixture	of	the	two.	With	presidential	and	parliamentary	systems.	And	so	on.		A	definition	of	this	sort	is	appropriate	for	two	reasons.	First,	though	I	do	not	proffer	the	above	as	an	answer	to	the	definition	question,13	I	do	think	that	political	systems	in	which	decisions	are	made	by	universal	suffrage	and	 the	aggregation	of	voters’	preferences	conventionally	attract	the	label	‘democratic’.14	Second,	even	if	that	were	not	 so,	 it	 is	 certainly	 the	 case	 that	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 aggregative	 decision-making	 are	 central	 features	 of	 a	 great	many	political	 societies	 in	 the	 real	world.	Whether	or	not	those	societies	are	democratic	in	some	deep	sense,	there	is	an	urgent	need	to	know	how,	morally,	political	decision-making	procedures	in	such	societies	ought	 to	 be	 structured.	 That	 is	 the	 project	 to	 which	 my	 dissertation	 aims	 to	contribute.			The	second	worry,	then,	would	hold	that	the	project	is	pointless.	One	might	think	that	 the	 answers	 to	 the	 various	 institutional	 questions	 democratic	 societies	 face	require	and/or	follow	trivially	from	whatever	the	best	answer	to	the	justification	question	 turns	 out	 to	 be.	 The	 fundamental	 values	 which	 ultimately	 ground	 our	democratic	 commitments	 will	 have	 a	 substantial	 bearing	 upon	 the	 institutions	democracies	ought	to	adopt	in	practice.	Offering	guidance	of	this	sort	is	among	the	stated	objectives	of	at	least	some	theorists	concerned	with	the	justification	question	(e.g.	Kolodny,	2014b).	Proponents	of	this	worry	would	hold,	then,	that	there	is	no	useful	 purpose	 served	 by	 attempting	 to	 address	 the	 institutions	 question	independently	of	the	justification	question.	Answers	to	the	former	must	necessarily	be	parasitic	upon	answers	to	the	latter.	
																																																						13	 It	 would	 clearly	 be	 unsatisfactory	 on	 that	 score,	 insofar	 entails	 that	 voting	 is	 essential	 for	democracy.	 The	 Ancient	 Greeks,	 famously,	 appointed	 magistrates,	 jurors,	 and	 members	 of	 the	Council	of	the	500	by	lot,	rather	than	by	voting	(Manin,	1997,	ch.	1).	Some	contemporary	theorists	think	that,	ideally,	democracy	would	not	involve	voting	at	all	(e.g.	Cohen,	1989b).	14	Though,	of	course,	desirable	democratic	arrangements	go	well	beyond	such	institutions.	
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	The	justification	and	institutions	questions	are	obviously	related.	For	two	reasons,	however,	 answers	 to	 the	 former	 do	 not	 straightforwardly	 entail	 answers	 to	 the	latter.	 First,	 while	 all	 accounts	 of	 the	 justification	 of	 democracy	 do	 entail	 that	political	 societies	 have	 reason	 to	 adopt	 some	 institutional	 arrangements,	 none	provides	 answers	 to	 all	 the	 institutional	 questions	 that	 might	 arise.15	 Kolodny’s	(2014b)	 account,	 for	 example,	 holds	 that	 democracy	 is	 justified	 as	 a	 necessary	condition	of	affording	 individuals	equal	opportunities	 for	political	 influence.	This	obviously	 rules	 out	 certain	 institutional	 arrangements.	 Race-based	disenfranchisement,	 for	 instance.	 But	 it	 is	 simply	 silent	 over	 other	many	 others.	Whether	 voting	 should	 be	 compulsory,	 for	 example.	 We	 must	 appeal	 to	 other	considerations	to	come	to	a	determination	on	such	questions.			Second,	political	 institutions	can	affect	 the	degree	to	which	many	different	moral	values	are	realised.	Such	effects	ought	to	be	considered	in	the	design	of	democratic	institutions,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 values	 in	 question	 are	 those	 which	 ultimately	ground	 our	 democratic	 commitments.	 By	 analogy,	 public	 healthcare	 is	 plausibly	justified	as	a	means	of	promoting	human	wellbeing.	But	it	obviously	does	not	follow	that	welfarist	considerations	are	all	that	matter	in	the	design	and	operation	of	health	systems.	 Other	 values	 are	 also	 at	 stake	 –	 equality	 of	 opportunity,	 respect	 for	autonomy,	 efficiency,	 and	 so	 on.	Welfarist	 considerations	 sometimes	 need	 to	 be	traded	off	against	these	other	values.	Similarly,	then,	whatever	the	value	or	values	which	 ground	our	democratic	 commitments,	 there	will	 be	 a	wide	 range	of	 other	values	 that	 must	 also	 be	 considered	 in	 determining	 how	 democratic	 decision-procedures	ought	to	be	structured	in	practice.	Answers	to	the	justification	question	explain	why	political	decisions	ought	to	be	made	democratically	in	the	first	place.	But	they	do	not,	in	any	straightforward	way,	entail	conclusions	as	to	how	democratic	institutions	ought	to	be	structured	in	practice.		For	the	same	reasons,	answers	to	institution-level	questions	do	not	imply	answers	to	 the	 justification	 question.	 Rights-based	 judicial	 review,	 for	 example,	might	 be	justified	on	 instrumental	grounds.	But	 that	goes	no	distance	 to	 showing	 that	our	
																																																						15	 Even	 pure	 instrumentalists	 run	 out	 of	 answers	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 instrumental	 prospects	 of	competing	arrangements	are	equally	good.	
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democratic	 commitments	 are	 fundamentally	 grounded	 upon	 instrumental	considerations.	Values	can	be	relevant	 to	 the	design	and	operation	of	democratic	institutions,	without	being	the	ultimate	ground	of	their	justification.	The	justification	and	 institutions	 questions	 are,	 as	 such,	 related.	 But	 they	 are	 also,	 importantly,	independent.			Such	considerations	aside,	it	must	surely	be	acknowledged	that	questions	over	the	design	and	operation	of	democratic	institutions	are	both	ubiquitous	and	pressing	in	real-world	politics.	It	must	also	surely	be	acknowledged	that	if	democratic	theorists	were	to	wait	for	the	development	of	wholly	satisfactory	answers	to	the	definition	and	justification	questions	before	considering	institutional	matters,	we	should	be	required	 to	 wait	 a	 very	 long	 time,	 indeed.	 Debates	 over	 these	 questions	 are	centuries-old.	It	is	by	no	means	certain	that	they	shall	ever	be	satisfactorily	resolved.	If	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 progress	 on	 the	 institutions	 question,	 while	 remaining	agnostic	with	respect	to	the	justification	and	definition	questions,	then,	I	think	we	ought	to	do	so.		1.3.	Methodology		Before	giving	an	overview	of	my	dissertation,	it	is	worth	briefly	considering	some	methodological	issues.	Political	theorists	have	been	much	interested	in	the	so-called	‘ideal/non-ideal	 theory	 debate’	 in	 recent	 years.16	 For	 our	 purposes,17	 we	 can	understand	 ideal	 theories	 as	 those	 which	 presuppose	 background	 conditions	superior	in	some	relevant	respect	to	those	which	obtain	in	the	real	world,	and	non-ideal	theories	as	those	which	do	not.18	Rawls’	special	conception	of	justice	is	an	ideal	theory,	 insofar	 as	 it	 presupposes,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 all	 persons	 know,	 accept,	 and	strictly	comply	with	the	principles	of	justice	–	something	persons	do	not,	and	would	not,	do	in	real	 life	(Rawls,	1971,	pp.	142-5).	Classical	utilitarianism	is	a	non-ideal	theory,	 insofar	 as	 it	 simply	 requires	 agents	 to	 maximise	 utility,	 whatever	 the	circumstances.	
																																																						16	For	excellent	overviews,	see	Hamlin	and	Stemplowska	(2012)	and	Valentini	(2012).	17	There	are	a	range	of	ways	of	drawing	the	distinction	(Hamlin	and	Stemplowska,	2012,	pp.	48-52).	This,	however,	is	the	salient	distinction	for	our	purposes.	18	Strictly,	there	is	no	binary	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	theories	in	this	sense,	but	rather	a	continuum	of	more	and	less	idealised	theories	(Hamlin	and	Stemplowska,	2012).	We	can	set	aside	this	complication	for	our	purposes.	
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	Virtually	 all	 figures	 in	 the	 debate	 acknowledge	 the	 value	 of	 non-ideal	 theory.	 As	such,	discussion	has	largely	centred	around	the	value,	or	otherwise,	of	ideal	theory.	Critics	(e.g.	Farrelly,	2007;	Sen,	2010;	Wiens,	2012)	argue	that	ideal	theory	is	useless	when	it	comes	to	making	judgements	of	comparative	justice	in	the	real	world,	and	therefore	in	guiding	action.	The	fact	that	justice	would	require	some	course	of	action	were	the	world	a	radically	different	place	is	neither	here	nor	there	with	respect	to	what	justice	requires	in	the	world	as	it	is.	Worse,	as	the	problem	of	the	second-best	demonstrates,	 acting	 upon	 the	 recommendations	 of	 ideal	 theories	 where	 the	conditions	they	presuppose	fail	to	obtain	may	lead	to	worse	results	than	might	have	been	 realised	 had	 some	 other	 set	 of	 recommendations	 been	 followed.19	 Such	authors	urge	political	theorists	to	abandon	ideal	theory	in	favour	of	approaches	of	more	immediate	practical	application.		That	is	much	too	quick.	As	defenders	of	ideal	theory	point	out,	the	mere	fact	that	a	theory	makes	demands	of	individuals	that	they	are	unlikely	to	satisfy	does	not,	in	itself,	 show	 that	 those	 demands	 are	 not	 truly	 demands	 of	 justice.	 Our	 failure	 to	satisfy	 those	 demands	 might	 itself	 be	 morally	 criticisable	 (Estlund,	 2014).	 Such	objections	 also	 risk	 proving	 too	much.	 A	 great	 deal	 of	 academic	 work	 –	 certain	advances	in	pure	mathematics,	for	example	–	lacks	reasonably	foreseeable	practical	application,	 and	 yet	 is	 surely	 not	 valueless.	 Ideal	 theories	 may	 also	 have	 an	important	epistemic	role	to	play	in	the	development	of	non-ideal	theories	(Gilabert,	2012,	pp.	45-9).	It	may,	for	instance,	be	easier	to	identify	injustices,	the	amelioration	of	which	we	ought	to	work	towards	under	non-ideal	conditions,	if	one	is	possessed	of	a	demanding	ideal	theory.		Nevertheless,	there	is	an	important	lesson,	here:	theorists	ought	to	adopt	a	mode	of	theorising	 proportionate	 to	 their	 theoretical	 objectives.20	 Theorists	 seeking	 to	articulate	principles	for	an	ideally	just	state	of	affairs	may	reasonably	presuppose	the	absence	of,	for	example,	racial	prejudice.	Such	prejudices	are	an	obvious	source	of	social	 injustice,	and	would	as	such	be	absent	 from	ideally	 just	states	of	affairs.	Theorists	aiming	to	offer	recommendations	for	the	alleviation	of	racial	inequality	in	
																																																						19	See	Lipsey	and	Lancaster	(1956-7)	on	the	problem	of	the	second-best.	20	My	discussion	in	this	paragraph	has	been	much	informed	by	Valentini	(2009,	pp.	351-5).	
	 11	
the	real	world,	however,	obviously	ought	not	do	so.	The	existence	of	such	attitudes	is	 likely	 to	have	an	 important	bearing	on	 the	probable	success	of	any	attempt	 to	overcome	 racial	 injustice.	 Different	 theoretical	 objectives	 license	 different	theoretical	practices.		Now,	non-ideal	theorising	is	plainly	appropriate	for	my	project,	for	three	reasons.	First,	attempts	to	offer	guidance	with	respect	to	the	design,	operation,	and	reform	of	real-world	democratic	institutions	would	do	well	to	avoid	idealisation,	or	else	risk	issuing	conclusions	that	are	simply	otiose.	Second,	some	of	the	discussion	to	follow	engages	 contemporary	 critics	 of	 democratic	 institutions,	 all	 of	 whom	 claim	 that	democratic	institutions	in	the	real	world	promote	bads	of	various	kinds	(elite	bias,	for	example).	It	would	hardly	be	a	convincing	defence	of	democracy	to	argue	that	were	the	world	a	different	place,	democratic	institutions	would	not	produce	those	bads.	Finally,	democratic	institutions	will	have	a	crucial	role	to	play	in	any	attempt	to	 realise	 any	 of	 the	 more	 ambitious,	 ideal	 states	 of	 affairs	 described	 by	 other	political	theorists.	Such	attempts	will	require	collective	action,	to	be	organised	and	regulated	 by	 governments.	 Assuming	 that	 such	 governments	 will,	 generally,	 be	democratic,	 there	is	a	particular	need	to	consider	how	democratic	 institutions,	 in	the	 real	world,	might	 be	 reformed	 such	 that	 they	might	 produce	more	desirable	outcomes.			Non-ideal	theory,	however,	is	not	without	its	challenges.	There	is	massive	variability	in	real-world	conditions.	Our	knowledge	of	those	conditions	is	often	incomplete,	as	is	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 probable	 effects	 of	 introducing	 various	 institutional	reforms.	 How	 serious	 a	 difficulty	 these	 considerations	 pose	 is	 hard	 to	 judge	 in	advance	of	actually	doing	some	non-ideal	democratic	theory	and	seeing	if	concerns	arise.	Assuming	they	do,	however,	they	surely	need	not	deter	us	from	the	project	entirely.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 should	 simply	 prompt	 us	 to	 adopt	 appropriate	philosophical	practices.	Standard	philosophical	virtues	–	clarity,	precision,	honesty,	and	so	on	–	aside,	three	such	practices	will,	I	think,	be	of	particular	importance.		First,	 it	 is	 plainly	 not	 acceptable	 for	 non-ideal	 theorists	 to	 rely	 only	 upon	 folk	presuppositions	with	respect	to	the	state	of	the	world.	Modern	social	science	has	shown	us	that	a	great	many	of	these	presuppositions	are	simply	false.	Theorising	
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premised	solely	upon	such	presuppositions	is,	as	such,	of	limited	value.	Instead,	non-ideal	 theorists	 ought	 to	 be	 informed	 –	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 possible	 –	 by	 the	relevant	social	science.21	Fortunately,	political	institutions	have	been	the	object	of	intensive	study	in	the	social	sciences	for	many	decades.	We	shall	draw	heavily	upon	this	body	of	knowledge	(together	with	evidence	from	other	empirical	disciplines)	as	we	proceed.	We	cannot	reasonably	expect	all	the	presuppositions	upon	which	we	must	 rely	 to	 have	 been	 validated	 in	 this	 way.	 Some	 questions	 have	 not	 been	extensively	studied.	Controversy	prevails	over	others.	Even	with	respect	to	claims	for	which	there	is	substantial	evidence,	we	can	at	most	have	a	qualified	degree	of	confidence.	 Disconfirming	 evidence	might	 be	 produced	 in	 the	 future.	 Real-world	conditions	might	change.	Again,	however,	such	worries	need	not	deter	us.	We	must	simply	proceed	in	a	manner	suitably	deferential	to	these	difficulties.	The	latter	two	practices	are	significant	in	this	respect.			Secondly,	then,	non-ideal	theory	must	be	appropriately	qualified.	Theorists	ought	to	articulate	which	background	 conditions	 are	 presupposed	by	 their	 theory,	 be	 up-front	where	there	is	uncertainty	as	to	whether	those	conditions	obtain	in	the	real	world	(in	virtue	of	either	conflicting	evidence,	or	a	lack	thereof),	and	be	clear	that	any	normative	recommendations	they	offer	are	conditional	upon	those	background	conditions	being	in	place.			Finally,	where	non-ideal	theorists	are	in	the	business	of	arguing	for	reforms	to	social	institutions,	 they	 must	 acknowledge	 that,	 even	 armed	 with	 extensive	 empirical	research,	 the	 probable	 effects	 of	 institutional	 reforms	 are	 difficult	 to	 predict.	Reforms	 do	 not	 always	 achieve	 their	 desired	 outcomes.	 Other	 times,	 they	 have	unexpected,	 sometimes	 unwelcome,	 consequences.	 For	 that	 reason,	 non-ideal	theorising	ought	to	be	modest.	Theorists	ought	to	make	clear	that	the	claims	they	defend	 are	 pro	 tanto	 –	 susceptible	 to	 being	 outweighed	 by	 countervailing	considerations.	For	the	same	reasons,	non-ideal	theorists	should	avoid	dogmatism.	To	the	extent	that	evidence	can	be	produced	demonstrating	that	some	institutional	reform	 fails	 to	 produce	 the	 outcomes	 intended	 to	 justify	 that	 reform,	 non-ideal	theorists	must	be	prepared	to	concede	that	(absent	some	other	 justification),	 the	case	for	that	reform	fails.	
																																																						21	On	empirical	evidence	in	democratic	theory,	see	also	Fung	(2007a)	and	Thompson	(2008a).	
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	For	 better	 or	 worse,	 and	 no	 doubt	 imperfectly,	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 follow	 these	practices	in	the	chapters	that	follow.			1.4.	Dissertation	Overview		It	 would	 obviously	 be	 impossible	 for	 anyone	 to	 give	 a	 complete	 account	 of	 the	institutions	 real-world	 democracies	 ought	 to	 adopt,	 and	 I	 shall	 make	 no	 such	attempt,	here.	Rather,	I	simply	aim	to	contribute	to	a	series	of	debates	over	a	series	of	different	democratic	institutions.	The	chapters	to	follow	are	structured	around	three	particular	sub-issues.			Part	one	of	my	dissertation	is	concerned	with	how	states	may	permissibly	regulate	citizens’	 conduct	 in	 elections.	 Chapter	 two	 considers	 whether	 citizens	 who	 are	entitled	 to	 vote	 ought	 also	 be	 required	 to	 vote	 –	 i.e.	whether	 voting	 ought	 to	 be	compulsory.	As	a	complement	to	the	more	familiar	egalitarian	argument,	I	offer	a	defence	of	compulsory	voting	which	appeals	to	the	wrongness	of	free-riding.	I	also	respond	to	the	case	against	compulsory	voting,	arguing	that	its	opponents	typically	rely	upon	implausible	normative	claims,	mischaracterisations	of	compulsory	voting,	or	empirical	claims	unsupported	by	the	relevant	social	science.		Chapter	 three	 considers	 the	 morality	 of	 vote	 buying.	 I	 argue	 both	 that	 recent	arguments	in	favour	of	the	practice	are	implausible,	and	that	existing	accounts	of	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	are	unsatisfactory.	I	then	offer	a	novel,	respect-based	account	of	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying,	showing	that	it	is	able	to	resolve	several	puzzles	about	vote	buying,	and	withstand	numerous	lines	of	objection.		Part	 two	 of	 my	 dissertation	 is	 concerned	 with	 whether,	 and	 how,	 groups	conventionally	 excluded	 from	 the	 franchise	 ought	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	democratic	 process.	 Chapter	 four	 argues	 that	 the	 ongoing,	 blanket	disenfranchisement	of	children	is	unjust.	I	argue	that	all	major,	plausible	approaches	to	the	justification	of	voting	rights	converge	upon	a	requirement	that	children	from	around	the	age	of	twelve	be	enfranchised.	I	also	consider	a	range	of	objections	that	
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have	been	raised	in	the	literature	to	the	enfranchisement	of	children,	arguing	that	none	are	persuasive.		Chapter	five	considers	the	related	issue	of	persons	with	cognitive	disabilities.	Recent	work	in	democratic	theory	has	criticised	the	disenfranchisement	of	such	persons	as	unjust.	I	argue	that	this	is,	indeed,	the	case.	I	also	argue,	however,	that	hopes	that	enfranchising	the	cognitively	disabled	might	help	address	the	democratic	process’	under-responsiveness	 to	 such	 persons’	 interests	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 disappointed.	Ensuring	adequate	consideration	 for	 the	 interests	of	 the	cognitively	disabled	will	require	deeper	institutional	reform.	I	consider	a	range	of	possibilities	in	this	respect,	ultimately	 arguing	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 citizens’	 assembly	 to	 be	 tasked	 with	reviewing	existing	arrangements,	and	proposing	reforms	to	be	put	to	the	public	in	popular	referenda.		Part	 three	of	my	dissertation	 takes	a	 step	back,	 asking	whether	 the	 fundamental	institutions	of	democracy	(as	I	have	defined	it)	are	justifiable	in	light	of	two	recent,	sophisticated	 challenges.	 Chapter	 six	 considers	 the	 ‘competence	 objection’,	advanced	in	recent	literature	by	Jason	Brennan	(2011b;	2016).	Brennan	argues	that	universal	 suffrage	 is	 unjust	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 allowing	 ignorant	 and	 irrational	citizens	to	exercise	political	power	violates	others’	claims	against	exposure	to	undue	risk.	 I	 show	 that	 Brennan’s	 objection	 is	 reliant	 upon	 a	 naïve	 account	 of	 citizens’	rights	against	risk-impositions	and	that	the	objection	cannot	be	sustained	on	any	more	 plausible	 view.	 I	 also	 briefly	 consider	 the	 merits	 of	 his	 own	 preferred	‘epistocratic’	 alternative	 to	 democracy,	 and	 argue	 that	 it	would	 tend	 to	 produce	lower-quality	results	than	appropriately	structured	democracies.		Chapter	seven	considers	the	challenge	posed	by	proponents	of	chance-based	(so-called	 ‘lottocratic’)	 alternatives	 to	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 aggregative	 decision-making.	A	number	of	authors	have	recently	argued	that	substituting	either	or	both	of	these	institutions	for	a	range	of	chance-based	devices	would	either	preserve,	or	improve	upon,	the	egalitarian	appeal	of	democracy,	while	realising	higher-quality	results.	I	offer	a	three-part	response.	First,	I	argue	that	the	positive	egalitarian	case	for	these	institutions	rests	upon	a	series	of	implausible	normative	claims.	Second,	I	argue	that	the	comparative	egalitarian	merits	of	universal	suffrage	and	aggregative	
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decision-making	 are	 generally	 superior.	 Finally,	 I	 draw	 upon	 evidence	 from	 the	social	 sciences	 to	 show	 that	 such	 institutions	 are	 likely	 to	 realise	 lower-quality	results	than	well-structured	democracies.		The	dissertation	 concludes	with	 a	 brief	 summary,	 together	with	 some	 suggested	directions	for	future	research.				 	
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2.	Compelling	Citizens	to	Vote:	An	Argument	from	Free-Riding		Turnout	is	in	decline	in	established	democracies	worldwide	(Blais	and	Rubenson,	2013).	Where,	in	the	mid-1800s,	70%-80%	of	eligible	voters	regularly	participated	in	US	Presidential	 elections,	 turnout	 has	 averaged	 just	 56%	since	1972.	Average	turnout	 in	 general	 elections	 in	 the	UK	has	 fallen	 from	76.64%	during	 the	period	1945-1992,	 to	64.68%	since	1997.	Average	turnout	 in	Canadian	 federal	elections	has	fallen	from	74.52%	during	the	period	1940-1979,	to	62.5%	since	2000.	For	most	democrats,	these	trends	are	alarming.	‘Rule	by	the	people’	looks	far	less	attractive	with	 an	 effective	 electorate	 of	 only	 60%	 of	 eligible	 voters.	 Lower	 turnout	 is	associated	 with	 a	 range	 of	 ills,	 including	 increased	 inequality	 (Mueller	 and	Stratmann,	2003),	and	corruption	(Birch,	2009b,	pp.	132-3).	Compulsory	voting	is	amongst	the	most	effective	means	by	which	this	decline	might	be	arrested.	When	effectively	enforced,	compulsory	voting	increases	turnout	by	12%-13%	on	average,	and	sometimes	 far	more	 (Birch,	2009b,	 ch.	5).	Australia,	 for	example,	 introduced	compulsory	voting	in	1924,	and	saw	average	turnout	rise	from	64.2%	of	registered	voters	to	around	95%,	where	it	has	remained	ever	since	(Jackman,	2001,	p.	16316).		Compulsory	voting,	however,	is	deeply	controversial.	Its	opponents	claim	(1)	that	compulsory	voting	is	coercive,	(2)	that	coercion	is	morally	wrong	unless	backed	by	some	 compelling	 justification,	 and	 (3)	 that	 no	 such	 justification	 is	 available	 for	compulsory	voting.	This	chapter	offers	a	two-part	response	to	(3).	First,	I	offer	an	argument	 from	 free-riding	 which,	 though	 gestured	 towards	 by	 others	 (Engelen,	2007,	 pp.	 30-1;	 Galston,	 2011;	 Lijphart,	 1997,	 p.	 11;	 Waldron,	 1998,	 p.	 318;	Wertheimer,	 1975),	 has	 yet	 to	 receive	 sophisticated	 exposition	 and	 defence.22	Second,	 I	 show	 that	 the	 typical	 objections	 to	 compulsory	 voting	 rely	 upon	
																																																						22	Other	arguments	have	been	offered.	Chief	among	these	is	the	egalitarian	argument,	which	I	both	endorse,	and	discuss	in	section	three.	Others,	however,	face	difficulties.	Some	–	e.g.	Hill	(2015a,	pp.	69-71)	–	hold	that	compulsory	voting	merely	enforces	citizens’	consequentialist	duties	to	vote.	Yet	whether	 there	 is	 a	 consequentialist	 duty	 to	 vote	 is	 highly	 controversial,	 given	 the	 causal	inconsequentiality	of	individual	votes	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	2000).	Others	–	e.g.	Hasen	(1996)	–	hold	that	compulsory	voting	promotes	democratic	legitimacy	by	ensuring	high	turnout.	Yet	it	is	often	left	unclear	quite	what	democratic	 legitimacy	 is	 supposed	 to	mean	 in	 such	arguments,	 rendering	them	difficult	to	evaluate.	Still	others	–	e.g.	Hill	(2015b),	Lacroix	(2007),	and	Lardy	(2004)	–	appeal	to	non-standard	conceptions	of	liberty,	with	the	aim	of	demonstrating	that	compulsory	voting	does	not	undermine	citizens’	 freedom,	properly	understood.	Lacroix’s	argument	has	been	challenged,	 I	believe	decisively,	by	Brennan	(2014,	pp.	65-70)	and	Lever	(2008).	Lardy	and	Hill’s	arguments	are	more	convincing.	Unfortunately,	they	are	unlikely	to	be	dialectically	effective.	Critics	of	compulsory	voting	characteristically	reject	the	neo-republican	conception	of	liberty	to	which	they	appeal.	
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unsupported	 empirical	 claims,	 mischaracterisations	 of	 compulsory	 voting,	 or	implausible	normative	 commitments.	 States,	 I	 conclude,	may	permissibly	 compel	the	vast	majority	of	citizens	to	vote.		Compulsory	voting	might	be	implemented	in	many	ways.	It	is	important,	then,	to	get	clear	immediately	about	two	aspects	of	the	model	I	wish	to	defend.	First,	I	do	not	favour	systems	in	which	citizens	are	subject	to	coercible	requirements	to	cast	a	valid	ballot.	Enforcing	such	a	requirement	would	require	some	mechanism	to	check	that	citizens	had	filled	in	their	ballot	correctly,	undermining	the	secret	ballot.23	Instead,	I	favour	systems	in	which	citizens	are	required	to	either	cast	an	absentee	ballot,	or	attend	a	polling	station	on	election	day.	This	is,	in	practice,	what	compulsory	voting	generally	involves	in	the	real	world.	Citizens,	as	such,	remain	free	to	abstain	under	compulsory	 voting.	 Though	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 citizens	 go	 on	 to	 vote,	 they	 can	simply	leave	once	their	attendance	has	been	registered,	or	submit	a	spoiled	ballot.		Second,	like	most	other	proponents	of	compulsory	voting	(e.g.	Hill,	2014),	I	favour	regimes	 in	 which	 penalties	 for	 abstention	 are	 light,	 but	 effectively	 enforced.	 In	Australia,	for	instance,	abstention	is	(initially)	punishable	by	a	fine	of	$20	(Hill,	2014,	p.	 115).	 Bolivia,	 by	 contrast,	 punishes	 non-voters	 by	 barring	 them	 from	 public	employment,	 performing	 certain	 bank	 transactions,	 and	 getting	 a	 passport	 for	ninety	days	(Brennan,	2014,	p.	18).	Punishments	of	this	magnitude	are	excessive	by	standard	 criteria.	 More	 importantly,	 they	 are	 also	 probably	 unnecessary.	 While	evidence	indicates	that	effective	enforcement	is	necessary	for	compulsory	voting	to	impact	turnout,	most	effective	regimes	do	not	impose	heavy	penalties	for	abstention	(Birch,	2009b,	pp.	8-11,	89-95).			A	 further	 clarification:	 I	 wish	 to	 defend	 compulsory	 voting	 in	 the	 context	 of	referenda	and	elections	for	public	office	in	established	liberal	democracies	only.24	Other	contexts,	though	equally	important,	give	rise	to	a	range	of	considerations	that	would	 overcomplicate	 matters,	 here.	 In	 some	 developing	 nations,	 for	 example,	citizens	who	choose	to	vote	are	subject	to	threats	of	serious	harm,	a	consideration	which	obviously	militates	against	compulsory	voting.	I	therefore	set	such	contexts	
																																																						23	Some	countries	–	e.g.	Australia	–	do	technically	require	citizens	to	cast	a	valid	ballot,	though	these	requirements	are	generally	not	enforced	(Pringle,	2012).	24	I	am	heavily	indebted	to	Hill	(2014,	pp.	114-5)	throughout	this	paragraph.	
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aside.	 I	will	also	assume	that	elections	meet	 the	 following	three	conditions.	First,	there	must	be	no	excessive	barriers	to	accessing	the	franchise.	Citizens	must	not,	for	instance,	be	required	to	produce	forms	of	identification	they	are	unlikely	to	possess	in	order	to	vote.	Second,	voting	must	be	relatively	low-cost.	Citizens	must	not,	for	instance,	 be	 required	 to	 queue	 for	many	hours	 or	 travel	 great	 distances	 to	 vote.	Third,	elections	must	be	genuine	–	i.e.	they	must	not	be	a	sham,	or	otherwise	subject	to	 manipulation.	 Compulsory	 voting	 would	 obviously	 be	 perverse	 were	 voting	either	 unreasonably	 difficult,	 or	 irrelevant	 to	 political	 outcomes.	 I	 will	 simply	assume,	then,	that	elections	are	well-structured	in	the	manner	described.			Now,	though	it	has	received	very	limited	positive	defence,	the	free-riding	argument	has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 extensive	 criticism.	My	 strategy,	 then,	will	 be	 somewhat	defensive.	 I	 begin,	 in	 section	 one,	 by	 outlining	 an	 intuitively	 appealing,	 initially	plausible	version	of	the	argument,	together	with	the	key	considerations	upon	which	it	 is	 reliant.	 Section	 two	will	 then	 refine	 the	argument	 in	dialogue	with	 the	most	important	objections	raised	in	the	literature.	For	reasons	that	will	become	clear,	the	free-riding	 argument	 depends	 upon	 the	 claim	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 does	 not	entail	 unacceptable	 moral	 costs.	 Section	 three,	 then,	 responds	 to	 a	 range	 of	arguments	purporting	to	show	that	compulsory	voting	entails	such	costs.	Section	four	concludes.		2.1.	Abstention	as	Free-Riding		Free-riding	 consists	 in	 the	 consumption	 of	 collectively	 produced	 public	 goods	without	making	appropriate	contribution	to	the	system	by	which	those	goods	are	produced.	Public	goods	are	those	which	exhibit	jointness	in	supply	and/or	jointness	in	consumption	(Cullity,	2008,	p.	9).	A	good	exhibits	jointness	in	supply	if	supplying	the	good	to	one	member	of	a	group	one	means	supplying	it	to	all	members	of	that	group.	Providing	clean	air	to	some	citizens	in	a	particular	area,	for	example,	entails	providing	 clean	 air	 to	 all	 citizens	 in	 that	 area.	 A	 good	 exhibits	 jointness	 in	consumption	 where	 one	 group	 member’s	 consumption	 of	 that	 good	 does	 not	undermine	others’	consumption	of	that	good.	Buses	with	plenty	of	empty	seats,	for	example,	 exhibit	 jointness	 in	 consumption.	 My	 travelling	 on	 the	 bus	 does	 not	diminish	the	benefits	others	derive	from	bus	travel.	
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	Free-riding	 is	 objectionable	 because,	 and	 where,	 it	 is	 unfair.	 The	 unfairness	 in	question	consists	in	persons	affording	themselves	a	kind	of	objectionable	privilege:	arrogating	 certain	 preferential	 advantages	 to	 themselves,	while	 depending	 upon	others	declining	to	do	so	(Cullity,	1995,	pp.	22-32).	Fare-evaders	on	public	transport	afford	themselves	the	privilege	of	free	travel,	while	depending	upon	others’	failure	to	exercise	that	same	privilege.	The	benefits	of	public	transport	would	not	exist	at	all	were	no-one	willing	to	pay	their	fare.	Mutatis	mutandis	for	persons	who	refuse	to	pay	 their	 taxes	 while	 nevertheless	 enjoying	 the	 public	 goods	 made	 possible	 by	others’	contributions.		The	central	claim	of	this	chapter	is	that	non-voters	unfairly	free-ride	upon	voters.		Demonstrating	this	requires	us	to	show	that	voting	produces	some	public	good,	the	benefits	 of	 which	 are	 enjoyed	 by	 non-voters	 who	 fail	 to	 make	 appropriate	contribution	to	its	production.			Existing	statements	of	the	free-riding	argument,	such	as	they	are,	are	almost	never	explicit	about	what	this	public	good	is	supposed	to	be.	Wertheimer	(1975,	pp.	279-82)	is	an	important	exception.	He	claims	that	competitive	elections	are	a	public	good,	and	 that	 “[n]on-voters…	 free-ride	 upon	 voters’	 maintenance	 of	 the	 electoral	system.”	This	line	of	argument	is	too	coarse-grained.	It	may	well	be	that	non-voters	benefit	 in	 some	 sense	 from	 voters’	 efforts	 to	maintain	 the	 electoral	 system.	 The	trouble,	however,	is	that	for	non-voters	to	plausibly	count	as	free-riders,	they	must	surely	benefit	from	others’	efforts	all	things	considered.	John’s	failure	to	contribute	to	some	system	which	confers	a	$50	benefit	upon	him	while	imposing	costs	of	$500	surely	does	not	amount	to	unfair	free-riding.	And,	as	Hill	(2014,	p.	192)	points	out,	many	non-voters	are	plausibly	left	worse	off	by	others’	political	activity.	The	over-participation	of	some	groups	relative	to	others	causes	politicians	to	over-allocate	resources	to	the	former,	and	under-allocate	resources	to	the	latter.25	For	many	non-voters	 who	 belong	 to	 groups	 which	 under-participate,	 the	 costs	 of	 others’	participation,	overall,	will	plausibly	outweigh	 the	benefits.	This	 line	of	argument,	then,	will	fail	to	legitimate	compelling	a	substantial	number	of	citizens	to	vote.		
																																																						25	This	is	an	empirical	claim,	the	evidence	for	which	I	discuss	in	section	three.	
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I	 suggest	 a	 more	 fine-grained	 approach.	 Political	 participation	 by	 members	 of	particular	interest	groups	gives	politicians	incentives	to	allocate	resources	to	those	groups,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 win	 their	 electoral	 support.26	 Voters	 from	 particular	interest	groups,	then,	collectively	produce	the	good	of	governmental	responsiveness	to	those	groups.	The	benefits	of	their	doing	so	accrue	to	both	voting	and	non-voting	members	 of	 those	 groups.	 Governmental	 responsiveness	 is	 thus	 a	 public	 good,	insofar	 as	 it	 exhibits	 jointness	 in	 supply.	 Non-voters	 free-ride	 upon	 voters	 who	belong	to	the	same	interest	group	(or	groups)	as	themselves,	enjoying	the	benefits	of	 governmental	 responsiveness	 while	 failing	 to	 contribute,	 by	 voting,	 to	 its	production.			This	approach	avoids	 the	concern	raised	 in	 the	previous	paragraph.	The	costs	of	others’	political	participation	overall	may	well	outweigh	the	benefits	for	many	non-voters.	That,	however,	is	perfectly	consistent	with	non-voters	benefiting,	all	things	considered,	from	political	participation	by	members	of	the	interest	group	(or	groups)	
to	which	they	belong.	Such	non-voters	would	plausibly	be	even	worse	off,	were	it	not	for	participation	by	co-members	of	their	interest	group(s).27		The	idea	that	voters	produce	responsiveness	to	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	is	an	empirical	claim	for	which	there	is	strong	support.	Many	studies	have	demonstrated	a	 link	between	rates	of	participation	by	particular	 interest	groups,	and	the	allocation	of	resources	to	those	groups	by	government.	To	select	just	a	few	examples,	 Aidt	 and	 Dallal	 (2008)	 show	 that	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 women	 in	Western	Europe	between	1869	and	1960	brought	about	increased	spending	(0.6%-1.2%	of	GDP	in	the	short	term,	with	more	substantial	long-term	increases)	on	social	services	 upon	 which	 women	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 reliant.	 Abou-Chadi	 and	Orlowski	(2015)	show	that	that	the	abolition	of	property	and	income	requirements	on	the	franchise	in	Western	Europe	between	1880	and	1938	resulted	in	increased	spending	on	social	services	and	public	goods	upon	which	the	worse-off	were	more	
																																																						26	 By	 interest	 groups,	 I	 simply	 mean	 groups	 of	 persons	 with	 at	 least	 some	 non-trivial	 common	interests.	Each	of	us	is	a	member	of	many	different	interest	groups	–	racial,	gender,	socioeconomic,	geographical,	and	so	on.	27	This	strategy	has	two	further	benefits.	First,	it	avoids	the	concerns	raised	by	Lever	(2009,	p.	70;	2010,	 p.	 913)	 and	 Wellman	 (2005,	 pp.	 56-65)	 over	 the	 status	 of	 ‘high	 turnout’	 and	 ‘healthy	democracy’	as	public	goods.	Second,	it	helps	resolve	concerns	raised	by	Brennan	(2014,	p.	74)	and	Lever	 (2009,	 p.	 69;	 2010,	 p.	 913)	 over	 the	 consistency	 between	 the	 free-riding	 and	 egalitarian	arguments.	I	discuss	this	issue	in	section	three.	
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likely	to	be	reliant.28	Husted	and	Kenny	(1997,	pp.	56-7,	76)	show	that	the	abolition	of	poll	 taxes	and	 literacy	 tests	 in	 the	Old	South	between	1956	and	1968	brought	about	 enormous	 increases	 in	 African	 American	 participation	 and,	 subsequently,	substantial	increases	in	state	spending	on	welfare	programmes	upon	which	African	Americans	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 reliant.	 Finally,	 Martin	 (2003,	 pp.	 116-23)	demonstrates	that	counties	in	the	US	with	higher	rates	of	participation,	on	average,	receive	substantially	more	federal	grant	expenditure	per	capita	than	counties	with	lower	 rates	 of	 participation,	 even	 controlling	 for	 factors	 like	 ‘need’	 (e.g.	unemployment,	crime	rates),	and	electoral	competitiveness.		Abstention,	 then,	 is	 a	 form	 of	 free-riding.	 Non-voters	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	governmental	 responsiveness,	 produced	 by	 members	 of	 the	 interest	 groups	 to	which	they	belong	who	choose	to	vote,	without	making	appropriate	contribution	to	the	political	process	by	which	they	are	produced.		It	is	important	not	to	move	too	quickly,	however.	The	argument	relies	crucially	upon	the	 idea	 that	abstention	 is	not	merely	 free-riding,	but	unfair.	 It	 is	 this	unfairness	which	is	supposed	to	legitimate	compelling	individuals	to	vote,	just	as	the	unfairness	of	fare-evasion	and	tax-evasion	legitimates	the	punishment	of	fare-evaders	and	tax-evaders.	Not	all	free-riding,	however,	is	unfair.	The	severely	disabled,	for	example,	often	consume	public	goods	(e.g.	public	healthcare)	without	contributing	to	 their	production.	Their	failure	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	these	goods,	however,	is	surely	not	unfair.	We	cannot,	as	such,	move	automatically	from	the	claim	that	non-voters	are	free-riders	to	the	conclusion	that	citizens	may	legitimately	be	compelled	to	vote.		This,	however,	is	less	troubling	than	it	seems.	There	are	three	kinds	of	cases	in	which	it	is	standardly	recognised	that	free-riding	is	not	unfair.	First,	cases	in	which	persons	(e.g.	the	severely	disabled)	lack	the	capacity	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	public	goods	from	which	they	benefit.	Second,	cases	in	which	contributing	would	involve	costs	greater	than	the	value	of	the	benefits	received.	It	is	hardly	unfair	to	refuse	to	contribute	$200	 to	 the	production	of	 a	public	 good	worth	only	$2	 to	oneself,	 for	
																																																						28	These	results	are	conditional	upon	the	absence	of	counter-majoritarian	barriers	 to	progressive	change	(e.g.	aristocratic	upper	houses).	
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example.29	Finally,	cases	of	‘unjust	benefits’.	Suppose	some	gang	steals	all	the	cash	from	my	neighbour’s	safe.	To	apologise	for	any	disturbance,	they	leave	$500	on	the	doorstep	of	every	person	 in	 the	street.	We	should	hardly	wish	 to	conclude	 that	 I	thereby	have	obligations	to	contribute	to	 the	gang’s	 future	operations.	Rather,	as	Pasternak	(2016)	argues,	I	have	a	duty	to	transfer	the	$500	back	to	my	neighbour,	whereupon	I	shall	no	longer	be	a	beneficiary	of	the	gang’s	operations	and	therefore	no	longer	under	any	duty	of	fairness.		Non-voters,	however,	do	not	generally	fall	into	any	of	these	categories.	First,	some	citizens	abstain	out	of	a	lack	of	capacity,	but	the	vast	majority	do	not.	Reasonable	regimes	of	compulsory	voting	can	be	expected	to	make	exceptions	for	those	unable	to	vote.	Secondly,	where	elections	are	well-structured,	the	costs	of	voting	are	low.	As	 the	 evidence	 above	 indicates,	 however,	 the	 collective	 benefits	 can	 be	 very	substantial.	 Thirdly,	 there	 is	 nothing	 unjust	 about	 the	 democratic	 process	 itself.	Indeed,	many	philosophers	hold	that	democracy	is	the	sole	intrinsically	just	form	of	government	(e.g.	Beitz,	1989;	Christiano,	2008;	Kolodny,	2014b;	Pettit,	2012).			It	 is	undoubtedly	 the	case,	however,	 that	democracies	sometimes	produce	unjust	results	–	paradigmatically,	distributively	unfair	allocations	of	resources.	This	fact,	however,	 does	 not	 threaten	 the	 free-riding	 argument.	 To	 see	 this,	 we	must	 first	distinguish	two	classes	of	persons	–	persons	to	whom	resources	are	unjustly	under-allocated	by	the	democratic	process,	and	persons	to	whom	resources	are	unjustly	
over-allocated	by	the	democratic	process.30	There	 is	obviously	no	question	of	 the	duties	of	the	former	being	undermined	in	the	manner	Pasternak	describes.	Persons	to	whom	resources	are	unjustly	under-allocated,	by	definition,	do	not	have	duties	to	transfer	any	of	those	resources	to	others.		Persons	to	whom	resources	are	under-allocated	are	surely	far	more	numerous	than	persons	to	whom	resources	are	over-allocated.	Still,	I	also	think	that	the	latter	have	duties	of	fairness	to	vote,	the	injustice	of	their	distributive	shares	notwithstanding.	Notice	 that	 the	 democratic	 case	 differs	 crucially	 from	 the	 robbery	 case.	 My	neighbour	has	a	claim	on	the	entirety	of	the	$500	left	for	me	by	the	gang,	whereas	I	
																																																						29	Though,	of	course,	one	might	be	required	to	contribute	for	other	reasons.		30	For	ease	of	exposition,	I	am	speaking	in	terms	of	the	allocation	of	resources.	We	could	easily	add	in	elements	like	welfare,	liberties,	and	so	on	without	altering	the	argument.	
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have	no	claim	at	all.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	am	required	to	transfer	the	$500	to	my	 neighbour.	 The	 democratic	 case	 is	 more	 complex.	 Even	 citizens	 to	 whom	resources	are	over-allocated	by	the	democratic	system	have	claims	to	at	least	some	proportion	 of	 those	 resources.	 Access	 to	 welfare,	 social	 services,	 public	 order,	healthcare,	courts,	and	so	on	are	owed	to	all	citizens	by	the	political	community.	The	duties	 of	 citizens	 to	 whom	 resources	 are	 over-allocated	 persist	 in	 the	 face	 of	distributive	injustice.	Even	were	they	to	transfer	the	resources	to	which	they	are	not	legitimately	 entitled	 to	 others,	 they	 would	 continue	 to	 benefit	 from	 political	participation	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong,	insofar	as	such	persons’	participation	ensures	that	governments	continue	to	have	incentives	to	provide	them	resources	 to	which	they	are	 legitimately	entitled.31	The	 fact	 that	democracies	 produce	 unjust	 results,	 then,	 fails	 to	 undermine	 citizens’	 duties	 of	fairness	to	vote.32		Abstention,	 then,	 does	 not	 fall	 into	 any	 of	 the	 categories	 in	 which	 free-riding	 is	generally	regarded	as	not	unfair.	We	can	provisionally	conclude	that	abstention	is,	indeed,	unfair.	We	shall,	however,	return	to	the	issue	below.			Having	 set	 out	 the	 key	 considerations	 upon	 which	 the	 free-riding	 argument	depends,	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	state	the	initial	version	of	the	argument.		 (F1)	 It	is	unfair	for	sufficiently	capable	persons	to	benefit	from	voting	by	 members	 of	 the	 interest	 group(s)	 to	 which	 they	 belong	without	contributing,	by	voting,	to	the	political	process	by	which	those	benefits	are	produced.	(F2)	 It	is	permissible	for	the	state	to	subject	persons	to	compulsion	where	doing	so	would	substantially	prevent	such	unfairness.	(F3)	 Compelling	 sufficiently	 capable	 persons	 who	 benefit	 from	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	
																																																						31	Pasternak	(2016,	pp.	8-9)	herself	accepts	this	view	with	respect	to	cases	of	this	general	sort.	32	 One	 might	 object	 that	 persons	 to	 whom	 the	 democratic	 process	 has	 unjustly	 over-allocated	resources,	 by	 voting,	 contribute	 to	 those	 injustices	 by	 giving	 politicians	 incentives	 to	 continue	allocating	an	unjust	share	of	resources	to	the	group(s)	to	which	they	belong.	This	would	not	show	that	 citizens	 do	 not	 have	 duties	 of	 fairness	 to	 vote.	 Only,	 rather,	 that	 there	 are	 countervailing	considerations	which	might	outweigh	that	duty	in	practice.	Compulsory	voting,	fortunately,	is	likely	to	have	the	reverse	effect.	As	we	shall	argue	in	section	three,	compelling	citizens	to	vote	is	a	powerful	remedy	for	socioeconomic	bias	in	turnout	which,	in	turn,	undermines	elite	bias	in	decision-making.	
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to	 vote	would	deter	 abstention,	 substantially	preventing	 such	unfairness.	(FC)	 Therefore,	 it	 is	permissible	for	the	state	to	compel	sufficiently	capable	 persons	who	 benefit	 from	 voting	 by	members	 of	 the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	to	vote.33		The	free-riding	argument	has	much	intuitive	appeal.	However,	in	its	present	form,	the	argument	is	vulnerable	to	a	number	of	objections.	The	following	section	refines	the	argument	in	response	to	these	objections.		Before	proceeding,	however,	it	is	worth	noting	an	important	aspect	of	the	argument.	A	duty	of	fairness	to	vote	cannot	be	unconditional.	Citizens	have	such	duties	only	if	they	belong	 to	at	 least	one	group	whose	 interests	 are	advanced	by	 its	members’	political	participation.	Given	that	each	of	us	belongs	to	many	interest	groups	–	racial,	ethnic,	socioeconomic,	geographical	and	so	on	–	virtually	all	citizens	will	have	such	duties.	However,	it	is	at	least	possible	that	some	will	not.	If	no-one	from	any	of	the	groups	to	which	Juliette	belongs	chooses	to	vote,	for	example,	Juliette	obviously	has	no	duty	of	fairness	to	vote,	herself.		Is	 this	a	problem	for	 the	 free-riding	argument?	Not	a	serious	one.	As	noted,	such	persons	will	be	very	few	in	number.	There	may	also	be	other	grounds	upon	which	such	persons	might	permissibly	be	 compelled	 to	 vote	 (see	 section	 three).	 In	 any	case,	 reasonable	 regimes	 of	 compulsory	 voting	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 recognise	exemptions	in	limited	cases.	It	would	be	straightforward	to	extend	such	exemptions	to	citizens	able	to	demonstrate	that	they	do	not	benefit	from	others’	participation	in	the	manner	the	argument	requires.		2.2.	Refining	the	Free-Riding	Argument		
																																																						33	My	objective	 is	to	argue	that	compulsory	voting	is	not	unjust.	 I	 therefore	defend	only	the	weak	claim	that	states	may	permissibly	compel	citizens	to	vote,	rather	than	the	strong	claim	that	they	are	required	to	do	so.	
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Two	principal	lines	of	objection	have	been	raised	against	the	free-riding	argument.34	The	first	holds	that	duties	not	to	free-ride	are	not	justly	enforceable	–	i.e.	that	F2	is	false.	The	 second	holds	 that	 abstention	 is	not	unfair	 –	 i.e.	 that	F1	 is	 false.	 Let	us	consider	each	in	turn.		2.2.1.	Is	the	Duty	Enforceable?		Jason	Brennan	(2014,	p.	76)	holds	that	the	free-riding	argument	fails	because	duties	of	fairness	are	not	coercively	enforceable.	That	is	much	too	strong.	Few	would	deny	that	fare-evaders	and	tax-evaders	act	unfairly,	and	that	the	state	may	justifiably	take	steps	 to	 enforce	 such	persons’	duties	of	 fairness.	That	 said,	 it	 is	 true	 that	not	all	duties	of	fairness	are	coercively	enforceable.	If	Edith	agrees	to	feed	Fran’s	cat	one	night,	Fran	has	a	duty	of	fairness	to	return	the	favour.	However,	it	would	obviously	be	inappropriate	for	the	state	to	force	Fran	to	do	so.	This	raises	the	question:	are	duties	of	fairness	to	vote	enforceable?			We	can	make	progress,	here,	by	considering	what	distinguishes	our	two	paradigm	cases:	Fran,	whose	duty	cannot	be	enforced,	and	fare-evaders,	whose	duties	can	be	enforced.	 The	most	 obvious	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 enforcement	 of	 Fran’s	 duty	 to	Edith	would	carry	unacceptable	moral	costs.	Any	plausible	enforcement	mechanism	would	 be	 highly	 intrusive.	 Moreover,	 individuals’	 lives	 and	 relationships	 will	generally	 go	 better	 if	 they	 are	 required	 to	 resolve	 minor	 disputes	 of	 this	 kind	interpersonally.	 Such	 considerations	 obviously	 do	 not	 arise	 when	 compelling	citizens	 to	pay	 their	 fares	on	public	 transport.	This,	 then,	 suggests	 that	duties	of	fairness	may	only	be	enforced	where	doing	so	would	not	entail	unacceptable	moral	costs.	 Compulsory	 voting,	 surely,	 does	 not	 plausibly	 jeopardise	 our	 privacy,	 or	interpersonal	 relationships.	 Opponents	 of	 compulsory	 voting,	 however,	 have	claimed	 that	 compulsory	voting	does	entail	 a	 range	of	other	 costs.	 I	 argue	 in	 the	following	section	that	none	of	these	claims	are	plausible.	We	shall,	accordingly,	defer	discussion	of	the	issue	until	then.		
																																																						34	 Lever	 (2010,	 pp.	 913-5)	 offers	 a	 further	 objection	 that	 can	 be	 quickly	 dismissed:	 the	 primary	victims	of	abstention	are	not	voters	who	are	exploited	by	free-riding	non-voters,	but	rather	those	who	cannot	vote	who	are	deprived	of	the	political	support	they	might	have	received	had	non-voters	chosen	to	participate.	This	does	not	show	that	non-voters	are	not	unfair	free-riders.	Only,	rather,	that	abstention	also	causes	bads	of	other	kinds.	
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In	the	meantime,	however,	the	question	of	moral	costs	does	not	settle	the	matter.	Brennan	(2014,	p.	77)	does	allow	that	duties	of	fairness	may	be	enforced	if,	and	only	if,	individuals	consent	to	the	benefits	in	virtue	of	which	the	duty	arises.	This	suggests	an	 important	 disanalogy	 between	 non-voters	 and	 fare-evaders.	 Fare-evaders	consent	to	the	benefits	of	public	transport.	Non-voters,	however,	do	not	generally	consent	to	the	benefits	of	others’	political	participation.	Brennan	does	not	explain	why	this	is	so.	There	is,	however,	a	standard	argument	from	Simmons	(1979,	pp.	79-100)	 on	 this	 front.	 Voluntary	 consent,	 Simmons	 claims,	 requires	 reasonable	
alternatives.	If	Elizabeth	‘agrees’	to	give	her	purse	to	a	gunman	who	threatens	to	kill	her	if	she	does	not,	she	cannot	be	said	to	have	consented	to	giving	her	money	away,	given	the	unacceptability	of	the	alternative.	Similarly,	citizens	cannot	generally	be	said	to	have	given	consent	to	the	benefits	the	state	provides,	given	that	the	only	way	they	 can	 avoid	 receiving	 those	 benefits	 is	 by	 (the	 unreasonably	 costly	 act	 of)	emigration.	One	might,	similarly,	hold	that	non-voters	do	not	consent	to	the	benefits	of	others’	political	participation	since,	presumably,	emigration	is	also	the	only	way	in	which	one	can	avoid	receiving	those	benefits.		However,	 I	 reject	 the	 claim	 that	 duties	 of	 fairness	 are	 enforceable	 only	 where	individuals	have	given	consent.	Suppose	Jack	has	recently	been	in	an	accident.	The	‘meals	on	wheels’	service	operated	by	his	local	council	is	his	only	means	of	getting	food.	Residents	do	not	need	to	opt	in	to	the	service.	Meals	are	sent	automatically	to	residents	known	to	be	unwell.	The	council	charges	$10	a	week	for	the	service,	which	Jack	can	easily	afford.	Non-payment	 is	punishable	by	a	fine	of	$20.	 Jack	takes	the	meals	but	refuses	to	pay.	Jack	has	no	reasonable	alternative	to	accepting	the	meals.	He	would	 starve,	 otherwise.	He	 does	 not,	 therefore,	 strictly	 consent.	 Fining	 Jack,	however,	 seems	 totally	 unproblematic.	 Intuitively,	 his	willing	 acceptance	 of	 the	benefits	of	the	service	is	sufficient	to	render	him	liable	to	proportionate	coercion	if	he	refuses	to	pay.35		I	think	that	the	vast	majority	of	non-voters	can	also	be	said	to	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong.	The	intuitive	core	of	willing	acceptance	seems	well	captured	by	the	following.	
																																																						35	Rawls	(1964)	gestures	towards	a	similar	view	in	defence	of	a	duty	to	obey	the	law.	Importantly,	I	do	not	claim	that	willing	acceptance	is	necessary	to	render	duties	of	fairness	enforceable,	only	that	is	
sufficient	(provided	enforcement	does	not	entail	unacceptable	moral	costs).	
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	 For	a	beneficiary	to	have	willingly	accepted	some	benefit,	they	must	not	have	(a)	attempted	to	reject	that	benefit,	or	(b)	disgorged	that	benefit,	or	(c)	disgorged	 something	of	 equivalent	value,	or	 (d)	preferred	 that	 the	benefit	not	be	conferred	upon	them.		Jack’s	conduct	clearly	satisfies	none	of	these	conditions.	Nor	are	they	satisfied	by	the	vast	majority	of	non-voters.	Citizens	routinely	accept	the	benefits	of	government-provided	public	goods,	insofar	as	they	rely	upon	those	goods	(public	order,	roads,	transfer	payments	etc…)	in	daily	life.	The	rate	at	which	governments	provide	those	goods	to	different	interest	groups	is	a	function	of	governments’	political	incentives.	These,	in	turn,	are	partially	a	function	of	the	rate	at	which	different	interest	groups	participate	 in	 the	 political	 process.	 In	 accepting	 the	 benefits	 of	 government-provided	public	goods,	then,	non-voters	accept	–	i.e.	fail	to	reject	–	the	benefits	of	political	participation	by	members	of	 the	 interest	group(s)	 to	which	 they	belong.	Very	 few	 non-voters	 take	 steps	 to	 either	 disgorge	 these	 benefits,	 or	 objects	 of	equivalent	value	(perhaps	by	donating	some	suitable	sum	of	money	to	the	treasury).	And	it	would	be	simply	bizarre	if	non-voters	preferred	en	masse	that	these	benefits	were	not	conferred	upon	them	at	all.	Very	few,	presumably,	would	prefer	to	belong	to	groups	to	whom	governments	were	less	responsive.36		In	the	absence	of	some	further	argument,	then,	I	conclude	that	duties	of	fairness	to	vote	are	coercively	enforceable.	Engaging	with	this	line	of	objection,	however,	has	proven	fruitful.	We	have	identified	several	revisions	to	be	made	to	the	argument.	We	must	substitute	F2,	F3	and	FC	for	F2*,	F3*	and	FC*,	and	add	F4,	as	follows.		 (F2*)	 Where	persons	have	duties	of	fairness	in	virtue	of	the	receipt	of	benefits,	 and	 where	 the	 benefits	 in	 question	 were	 willingly	accepted	 by	 those	 persons,	 it	 is	 permissible	 for	 the	 state	 to	subject	 those	 persons	 to	 compulsion	 where	 doing	 so	 would	substantially	prevent	those	persons	from	violating	those	duties	
																																																						36	Outcomes	for	groups	to	whom	governments	are	under-responsive	are	typically	worse	than	those	of	other	citizens.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	plight	of	persistent	minorities	such	as	Native	Americans	(c.f.	Rights,	2003).	See	also	the	discussion	of	the	cognitively	disabled	in	chapter	five.	
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of	 fairness,	 provided	 there	 are	 no	 unacceptable	 moral	 costs	associated	with	doing	so.	(F3*)	 Compelling	 sufficiently	 capable	 persons	 who	 willingly	 accept	the	benefits	 of	 voting	by	members	of	 the	 interest	 group(s)	 to	which	 they	 belong	 to	 vote	 would	 substantially	 prevent	 such	persons	from	violating	their	duties	of	fairness	to	vote.	(F4)	 There	 are	 no	 unacceptable	 moral	 costs	 associated	 with	compelling	sufficiently	capable	persons	who	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	to	vote.		(FC*)	 Therefore,	 it	 is	permissible	for	the	state	to	compel	sufficiently	capable	persons	who	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	to	vote.		This	narrows	the	scope	of	the	argument.	Some	citizens	–	certain	radical	anarchists,	perhaps	–	do	not	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	others’	political	participation.	The	free-riding	argument	cannot	justify	compelling	such	persons	to	vote.	This	need	not	worry	 us.	 For	 the	 reasons	 outlined	 above,	 such	 persons	 are	 surely	 few	 and	 far	between.	They	might	potentially	be	permissibly	compelled	to	vote	on	other	grounds.	And,	if	not,	such	persons	might	simply	be	exempted	from	the	requirement	to	vote.		2.2.2.	Is	Abstention	Unfair?		A	more	foundational	line	of	objection	challenges	the	claim	that	abstention	is	unfair.	Three	separate	arguments	have	been	advanced	to	 this	end.	The	 first	 two	may	be	dealt	with	relatively	quickly.	The	third	is	more	complex.		First,	 Geoffrey	 Brennan	 and	 Loren	 Lomasky	 (2000,	 pp.	 75-9),	 and	 Christopher	Wellman	(2005,	pp.	59-60)	have	argued	that	abstention	is	not	unfair	because	it	does	not	 impose	 costs	 upon	 others.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 abstention	benefits	 citizens	who	choose	to	vote.	Brennan	and	Lomasky	point	out	that	shrinking	the	total	number	of	voters	increases	each	voter’s	probability	of	casting	a	decisive	ballot	and,	in	turn,	the	expected	value	of	voting.	Wellman	argues,	similarly,	that	shrinking	the	total	number	
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of	voters	increases	the	amount	of	influence	each	voter	can	be	said	to	exercise	over	the	outcome.		Both	 versions	 of	 the	 argument,	 then,	 rely	 upon	 the	 claim	 that	 unfair	 free-riding	necessarily	 involves	 imposing	 costs	 upon	 others	 (or,	 at	 least,	 failing	 to	 benefit	others).	That	view,	however,	should	be	rejected.	Construing	unfair	free-riding	in	this	way	leaves	us	unable	to	account	for	many	paradigmatic	cases.	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	Eloise	fare-evades	on	a	public	bus	with	plenty	of	empty	seats.	Eloise	surely	acts	unfairly.	However,	her	actions	are	neutral	with	respect	to	others’	welfare.	She	isn’t	preventing	anyone	from	using	the	bus.	Her	fellow	passengers	would	be	no	better	off	had	she	paid	her	fare	to	the	conductor.	Nor	do	her	actions	plausibly	affect	the	wider	community.	 A	 bus	 fare	 is	 much	 too	 trivial	 to	 make	 any	 difference	 to	 the	government’s	capacity	to	intervene	upon	citizens’	wellbeing,	for	instance.	It	 is	for	this	reason	that,	in	section	one,	we	defined	free-riding	as	a	failure	to	contribute	to	systems	for	the	production	of	public	goods	from	which	one	benefits.	The	case	of	fare-evasion	 illustrates	 that	such	 failures	do	not	necessarily	 involve	 the	 imposition	of	costs,	or	 failures	 to	confer	benefits,	upon	others.	The	 fact	 that	non-voters	benefit	voters	in	the	ways	described	is	neither	here	nor	there	with	respect	to	the	unfairness	of	abstention.37	Both	versions	of	this	challenge	simply	misfire.		Second,	Jason	Brennan	(2014,	pp.	75-82)	appeals	to	Robert	Nozick’s	(1974,	pp.	90-6)	 argument	 against	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 receipt	 of	 benefits	 is	 sufficient	 to	 ground	duties	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 system	 by	 which	 they	 are	 produced.	 If	 Anthony’s	neighbours	set	up	a	public-address	system	that	plays	music	he	occasionally	enjoys,	for	example,	he	is	surely	not	thereby	obliged	to	take	on	costs	to	help	maintain	the	system.	The	mere	fact	that	non-voters	benefit	from	others’	participation,	then,	does	not	show	that	non-voters	have	duties	to	vote.		All	 Nozick’s	 argument	 shows,	 however,	 is	 that	 persons	who	 benefit	 from	 public	goods	do	not	necessarily	have	duties	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	those	goods.	It	does	not	show	that	beneficiaries	never	have	such	duties.	Jack’s	acceptance	of	the	benefits	 of	 the	 meals	 on	 wheels	 service,	 above,	 clearly	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 duty	 to	
																																																						37	 Perhaps	 we	 might	 reinterpret	 these	 authors	 as	 claiming	 that	 the	 unfairness	 of	 abstention	 is	outweighed	by	benefits	to	voters.	This	seems	very	unpromising.	Each	citizen’s	abstention	will	have	only	a	miniscule	impact	upon	others’	chances	of	decisiveness	and	shares	of	political	influence.	
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contribute.	Similar	cases	abound.	If	one’s	neighbours	were	digging	a	well	to	provide	safe	 drinking	 water	 to	 the	 street	 where	 none	 was	 otherwise	 available,	 or	 else	eliminating	wild	animals	 that	 threaten	human	 life,	 for	 example,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	intuition	that	fairness	would	require	one	to	contribute	to	those	efforts.		As	Cullity	(2008,	pp.	13-4)	and	Klosko	(1987,	pp.	246-53),	among	others,	point	out,	what	appears	to	make	the	intuitive	difference	in	these	cases	is	the	significance	of	the	benefits	in	question.	The	ability	to	listen	to	music	chosen	by	one’s	neighbours	is	a	trivial	 benefit.	 Food,	 water,	 and	 personal	 safety	 are	 decidedly	 non-trivial.	 Nor,	importantly,	are	the	benefits	of	others’	political	participation	trivial.	Consider	the	evidence	above	linking	participation	rates	to	the	provision	of	important	goods	like	social	services	and	welfare.	Responding	to	this	criticism,	then,	simply	requires	us	to	make	a	slight	modification	to	the	argument,	substituting	F1	for	F1*.		 (F1*)	 It	 is	 unfair	 for	 sufficiently	 capable	 persons	 to	 benefit	 non-trivially	 from	 voting	 by	 members	 of	 the	 interest	 group(s)	 to	which	 they	 belong	 without	 contributing,	 by	 voting,	 to	 the	political	process	by	which	those	benefits	are	produced.		A	final	objection,	perhaps	the	most	important,	is	advanced	by	Jason	Brennan	(2014,	pp.	 79-82).	He	 argues	 that	 taking	 the	 free-riding	 argument	 seriously	 leads	 to	 an	unacceptable	 proliferation	 of	 moral	 duties.	 He	 begins	 by	 distinguishing	 the	following	two	views	of	the	moral	requirement	not	to	free-ride	(Brennan,	2014,	p.	79).		 (1)	 If	you	receive	a	good	of	type	P,	then	you	must	provide	goods	of	type	P	back	in	return.	(2)	 If	 you	 receive	 a	 good	 of	 type	 P,	 then	 you	 must	 provide	sufficiently	valuable	goods	of	any	type	back	in	return.		For	 abstention	 to	 generally	 amount	 to	 free-riding,	 we	 must	 be	 required	 to	reciprocate	for	the	benefits	of	voting	by	voting,	ourselves.	Under	(2),	citizens	would	be	able	to	make	up	for	failures	to	vote	in	other	ways	–	paying	taxes,	raising	children,	making	art,	and	so	on.	Moreover,	Brennan	(2014,	p.	81)	claims,	since	almost	all	of	us	
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make	some	net	positive	contribution	to	society	over	our	lifetimes,	non-voters,	under	(2),	would	almost	never	amount	to	free-riders.	The	free-riding	argument,	then,	must	rely	upon	(1).	(1),	however,	entails	implausible	conclusions.	Each	of	us	is	constantly	in	receipt	of	a	vast	range	of	goods	produced	by	others,	given	the	division	of	labour	characteristic	of	modern	societies.	Under	(1),	 then,	citizens	would	be	subject	to	a	plethora	of	requirements	to	provide	a	vast	range	of	goods	to	a	vast	range	of	people.	This	radically	misdescribes	our	moral	situation.	We	simply	are	not	subject	to	such	duties.	We	ought,	then,	reject	(1)	in	favour	of	(2).	As	we	have	already	pointed	out,	however,	(2)	undermines	the	claim	that	non-voters	are	free-riders.		Brennan,	 however,	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 false	 choice.	 Both	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 should	 be	rejected.	They	are	both	too	broad,	making	unrestricted	claims	as	to	what	individuals	are	required	to	do	where	they	receive	goods	of	any	kind.	As	a	conceptual	matter,	however,	free-riding	occurs	only	where	individuals	benefit	in	a	very	particular	way	–	 i.e.	 from	 others’	 production	 of	 public	 goods.	 As	 we	 have	 just	 seen,	 duties	 to	contribute	 to	 the	 production	 of	 public	 goods	 arise	 only	 where	 we	 benefit	 non-trivially	from	those	goods.	And,	as	we	have	also	just	seen,	our	duties	not	to	free-ride	do	 not	 necessarily	 require	 us	 to	 provide	 goods	 to	 others,	 but	 rather	 to	 make	
appropriate	contributions	to	systems	for	the	production	of	public	goods	from	which	we	benefit.	The	real	choice,	then,	is	between	the	following.			 (1’)	 If	you	benefit	non-trivially	from	some	public	good	P,	 then	you	must	 make	 appropriate	 contribution	 to	 the	 system	 by	 which	that	public	good	is	produced.		(2’)	 If	you	benefit	non-trivially	from	some	public	good	P,	 then	you	must	make	appropriate	contribution	to	some	system	by	which	some	public	good	is	produced.		Insofar	as	the	free-riding	argument	relies	upon	the	claim	that	citizens	who	benefit	from	others’	contributions	to	the	political	process	have	duties	to	contribute	to	the	political	 process	 themselves,	 the	 free-riding	 argument	 must	 depend	 upon	 (1’).	Whether	 we	 should	 accept	 (1’)	 or	 (2’)	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 which	 best	 captures	 our	
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intuitions.	In	this	respect,	(1’)	has	a	clear	advantage.38	We	do	not	generally	think	that	persons	who	have	made	even	very	substantial	contributions	to	some	system	for	the	production	 of	 public	 goods	 are	 thereby	 ‘off	 the	 hook’	 with	 respect	 to	 others.	Georgina’s	failure	to	buy	a	ticket	on	a	public	bus	seems	no	more	or	less	unfair	if	she	is	an	average	citizen	or	a	self-made	millionaire	who	employs	hundreds	of	people	and	pays	 a	 great	deal	 in	 tax.	Either	way,	Georgina	benefits	 from	 the	public	 transport	system,	and	ought	to	make	appropriate	contribution	to	that	system.		Opponents	 are	 likely	 to	 protest	 that	 (1’)	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 its	 own	 proliferation	objection.	 Notice,	 however,	 that	 (1’)	 is	 far	 narrower	 than	 (1).	 (1’)	 only	 requires	persons	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	production	of	public	goods	 from	which	 they	benefit	non-trivially.	 Many	 public	 goods	 provide	 us	 with	 trivial	 benefits,	 only.	 My	neighbour’s	well-kept	garden	might	be	a	public	good,	 insofar	as	anyone	can	 take	pleasure	in	looking	at	it.	But,	given	the	triviality	of	this	benefit,	(1’)	gives	rise	to	no	requirement	to	contribute	to	its	production.	Many	of	the	other	goods	from	which	we	benefit	are	not	public	goods,	at	all.	Most	goods	traded	on	the	economic	market,	for	example,	exhibit	neither	jointness	in	consumption,	nor	jointness	in	supply.		Of	 course,	 there	 are	 significant	 public	 goods	 from	 which	 we	 derive	 non-trivial	benefits	 –	 public	 order,	 clean	 air,	 public	 education,	 public	 health,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 to	which	we	are	obliged	to	contribute	under	(1’).	I	deny,	however,	that	this	is	in	any	way	problematic.	 In	 the	 first	place,	 citizens	are	able	 to	discharge	almost	all	 their	duties	to	contribute	to	such	goods	by	simply	paying	tax.	Private	actors	usually	do	not	produce	such	goods,	given	the	famously	difficult	co-ordination	problems	which	attend	private	efforts	to	do	so	(Olson,	1965).	Co-ordinating	the	production	of	such	goods	is	amongst	the	most	important	functions	of	the	state.	Governments	act	as	a	‘middle-man’,	collecting	each	person’s	contributions	via	taxation,	and	distributing	them	to	the	systems	by	which	those	goods	are	produced.	Some	significant	public	goods,	 of	 course,	 are	 provided	 by	 non-government	 organisations	 –	 charities	 and	churches	for	example.	But	even	in	these	cases,	citizens	generally	contribute	in	virtue	of	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 organisations	 are	 generally	 untaxed.	 Citizens	 are	 therefore	
																																																						38	 Philip	 Pettit	 has	 pointed	 out	 to	me	 that	 (2’)	 would	 have	 the	 additional	 disadvantage	 of	 being	virtually	impossible	to	institutionalise	and	enforce.	
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required	to	pay	higher	rates	of	taxation	to	fund	other	public	goods,	in	virtue	of	the	forgone	revenue	–	effectively	subsidising	non-government	operations.		In	the	small	number	of	remaining	cases	wherein	we	derive	non-trivial	benefits	from	public	 goods	 that	 are	 neither	 state-provided	 nor	 citizen-supported,	 I	 think	 we	should	accept	that	citizens	have	duties	to	contribute.	Georgina	simply	does	seem	to	have	 a	 duty	 of	 fairness	 to	 pay	 the	 bus	 fare,	 no	 matter	 the	 magnitude	 of	 her	contributions	in	other	domains.	Alternatively,	consider	again	the	case	in	which	one’s	neighbours	are	digging	a	well	to	provide	drinking	water	to	the	street.	One	simply	
does	seem	to	have	duties	to	contribute	to	their	efforts,	no	matter	the	magnitude	of	one’s	 other	 contributions.39	 (1’),	 perhaps,	 will	 require	 many	 of	 us	 to	 contribute	more,	and	in	more	ways,	than	we	do	at	present.40	In	my	view,	we	should	embrace	that	conclusion.	Many	of	us	do	free-ride	upon	others.	We	are	rightly	criticisable	as	such.		Brennan’s	critique,	however,	does	contain	a	grain	of	truth.	(1’)	requires	citizens	to	make	appropriate	contributions	to	systems	for	the	production	of	public	goods	from	which	 they	 benefit.	 Yet	 appropriate	 contributions	 are	 not	 necessarily	 identical	contributions.	 I	 hardly	 treat	 my	 neighbours	 unfairly	 if	 I	 contribute	 to	 the	construction	of	the	well	by	making	the	bricks	for	the	top	of	the	well	while	they	dig	the	hole.	 In	the	political	case,	citizens	have	duties	of	 fairness	to	contribute	to	the	political	process	by	which	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	produce	 the	 good	 of	 governmental	 responsiveness.	 But	 citizens	might	 discharge	such	duties	by	means	other	than	voting.	If	Irene	fails	to	vote	because	she	is	too	busy	ferrying	 dozens	 of	 members	 of	 her	 interest	 group	 who	 would	 otherwise	 have	abstained	to	the	polls,	for	example,	she	can	hardly	be	accused	of	free-riding.			This	is	hardly	a	serious	problem	for	the	argument.	Presumably,	very	few	citizens	fail	to	 vote	 in	 order	 to	 make	 political	 contributions	 of	 other	 kinds.	 Such	 persons’	
																																																						39	Someone	might	object	by	appeal	to	a	counterexample	of	the	following	sort.	Suppose	that,	while	the	neighbours	dug	the	well,	you	cleared	away	a	large	pile	of	garbage	from	the	street.	It	hardly	seems	fair	to	describe	you	as	a	free-rider,	though	you	fail	to	contribute	to	the	digging	of	the	well.	All	this	shows,	however,	 is	 that	 we	 need	 to	 be	 careful	 in	 how	we	 individuate	 public	 goods.	 Both	 you	 and	 your	neighbours	are	contributing	to	the	same	public	good	–	the	liveability	of	the	street	–	in	different	ways.	I	thank	Philip	Pettit	for	helpful	advice	on	this	point.	40	Notice	also	that	(2’)	would	be	no	less	demanding	than	(1’).	(2’)	does	not	give	rise	to	less	demanding	duties.	It	merely	affords	persons	greater	latitude	with	the	respect	to	how	they	can	fulfil	those	duties.	
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compulsion	 might	 be	 legitimated	 on	 other	 grounds.	 And,	 if	 such	 grounds	 are	unavailable,	further	exemptions	might	easily	be	introduced.	Still,	the	argument	must	be	modified	slightly	 to	accommodate	such	persons.	F1*,	F3*,	F4	and	FC*	must	be	substituted	 for	 F1**,	 F3**,	 F4*	 and	 FC**,	 as	 follows.	 Since	 these	 are	 the	 final	refinements,	we	can	now	state	the	final	version	of	the	argument	in	full.		 (F1**)	 It	 is	 unfair	 for	 sufficiently	 capable	 persons	 to	 benefit	 non-trivially	 from	 voting	 by	 members	 of	 the	 interest	 group(s)	 to	which	 they	 belong	 without	 either	 voting,	 or	 making	 some	equivalent	contribution	to	the	political	process	by	which	those	benefits	are	produced.	(F2*)	 Where	persons	have	duties	of	fairness	in	virtue	of	the	receipt	of	benefits,	 and	 where	 the	 benefits	 in	 question	 were	 willingly	accepted	 by	 those	 persons,	 it	 is	 permissible	 for	 the	 state	 to	subject	 those	 persons	 to	 compulsion	 where	 doing	 so	 would	substantially	prevent	those	persons	from	violating	those	duties	of	 fairness,	 provided	 there	 are	 no	 unacceptable	 moral	 costs	associated	with	doing	so.	(F3**)	 Compelling	 sufficiently	 capable	 persons	 who	 willingly	 accept	the	benefits	 of	 voting	by	members	of	 the	 interest	 group(s)	 to	which	 they	 belong,	 without	 making	 some	 equivalent	contribution	to	the	political	process	by	which	those	benefits	are	produced,	 to	 vote	 would	 substantially	 prevent	 such	 persons	from	violating	their	duties	of	fairness	to	vote.	(F4*)	 There	 are	 no	 unacceptable	 moral	 costs	 associated	 with	compelling	sufficiently	capable	persons	who	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	 belong,	without	making	 some	 equivalent	 contribution	 to	the	political	process	by	which	 those	benefits	are	produced,	 to	vote.		(FC**)	 Therefore,	 it	 is	permissible	for	the	state	to	compel	sufficiently	capable	persons	who	willingly	accept	the	benefits	of	voting	by	members	of	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong,	without	
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making	some	equivalent	contribution	to	the	political	process	by	which	those	benefits	are	produced,	to	vote.		The	 refinement	 of	 the	 argument	 is	 complete.	 Its	 defence,	 however,	 is	 not.	 The	argument	relies	crucially	upon	the	claim	that	compulsory	voting	does	not	involve	unacceptable	moral	costs	(i.e.	F4*).	As	noted	above,	however,	this	is	controversial.	Critics	 often	 claim	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 imposes	 unacceptable	moral	 costs.	 A	satisfactory	defence	of	the	free-riding	argument,	then,	must	respond	to	these	claims.		2.3.	The	Purported	Moral	Costs	of	Compulsory	Voting		Opponents	of	compulsory	voting	have	advanced	three	lines	of	argument	to	the	effect	that	compulsory	voting	entails	unacceptable	moral	costs.41	These	hold,	respectively,	that	compulsory	voting	leads	to	lower-quality	decisions,	undermines	the	valuable	political	effects	of	abstention,	and	violates	a	purported	right	not	to	vote.	As	we	shall	see,	 these	 objections	 all	 rely	 upon	 implausible	 normative	 premises,	mischaracterisations	 of	 compulsory	 voting,	 or	 empirical	 claims	 that	 are	unsupported	by	the	relevant	social	science.			2.3.1.	Lower-Quality	Decisions		The	 most	 popular	 line	 of	 objection	 to	 compulsory	 voting	 holds	 that	 compelling	citizens	 to	 vote	 leads	 to	 lower-quality	 political	 decisions.42	 Empirical	 evidence	suggests	that	habitual	non-voters	are	likely	to	be	less	informed	than	regular	voters	(Citrin	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Compulsory	 voting	 compels	 persons	 who	 would	 otherwise	habitually	 abstain	 to	 vote.	 The	 median	 voter,	 then,	 is	 less	 well	 informed	 under	compulsory	voting.	Lower-quality	political	decisions,	critics	claim,	are	the	inevitable	result.			However,	 evidence	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 produces	 lower-quality	 decisions,	 in	practice,	is	thin	on	the	ground.	There	are	at	least	two	good	reasons	to	doubt	whether	such	evidence	is	likely	to	be	forthcoming.		
																																																						41	For	other	important	responses	to	these	and	other	objections,	see	Hill	(2014,	ch.s	7-8).	42	See,	for	example,	Brennan	(2014,	ch.	4),	Caplan	(2006,	pp.	156-8),	and	Ciccone	(2002,	p.	348-50).	
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	First,	Lijphart	(1997,	p.	10)	conjectures	that	“…mandatory	voting	may	serve	as	an	incentive	to	become	better	informed,”	mitigating	these	concerns.	Some	studies	(e.g.	Birch,	 2009b,	p.	 67;	 Loewen	et	 al.,	 2008)	 find	no	evidence	of	 such	an	 effect.	The	majority	 of	 studies,	 however,	 lend	 support	 to	 Lijphart’s	 conjecture.	 Shineman	(Forthcoming),	for	example,	surveyed	two	groups	of	around	100	voters	prior	to	a	San	Francisco	municipal	election.	One	group	was	issued	with	a	$25	gift	card,	to	be	activated	only	if	they	voted.	Post-election	surveys	showed	that	the	group	who	stood	to	lose	$25	by	not	voting	gathered	substantially	more	information	than	the	control.	In	 a	 cross-national	 study	 of	 37	 countries,	 Sheppard	 (2015)	 finds	 that	 where	compulsory	voting	is	effectively	enforced,	controlling	for	other	factors,	citizens	have	greater	average	levels	of	political	knowledge,	and	there	is	a	smaller	knowledge	gap	between	well-educated	 and	 under-educated	 citizens.	 Carreras	 (2016)	 finds,	 in	 a	study	of	Latin	American	nations,	that	compulsory	voting	increases	overall	levels	of	political	 discussion,	 the	 proportion	 of	 individuals	 with	 party	 affiliations,	 and	attention	to	political	news	among	the	poorly	educated.	In	a	cross-national	study	of	12	European	nations,	Gordon	and	Segura	(1997,	pp.	137-41)	and	Berggren	(2001)	found	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 citizens’	 ability	 to	 locate	political	parties	on	the	ideological	spectrum.		Finally,	in	a	study	comparing	Austrian	provinces	in	which	voting	is	compulsory	to	those	in	which	it	is	voluntary,	Shineman	(2012)	finds	that	compulsory	voting	has	a	significant,	positive	impact	upon	citizens’	levels	 of	 political	 knowledge.	 It	 appears,	 then,	 that	 compulsory	 voting	mitigates	voter	ignorance,	and	thus	the	risk	of	lower-quality	decisions.		Second,	even	if	future	research	tells	against	Lijphart’s	conjecture,	this	may	not	much	matter.	A	substantial	body	of	evidence	indicates	that	uninformed	voters	are	often	able	 to	 emulate	 better-informed	 voters	 by	 employing	 informational	 shortcuts	(Boudreau,	 2009;	 Lupia	 and	 McCubbins,	 1998).	 Merely	 knowing	 a	 candidate’s	partisan	 affiliation,	 race,	 or	 gender	 is	 often	 sufficient	 for	 relatively	 uninformed	citizens	 to	 vote	 as	 they	 would	 have	 done	 had	 they	 been	 better	 informed.	Informational	shortcuts	are	no	panacea.	They	can	go	wrong	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Still,	they	plausibly	allow	relatively	uninformed	persons	–	including	habitual	non-voters	–	to	vote	as	though	they	were	well	informed	in	(at	the	very	least)	a	wide	range	of	cases,	again	mitigating	the	risks	of	lower-quality	decisions.	
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	On	the	other	hand,	we	must	weigh	the	(rather	speculative)	risks	of	 lower-quality	decisions	 against	 the	 chance	 of	 higher-quality	 decisions.	 To	 this	 end,	 other	proponents	 of	 compulsory	 voting	 have	mounted	 a	 powerful	 case	 to	 suggest	 that	compulsory	voting	is	likely	to	produce	more	egalitarian	outcomes	(Birch,	2009a,	pp.	23-4;	Engelen,	2007,	p.	25;	Hill,	2014,	ch.	6;	Lijphart,	1997).	It	is	well-accepted	that	voluntary	 voting,	 where	 large	 numbers	 of	 individuals	 abstain,	 leads	 to	 heavy	socioeconomic	 bias	 in	 turnout.	 Disadvantaged	 social	 groups	 –	 e.g.	 young	 people,	poor	 people,	 the	 unemployed,	 the	 poorly	 educated,	 the	 homeless,	 indigenous	people,	prisoners,	persons	with	poor	language	skills	–	are	substantially	less	likely	to	vote	than	others	(Hill,	2014,	p.	132).	This,	proponents	of	the	egalitarian	argument	claim,	contributes	to	elite	bias	in	political	decision-making.	As	discussed	in	section	one,	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 politicians	 are	 substantially	 more	 attentive	 to	 the	interests	 of	 groups	 who	 vote	 in	 greater	 numbers.	 Compelling	 citizens	 to	 vote	substantially	 addresses	 socioeconomic	 bias	 in	 turnout	 (Singh,	 2015).	We	 should	expect	compulsory	voting,	then,	to	partially	mitigate	elite	bias	in	political	decision-making.		A	growing	body	of	empirical	evidence	lends	support	to	the	egalitarian	argument.	In	a	cross-national	study	of	41	democracies	in	1991,	O'Toole	and	Stroble	(1995)	found	that	compulsory	voting	is	associated	with	higher	levels	of	government	spending	on	services	 upon	 which	 the	 worse-off	 are	 more	 typically	 reliant	 (e.g.	 health,	 and	housing).	In	a	cross-national	study	of	91	countries	between	1960	and	2000,	Chong	and	Olivera	(2008)	show	that	compulsory	voting	–	when	effectively	enforced	–	leads	to	Gini	coefficients	3.7	points	lower	on	average.43	Birch	(2009b,	p.	131)	finds	similar	results	in	cross-national	analyses	of	Western	Europe	and	Latin	America.	In	a	study	of	direct	referenda	in	Swiss	Cantons	over	the	period	1908-1970,	Bechtel	et	al.	(2016,	p.	764)	find	that	the	vote	share	for	redistributive	policy	measures	was	11%	higher	on	average	in	Cantons	that	enforced	compulsory	voting.	Carey	and	Horiuchi	(2017,	pp.	125-35)	find	that	Venezuela’s	abolition	of	compulsory	voting	 in	1993	sharply	depressed	turnout	(from	80%	in	1988	to	54%	in	1993),	and	lead	to	increased	Gini	coefficients.	 Finally,	 Fowler	 (2013,	 pp.	 173-7)	 finds	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	compulsory	 voting	 in	 Australia	 in	 1924	 lead	 to	 increased	 federal	 spending	 on	
																																																						43	Lower	Gini	coefficients	imply	a	more	equal	distribution	of	income.	
	38	
pensions,	 more	 strongly	 favoured	 by	 working-class	 voters	 at	 that	 time.44	 This	evidence	 powerfully	 suggests,	 then,	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 leads	 to	 more	egalitarian	 outcomes	 –	 and,	 thus,	 better	 outcomes	 (at	 least	 with	 respect	 to	equality).45		Perhaps,	however,	it	is	not	open	to	proponents	of	the	free-riding	argument	to	appeal	to	such	benefits.	Brennan	(2014,	p.	74)	and	Lever	(2009,	p.	69;	2010,	p.	913)	have	objected	that	the	free-riding	and	egalitarian	arguments	are	inconsistent.	According	to	Brennan,	 the	 free-riding	 argument	depends	upon	 the	 claim	 that	 voters	 confer	benefits	 upon	 non-voters,	 whereas	 the	 egalitarian	 argument	 depends	 upon	 the	claim	 that	 voters	 harm	 non-voters	 by	 causing	 governments	 to	 over-allocate	resources	to	the	former	at	the	latter’s	expense.	According	to	Lever,	the	free-riding	argument	depends	upon	the	claim	that	non-voters	self-interestedly	exploit	voters,	whereas	the	egalitarian	argument	depends	upon	the	claim	that	non-voters	fail	to	act	in	their	self-interest,	and	must	be	compelled	to	do	so.		Brennan,	 however,	 mischaracterises	 both	 arguments.	 The	 egalitarian	 argument	relies	only	upon	the	claim	that	members	of	interest	groups	that	under-participate	are	 harmed	 by	 the	 relative	 over-participation	 of	 other	 interest	 groups.	 My	 free-riding	 argument	 depends	 only	 upon	 the	 claim	 that	 non-voters	 are	 benefited	 by	members	 of	 their	 own	 interest	 group(s)	 who	 choose	 to	 vote.	 These	 claims	 are	obviously	consistent.		Lever,	by	contrast,	conflates	two	distinct	questions:	whether	non-voters	act	in	a	self-interested	 manner	 as	 individuals,	 and	 whether	 non-voters’	 collective	 abstention	promotes	 their	 interests.	 The	 free-riding	 argument	 relies	 upon	 an	 affirmative	answer	 to	 the	 former,	 but	 is	 neutral	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 latter.	 The	 egalitarian	
																																																						44	Brennan	 (2014,	pp.	39-42)	attempts	 to	explain	 these	 results	away,	arguing	 that	 countries	with	egalitarian	political	cultures	are	likely	to	support	both	reducing	inequality,	and	compulsory	voting.	Egalitarian	outcomes	and	compulsory	voting,	therefore,	have	a	common	cause.	We	should	reject	this	hypothesis	 for	 three	 reasons.	 First,	 Brennan	 offers	 no	 evidence	 in	 its	 favour.	 Second,	 there	 is	substantial	 evidence	 that	 higher	 turnout	 overall	 (and	 thus	 higher	 turnout	 among	 the	worse-off)	promotes	more	egalitarian	outcomes,	with	or	without	compulsory	voting	(c.f.	Avery,	2015;	Fumagalli	and	Narciso,	 2012;	Mueller	 and	 Stratmann,	 2003).	 Third,	 several	 of	 these	 studies	 –	Bechtel	 et	 al.	(2016),	Carey	and	Horiuchi	(2017),	and	Fowler	(2013)	–	are	single-case	studies,	demonstrating	that	compulsory	voting	has	an	equalising	effect	internal	to	particular	political	cultures.	45	As	Goodin	(1995,	p.	23)	points	out,	the	law	of	diminishing	marginal	utility,	suggests	that	more	equal	distributions	of	resources	will	also	tend	to	lead	to	higher	levels	of	wellbeing	overall.	
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argument	relies	upon	a	negative	answer	to	the	latter,	but	is	neutral	with	respect	to	the	 former.	 This,	 too,	 is	 perfectly	 consistent.	 It	 is	 overwhelmingly	 plausible	 that	individually	self-interested	conduct	causes	collective	abstention,	and	its	attendant	harms.	 Individual	 voters	 know,	 in	 all	 real-world	 elections,	 that	 they	 can	 neither	decide	 political	 outcomes,	 nor	 probabilify	 political	 outcomes	 to	 any	 non-trivial	degree	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	4).	As	such,	it	is	in	each	individual	voter’s	rational	self-interest	to	abstain	–	even	if	mass	abstention	by	the	interest	group(s)	to	which	they	belong	will	lead	to	worse	results,	overall,	than	collective	participation.	There	is	no	inconsistency,	then,	between	the	claims	that	abstention	is	individually	self-interested,	and	collectively	harmful	for	groups	that	under-participate.	There	is,	as	such,	no	inconsistency	between	the	free-riding	and	egalitarian	arguments.		All	 this	 in	hand,	we	can	confidently	reject	 this	 first	 line	of	objection.	The	risks	of	lower-quality	 decisions	 under	 compulsory	 voting	 are	 highly	 speculative.	 The	benefits,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 demonstrable	 –	 and	 perfectly	 available	 to	proponents	of	the	free-riding	argument.		2.3.2.	Valuable	Political	Effects		Several	authors	have	argued	that	abstention	has	valuable	political	effects	that	would	be	 lost	 under	 compulsory	 voting.	 First,	 Swenson	 (2007,	 pp.	 540-1)	 appeals	 to	Downs'	(1957,	p.	119)	observation	that	more	extreme	supporters	of	political	parties	can	deter	those	parties	from	moving	towards	the	median	by	threatening	to	abstain.	Citizens	would	be	deprived	of	 this	 ability	 under	 compulsory	 voting.	 It	 is	 unclear	whether	this	would	be	such	a	loss.	If	the	median	voter	is	more	reasonable	than	the	extremes,	then	it	is	surely	better	if	parties	move	towards	that	position.	Moreover,	as	pointed	out	 earlier,	 compulsory	voting	does	not	deprive	 citizens	of	 the	ability	 to	abstain.	 Citizens	 can	 leave	 the	 polling	 station	 once	 their	 attendance	 has	 been	registered,	without	voting.		Secondly,	Ciccone	(2002,	p.	348)	argues	that	abstention	prevents	unaffected	and/or	indifferent	 voters	 from	 distorting	 political	 outcomes.	 The	 potential	 harms	 are	twofold.	 First,	 voting	 by	 unaffected	 and/or	 indifferent	 citizens	 may	 lead	 to	 bad	outcomes	from	the	perspective	of	affected	and/or	non-indifferent	citizens.	Childless	
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parents	voting	in	school	board	elections,	for	example,	may	select	candidates	harmful	to	the	school	system.	Second,	if	the	number	of	indifferent	and/or	unaffected	voters	is	greater	than	the	number	of	affected	and/or	non-indifferent	voters,	politicians	will	have	 incentives	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	 former,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 latter.	 Indifferent	and/or	unaffected	voters	abstain	where	voting	is	optional.	Not	so,	obviously,	under	compulsory	voting.			I	 deny,	 however,	 that	 unaffected	 or	 indifferent	 voters	 pose	 such	 difficulties.	Unaffected	 voters	 simply	 do	 not	 exist	 in	 large-scale	 political	 decisions.	 Political	decisions	characteristically	concern	bundles	of	policies,	at	least	some	of	which	are	likely	to	impact	all	members	of	the	relevant	community.	There	are	perhaps	some,	limited	cases	where	groups	who	cannot	possibly	be	affected	by	some	decision	can	be	 clearly	 identified	 (e.g.	 school	 board	 elections).	 In	 those	 cases,	 perhaps,	compulsory	 voting	 is	 inappropriate.	 It	 obviously	 does	 not	 follow,	 however,	 that	compulsory	voting	is	inappropriate	across	the	board.		Genuinely	 indifferent	voters	can	be	expected	 to	vote	randomly,	distributing	 their	votes	 evenly	 over	 the	 options	 on	 the	 agenda,	 and	 thereby	 making	 virtually	 no	difference	to	the	probabilities	of	the	various	outcomes	emerging	as	the	social	choice	(Goodin,	2007,	pp.	58-9).	‘Indifferent’	voters	to	whom	politicians	successfully	appeal	are,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 no	 longer	 truly	 indifferent.	 In	 that	 case,	 there	 is	 presumably	nothing	problematic	about	such	voters	exercising	influence	over	political	outcomes,	alongside	other	voters.		Finally,	 Blomberg	 (1995,	 pp.	 1024-5)	 holds	 that	 widespread	 abstention	 is	 an	efficient	means	of	encouraging	qualified	 individuals	to	run	for	office.	Widespread	abstention	 implies	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 large	 constituency	 of	 voters	who	might	 be	mobilised	by	an	exceptional	candidate.	Blomberg	offers	no	evidence	in	support	of	this	claim,	and	I	can	find	none.	There	are	good	reasons	to	be	sceptical	that	any	such	evidence	 is	 likely	 to	be	 forthcoming.	Abstention	 in	previous	elections	 is	 a	 strong	predictor	of	abstention	in	future	elections	(Fowler,	2006;	Plutzer,	2002).	Candidates	who	seek	to	mobilise	large	numbers	of	habitual	non-voters	can	therefore	expect	to	meet	with	little	success.	This	probably	deters	most	potential	candidates	from	trying.	Candidates	who	do	successfully	mobilise	large	numbers	of	habitual	non-voters	may	
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not	be	of	particularly	high	quality.	And,	even	if	they	are,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	they	will	win.	 They	may	 even	 cause	 harm,	 splitting	 the	 vote	with	 the	 next-most	qualified	candidate,	causing	a	still	worse	candidate	to	prevail.			These	costs,	then,	are	at	worst	highly	speculative	–	and	are,	as	such,	also	liable	to	outweighed	by	the	gains	of	compulsory	voting	outlined	in	the	previous	section.		2.3.3.	The	Right	Not	to	Vote		Our	final	line	of	objection	holds	that	compulsory	voting	violates	a	right	not	to	vote.	Some	(e.g.	Ciccone,	2002,	pp.	347-8;	Katz,	1997,	p.	244)	think	the	right	not	to	vote	is	logically	entailed	by	the	right	to	vote.	That	is	much	too	quick.	As	many	have	pointed	out,	rights	do	not	necessarily	entail	their	inverse.	A	child’s	right	to	an	education,	for	example,	does	not	 imply	a	right	not	to	be	educated.	Proponents	of	 this	objection,	then,	must	offer	a	positive	argument	for	the	right	not	to	vote.	There	 is	no	way	of	showing	that	no	such	argument	could	possibly	be	offered.	We	can,	however,	show	that	no	existing	argument	is	convincing.		Two	such	arguments	may	be	dismissed	quickly.	First,	Blomberg	(1995,	pp.	1019-20,	1022)	 argues	 that	 citizens	 have	 a	 right	 against	 being	 compelled	 to	 vote	 on	 the	grounds	 that	 abstention	 can	 be	 rational.	 This	 proves	 far	 too	 much.	 The	 whole	enterprise	of	the	criminal	law,	after	all,	largely	functions	by	deterring	citizens	from	actions	 –	 e.g.	 theft	 –	 it	might	 otherwise	 be	 rational	 to	 perform.	 Second,	 Ciccone	(2002,	pp.	349-50)	argues	that	citizens	have	a	right	against	being	compelled	to	vote	on	the	grounds	that	voting	is	supererogatory.	I,	however,	have	argued	that	the	vast	majority	 of	 citizens	 have	 duties	 of	 fairness	 to	 vote	 (i.e.	 that	 voting	 is	 not	supererogatory	for	the	vast	majority	of	citizens),	and	that	the	remainder	can	simply	be	exempted.		Others	 hold	 that	 abstention	 constitutes	 a	 valuable	 expressive	 opportunity.	Proponents	 of	 this	 argument	 have	 appealed	 to	 two	distinct	 opportunities	 in	 this	respect:	 the	 ability	 to	 express	 dissatisfaction	 with,	 or	 indifference	 between,	 the	options	on	 the	ballot	 (Ciccone,	2002,	pp.	347-8;	Swenson,	2007,	p.	542),	 and	 the	ability	to	express	dissent	from	the	democratic	system	as	a	whole	(Blomberg,	1995,	
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p.	1023;	Lever,	2010,	p.	911;	Swenson,	2007,	pp.	542-3).	Let	us	grant,	arguendo,	that	citizens	have	rights	to	express	attitudes	of	both	these	kinds,	and	that	abstention	is	one	 means	 of	 doing	 so.	 Still,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 is	 rights-violating.		This	 is	 clearest	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 right	 to	 express	 indifference	 between,	 or	dissatisfaction	with,	 the	 options	 on	 the	 ballot,	 by	 abstaining.	 Compulsory	 voting	does	not	deprive	 citizens	of	 the	opportunity	 to	 abstain	 –	 and	 therefore	does	not	deprive	citizens	of	such	expressive	opportunities.		Compulsory	voting	does,	however,	compel	citizens	to	attend	a	polling	station.	That,	it	 might	 be	 argued,	 is	 a	 form	 of	 political	 participation,	 even	 if	 citizens	 go	 on	 to	abstain.	On	that	basis,	one	might	claim	that	compulsory	voting	forces	citizens	who	might	 otherwise	 have	 wished	 to	 dissent	 to	 express	 support	 for	 the	 democratic	system.46	That	is	implausible.	Citizens	who	attend	polling	stations	merely	because	they	are	compelled	to	cannot	reasonably	be	seen	to	express	support	for	democracy,	any	more	than	non-believers	forced	to	attend	church	can	be	said	to	express	religious	belief.	The	sheer	fact	of	coercion	blocks	any	such	inference.	More	moderately,	one	might	claim	that	mandatory	attendance	merely	deprives	citizens	of	the	opportunity	to	express	dissent.	However,	compulsory	voting	would	leave	open	many	expressive	opportunities	 of	 equivalent	 value	 –	 posting	 on	 Facebook,	 writing	 letters	 to	newspaper	 editors,	 and	 so	 on.	 Indeed,	 compulsory	 voting	 plausibly	amplifies	 the	expressive	power	of	refusing	 to	attend	by	converting	 the	act	of	abstention	 into	a	costly	signal	(since	citizens	must	typically	pay	a	fine	if	they	wish	to	express	their	dissent	from	the	democratic	system	by	abstaining).	This	line	of	argument,	then,	is	also	unconvincing.		Finally,	Lever	(2008,	p.	62;	2010,	pp.	910-12)	argues	that	compulsory	voting	violates	liberal	 neutrality.	 Reasonable	 disagreement	 abounds	 over	 the	 value	 of	 political	participation	 in	 general,	 and	 voting	 in	particular.	 Compelling	 individuals	 to	 vote,	therefore,	violates	citizens’	rights	against	having	reasonably	contested	conceptions	of	the	good	imposed	upon	them.	This,	however,	misunderstands	the	requirements	of	liberal	neutrality.	Compulsory	voting	certainly	has	effects	that	adherents	of	views	
																																																						46	Lever	(2010,	p.	911)	gestures	towards	this	view.	
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on	which	voting	is	not	a	valuable	form	of	political	participation	will	find	unwelcome.	Yet	liberal	neutrality	is	not	ultimately	concerned	ensuring	neutrality	with	respect	to	the	effects	of	different	social	policies	between	adherents	of	various	conceptions	of	the	good.	If	neutrality	requires	anything	at	all,	it	surely	requires	religious	tolerance,	which	disadvantages	adherents	of	intolerant	religions,	for	example.	Rather,	liberal	neutrality	requires	that	social	policies	not	be	justified	solely	by	appeal	to	reasonably	contested	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good	 (Rawls,	 1988,	 pp.	 260-5).	 Proponents	 of	compulsory	voting	do	not	typically	appeal	to	such	conceptions.	Rather,	they	appeal	to	 values	 all	 citizens	 might	 reasonably	 be	 expected	 to	 share	 (e.g.	 equality,	 and	fairness).47	It	is	hard	to	see,	then,	quite	how	compulsory	voting	is	supposed	to	be	objectionable	on	this	score.		We	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	some	more	compelling	argument	for	a	right	not	 to	 vote	 is	 available.	 Yet	 this	 seems	 doubtful.	 Compulsory	 voting	 is	 neither	particularly	 demanding,	 nor	 particularly	 coercive.	 Elections	 come	 around	 very	occasionally,	and	punishments	under	defensible	regimes	of	compulsory	voting	are	light.	If	laws	compelling	citizens	to	pay	tax	or	obey	the	speed	limit	are	not	rights-violating,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 is	 rights-violating	 either.	Moreover,	even	if	there	were	a	plausible	argument	for	a	right	not	to	vote,	it	would	still	need	to	be	shown	that	compulsory	voting	–	wherein	citizens	retain	their	ability	to	abstain	–	would	violate	that	right.	That	is	going	to	be,	to	say	the	least,	a	tall	order.	In	the	absence	of	such	an	argument,	we	can	safely	dismiss	this	final	line	of	objection,	too.		***		No	 prominent	 attempt	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 compulsory	 voting	 would	 entail	unacceptable	moral	costs	succeeds.	That	is	of	independent	theoretical	interest.	But,	more	importantly	for	our	purposes,	it	completes	the	final	step	in	our	defence	of	the	free-riding	argument.	The	free-riding	argument,	as	such,	appears	to	be	sound.		2.4.	Conclusion		
																																																						47	See	also	Engelen	(2009,	p.	220).	
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I	began	this	chapter	by	setting	out	the	problem	of	declining	turnout,	and	pointing	to	compulsory	voting	as	 the	most	effective	remedy.	Compulsion,	however,	demands	justification.	I	argued	that	non-voters,	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases,	are	free-riding	upon	members	of	the	interest	group	or	groups	to	which	they	belong	who	choose	to	vote.	They	may,	as	such,	be	legitimately	compelled	to	vote.	Typical	objections	to	the	free-riding	argument,	I	argued,	ought	to	prompt	us	to	refine	the	argument,	rather	than	 reject	 it	 outright.	 We	 also	 considered	 a	 range	 of	 prominent	 objections	 to	compulsory	voting	as	such,	each	of	which	purports	to	show	that	compulsory	voting	is	unacceptably	costly	from	a	moral	point	of	view.	These	objections,	I	argued,	are	uniformly	 reliant	 upon	 implausible	 normative	 or	 empirical	 premises,	 or	mischaracterisations	 of	 compulsory	 voting.	 States,	 I	 conclude,	 may	 permissibly	compel	citizens	to	vote.			 	
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3.	Vote	Buying	and	Respect	for	Autonomy		On	July	9,	1996,	Don	McCranie	was	elected	Commissioner	of	Dodge	County,	Georgia.	Sometime	later,	his	opponent	Doyce	Mullis	petitioned	the	Dodge	County	Superior	Court,	 seeking	 to	 have	 the	 result	 overturned.	 The	 court,	 citing	 numerous	irregularities,	agreed	with	Mullis	and	voided	the	election,	a	verdict	later	upheld	by	the	 Georgia	 Supreme	 Court.	 A	 Federal-State	 investigation	 subsequently	 revealed	electoral	fraud	on	both	sides,	including	extensive	vote	buying	campaigns.	So	brazen	were	both	sides’	operatives	that,	at	one	stage,	tables	were	set	up	at	opposite	ends	of	a	 courthouse	 where	 pre-polling	 was	 underway,	 with	 Mullis	 and	 McCranie’s	campaign	operatives	openly	bidding	for	votes	in	the	manner	of	a	flea	market.48		Such	 cases	 arouse	 strong	 intuitions.	 Vote	 buying	 seems	 morally	 wrong.	 Its	criminalisation	seems	obviously	justified.	Almost	every	democratic	theorist	that	has	considered	 the	 issue	 has	 sought	 to	 vindicate	 these	 judgements.49	 Yet,	 as	 recent	literature	as	shown,	the	matter	is	complex.	A	number	of	recent	pieces	have	offered	sophisticated	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 vote	 buying	 (c.f.	 Brennan,	 2011a,	 ch.	 6;	Brennan	 and	 Jaworski,	 2016,	 ch.	 19;	 Freiman,	 2014;	 Taylor,	 Forthcoming-b).	Moreover,	 as	 Lippert-Rasmussen	 (2011)	 has	 shown,	 differentiating	 vote	 buying	from	 other	 practices,	 from	 a	 moral	 point	 of	 view,	 is	 not	 straightforward.	 For	example,	it	is	(generally)	permissible	for	political	candidates	to	seek	voters’	support	by	 promising	 to	 promote	 their	 material	 interests,	 conditional	 upon	 their	 being	
elected.	What	is	so	very	different	about	candidates	seeking	to	secure	voters’	support	by	promising	to	promote	their	material	interests,	conditional	upon	them	voting	for	the	candidate	in	question?			This	chapter	proposes	a	novel	account	of	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying.	Vote	buying,	I	 shall	 argue,	 involves	 a	 peculiar	 kind	 of	 disrespect	 for	 persons	 as	 autonomous	agents.	Before	proceeding,	however,	it	would	be	as	well	to	get	clear	over	the	nature	of	 vote	 buying.	 For	 A	 to	 purchase	 B’s	 vote	 is	 for	 A	 and	 B	 to	 enter	 a	 contractual	relationship	wherein	A	agrees	 to	 transfer	some	benefit	or	other	 to	B,	conditional	
																																																						48	The	full	facts	are	outlined	in	United	States	v.	McCranie,	169	F.3d	723,	726	(11th	Cir.	1999).	49	See	Archer	and	Wilson	(2014),	Epstein	(1985),	Hasen	(2000),	Karlan	(1994),	Kochin	and	Kochin	(1998),	Rose-Ackerman	(1985),	Satz	(2010),	Stokes	(2007),	Sunstein	(1994),	and	Tobin	(1970).	
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upon	B	 disposing	 of	 their	 ballot	 as	 A	 directs.	 Votes	 can	 be	 bought	 and	 sold	 in	 a	variety	 of	 contexts	 –	 public	 elections	 and	 referenda,	 meetings	 of	 clubs,	 political	parties,	 shareholders	and	 the	 like,	or	even	among	elected	officials	 in	 legislatures.	Buyers	might	be	candidates	for	public	office	(or	their	campaign	officials),	ordinary	citizens,	or	foreign	nationals.	The	benefits	in	question	will	generally	be	monetary	–	in	the	Dodge	County	case,	for	example,	votes	were	bought	for	between	$20	and	$40	–	but	need	not	be.	In	the	19th	century,	political	parties	in	the	US	and	UK	regularly	bought	votes	with	food,	alcohol,	and	healthcare,	for	example	(Stokes	et	al.,	2013,	ch.	8).	Buyers	might	direct	sellers	to	dispose	of	their	ballots	in	any	number	of	ways	–	to	vote	for	the	buyer’s	preferred	candidate,	to	vote	for	whomever	the	seller	wants,	to	burn	their	ballot	paper,	and	so	on.		Vote	buying,	then,	is	multifarious.	To	keep	the	discussion	that	follows	manageable,	I	propose	to	delimit	our	focus	in	three	ways.	First,	I	will	focus	upon	vote	buying	in	elections	and	referenda,	remaining	neutral	on	the	morality	of	vote	buying	in	other	contexts.			Second,	I	shall	concentrate	only	upon	the	two	most	common	forms	of	vote	buying.	‘Direct’	vote	buying	involves	buyers	paying	sellers	to	hand	over	their	ballot	papers	for	the	buyer	to	fill	in	and	cast	as	they	wish.	‘Indirect’	vote	buying	involves	buyers	paying	sellers	to	personally	fill	out	and	cast	their	ballots	for	the	buyer’s	preferred	candidates	 and/or	 policies.	 The	 two	 are	 importantly	 distinct.	 Direct	 vote	 buying	involves	a	transfer	of	property	rights	over	the	seller’s	ballot.	Indirect	vote	buying	is	more	akin	to	a	‘paid	performance’	(Brennan,	2011a,	p.	137).	Just	as	paying	a	guitarist	to	 perform	 at	 a	 party	 does	 not	 involve	 a	 transfer	 of	 property	 rights	 over	 the	performer’s	guitar,	indirect	vote	buying	does	not	involve	buyers	asserting	property	rights	over	the	seller’s	ballot.	On	all	other	forms	of	vote	buying	–	e.g.	paying	people	not	to	vote,	paying	people	to	vote	for	whomever	they	like	–	I	remain	neutral.			Finally,	I	will	also	remain	neutral	on	the	matter	of	vote	selling.	Often,	the	reasons	in	virtue	of	which	it	 is	wrong	to	purchase	some	object	or	service	do	not	explain	the	wrongness	of	selling	that	same	object	or	service.	Many	of	the	considerations	which	explain	 the	wrongness	of	 slave-buying	 (e.g.	 the	wrongness	of	 subjugating	others’	wills	 to	 one’s	 own)	 do	 not	 explain	 the	wrongness	 of	 selling	 oneself	 into	 slavery.	
	 47	
Similarly,	 then,	an	account	of	 the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	need	not	explain	 the	wrongness	of	vote	selling.	We	shall,	as	such,	set	the	issue	aside.		This	in	hand,	we	can	proceed	to	the	arguments.	We	begin	with	recent	arguments	in	favour	of	vote	buying	that	have	appealed	to	the	supposed	instrumental	benefits	of	the	practice.	Such	arguments,	I	show,	are	generally	unpersuasive.	Vote	buying	would	likely	 be	 bad	 from	 an	 instrumental	 point	 of	 view.	 Yet,	 given	 the	 multiplicity	 of	contexts	in	which	vote	buying	might	be	introduced,	and	the	various	ways	in	which	vote	markets	might	be	regulated,	instrumental	considerations	do	not	tell	decisively	against	vote	buying.	We	must,	then,	consider	the	non-instrumental	features	of	vote	buying.	Several	such	accounts	–	appeals	to	exploitation,	effective	participation,	and	political	 equality	 –	 are	 on	 offer.	 I	 show	 that	 each	 of	 these	 accounts,	 however,	 is	crucially	incomplete.	Drawing	lessons	from	the	failure	of	these	accounts,	I	defend	the	view	that	vote	buying	is	wrong	insofar	as	it	expresses	an	objectionable	failure	of	respect	 for	 persons	 as	 autonomous	 agents.	 Bans	 on	 vote	 buying,	 I	 conclude,	 are	justified.		3.1.	The	Instrumental	Case	for	Vote	Buying		The	 two	 principal	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 vote	 buying	 are	 both	 instrumental	 in	character.50	 First,	 the	 appeal	 to	 exchange.51	 Free	 exchanges	 of	 goods	 generally	promote	 the	 welfare	 of	 all	 parties	 to	 those	 exchanges.	 Gerald	 will	 exchange	 his	apples	for	Susan’s	oranges	if	and	only	if	he	values	her	oranges	more	than	he	values	his	 apples.	Mutatis	 mutandis	 for	 Susan.	 A	 free	 exchange	 of	 apples	 and	 oranges	between	Gerald	and	Susan,	then,	ought	to	promote	both	parties’	welfare.	Freiman	(2014,	p.	761),	among	others,	argues	that	the	same	logic	applies	to	votes;52		 I’ll	sell	my	vote	for	n	dollars	only	if	I	value	n	dollars	more	than	my	vote,	and	the	buyer	will	buy	my	vote	for	n	dollars	only	if	she	values	my	vote	
																																																						50	One	 argument	 I	 do	 not	 address	 is	 Freiman’s	 (2014,	 pp.	 762-4)	 appeal	 to	 voter	 liberty.	 Voters,	Freiman	claims,	have	the	moral	right	to	cast	their	ballots	as	they	choose,	free	from	interference	by	others.	This	extends	to	a	right	to	cast	one’s	ballot	as	others	direct,	for	money.	This	argument	has	been	powerfully	criticised	by	Taylor	(Forthcoming-a).	Moreover,	it	would	at	best	justify	a	right	to	sell	one’s	vote,	rather	than	a	right	to	buy	others’	votes,	the	subject	under	discussion,	here.	51	See	Taylor	(Forthcoming-b,	pp.	4-8)	for	a	critique	of	this	argument.	52	See	also	Buchanan	and	Tullock	(1962,	pp.	270-81),	Copp	(2000,	p.	87),	Taylor	(2016,	pp.	315-6),	and	Tobin	(1970,	p.	269).	
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more	than	n	dollars.	All	things	equal,	vote	markets	leave	both	buyers	and	sellers	better	off.		The	second	argument	appeals	to	intensity	of	preference.53	Suppose,	in	a	group	of	10	001	voters,	5	001	slightly	prefer	candidate	A	to	candidate	B,	whereas	5000	strongly	prefer	B	to	A.	Debatably,	B	is	a	better	social	choice,	given	the	relative	intensity	of	citizens’	 preferences.	 Standard	 voting	 methods,	 however,	 are	 insensitive	 to	intensities	of	preference,	and	would	result	in	A	being	selected	as	the	social	choice.	Were	 vote	 buying	 permitted,	 however,	 strong	 B-supporters	 could	 purchase	additional	votes	from	weak	A-supporters,	ensuring	B’s	victory.	Vote	buying,	then,	is	one	 means	 by	 which	 democratic	 decision-making	 could	 be	 made	 sensitive	 to	intensities	of	preference.		Both	arguments	face	serious	difficulties.	First,	there	will	often	be	a	dearth	of	buyers.	Suppose,	that,	of	10	001	voters,	5501	prefer	C,	and	4500	prefer	D.	To	bring	D	about,	D-supporters	must	collectively	purchase	501	votes,	and	sell	none.	Notice,	however,	that	 the	 benefits	 of	 D’s	 victory	 are	 non-excludable.	 All	 D-supporters	 benefit,	regardless	of	whether	they	‘contribute’	by	purchasing	additional	votes.	The	benefits	are	also	non-scalar.	It	is	no	better	for	D-supporters	that	D	prevail	by	a	wide	margin	than	a	narrow	margin.	It	is	therefore	rational	for	a	D-supporter	to	contribute	if	and	only	if	(1)	the	benefits	of	D’s	victory	outweigh	the	cost	of	contributing	and	(2)	D’s	victory	 counterfactually	 depends	 upon	 their	 doing	 so.	 If	 either	 condition	 fails,	contributing	 is	obviously	 inefficient.	We	can	often	expect	 these	conditions	 to	 fail.	Aside	from	the	standard	difficulties	which	arise	in	such	cases	(c.f.	Olson,	1965),	there	is	the	simple	fact	that	there	will	often	be	few	individuals	able	to	purchase	enough	votes	 to	be	 guaranteed	of	making	 a	 difference	 to	 the	 outcome	without	 incurring	costs	of	greater	magnitude	than	the	utility	they	stand	to	gain	from	getting	their	way.	These	two	benefits,	such	as	they	are,	will	often	fail	to	obtain.		Second,	the	appeal	to	intensities	of	preference	faces	the	problem	of	interpersonal	comparisons.	 Suppose	 two	 referenda	 were	 to	 be	 held,	 the	 first	 over	 a	 cut	 to	corporate	 tax	 rates,	 the	 second	 over	 the	 legal	 recognition	 of	 same-sex	marriage.	
																																																						53	 See,	 among	 others,	 Freiman	 (2014,	 p.	 764),	 Levmore	 (2000-2001),	 and	 Philipson	 and	 Snyder	(1996).	
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Suppose	votes	cost	$20.	Sue,	David,	and	George	each	purchase	three	additional	votes	in	the	former	referendum	at	a	net	cost	of	$80	(a	$20	opportunity	cost	for	keeping	their	own	votes,	and	$60	for	three	additional	votes).	Suppose	each	also	buys	seven	additional	votes	 in	the	 latter	 for	$160.	We	can	perhaps	 infer	that	Sue,	David,	and	George’s	 preferences	 over	 same-sex	 marriage	 are	 twice	 as	 intense	 as	 their	preferences	 over	 corporate	 tax.	 However,	 we	 cannot	 thereby	 infer	 that	 their	preferences	are	as	intense	as	each	other’s.	Suppose	only	Sue,	David	and	George	vote	in	the	corporate	tax	referendum.	Sue	and	David	vote	in	favour.	George	votes	against.	Sue	and	David	will	be	victorious.	But	this	belies	the	fact	that	George’s	preferences	are	 potentially	 more	 than	 twice	 as	 intense	 as	 Sue	 and	 David’s,	 in	 which	 case	 –	accepting	 arguendo	 that	 we	 ought	 to	 account	 for	 intensities	 of	 preference	 in	democratic	decisions	–	the	status	quo	would	be	a	better	result.	Outcomes	realised	under	vote-buying,	 then,	will	not	necessarily	 reflect	 intensities	of	preference	any	better	than	outcomes	realised	under	normal	arrangements.			Most	importantly,	however,	the	political	science	literature	has	documented	a	range	of	reasons	to	believe	that	vote	buying	would	lead	to	lower-quality	outcomes	overall.	Most	 strikingly,	 Kochin	 and	 Kochin	 (1998)	 show	 that	 vote	 buying	 can	 lead	 to	outcomes	 that	 are	 dispreferred	 by	 a	 substantial	 majority	 of	 citizens.	 Suppose	proposal	 P	would	 impose	 a	 net	 cost	 -c	on	 all	 citizens.	 Suppose	 that	 a	 very	 small	minority	of	citizens	(perhaps	a	single	citizen)	offers	all	others	a	side-payment	s	to	vote	for	P.	Suppose	that	s	is	smaller	in	magnitude	than	-c.	Even	accounting	for	the	side-payment,	it	would	be	best	for	almost	everyone	if	P	were	voted	down.	Suppose	a	 clear	 majority	 of	 citizens	 know	 this,	 and	 prefer	 not-P	 over	 P.	 Vote	 buying	drastically	raises	the	probability	that	P	will	prevail,	these	facts	notwithstanding.	For	any	 given	 voter,	 I,	 I	 can	 be	 certain	 that	 their	 vote	 will	 neither	 be	 decisive,	 nor	probabilify	the	outcomes	to	any	significant	degree	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	4).	Consider,	then,	the	payoff	structure	for	I;		 Other	voters’	choices	 Take	side-payment	 Refuse	side-payment	
I’s	choices	 	 	Take	side-payment	 s-c	 s	Refuse	side-payment	 -c	 0		Accepting	the	side-payment	and	voting	for	P	is	the	dominant	strategy	for	I.	If	others	refuse,	I	might	as	well	profit	by	accepting	s.	If	others	accept,	I	might	as	well	accept	s	
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to	partially	counterbalance	their	losses.	And	since	all	citizens	can	be	confident	that	their	votes	will	make	no	difference	to	the	outcomes	or	probabilities,	accepting	s	is	the	dominant	strategy	for	all	citizens	(or,	at	 least,	 for	all	 those	without	unusually	intense	expressive	preferences	for	not-P).54	P,	then,	looks	to	be	the	inevitable	result.		There	are	several	other	likely	costs.	Epstein	(1985,	pp.	987-8)	points	out	that	vote	buying	would	promote	rent-seeking.	One	has	an	interest	in	buying	votes	if	and	only	if	one	expects	 to	profit	by	doing	so.	The	most	straightforward	means	of	profiting	would	be	to	make	use	of	one’s	political	power	to	divert	public	funds	to	one’s	private	purposes.	Vote	markets	would	also	be	plagued	by	wealth	effects.	Given	the	declining	marginal	utility	of	money,	the	worse-off	would	be	substantially	more	likely	to	sell	their	 votes	 than	 the	 wealthy.55	 Systems	 of	 vote-buying,	 then,	 would	 likely	 over-weight	the	preferences	of	the	wealthy	(who	are	able	to	easily	purchase	additional	votes),	and	under-weight	the	preferences	of	the	worse-off	(who	will	be	less	able	to	buy,	and	more	willing	 to	sell).56	For	similar	 reasons,	vote	markets	would	 tend	 to	diminish	the	responsiveness	of	government	to	the	worse-off,	exacerbating	elite	bias	(Rose-Ackerman,	1985,	p.	963).	Governments	would	plainly	have	little	incentive	to	respond	to	the	preferences	of	those	who’d	sold	their	votes.57	Vote	buying	might	also	depress	participation	by	those	who	decline	to	sell.	Empirical	studies	suggest	 that	citizens	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 participate	 where	 their	 sense	 of	 political	 efficacy	 is	undermined	(Blais	and	Dobrzynska,	1998),	something	we	might	well	expect	were	electoral	outcomes	to	be	reduced	to	mere	contests	over	which	wealthy	group	is	able	to	purchase	the	greatest	number	of	votes.			The	 instrumental	 case	 for	 vote	 buying	 looks	 very	 uncompelling.	 We	 should	 be	cautious,	 however.	 Vote	 buying	 is	 demonstrably	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 lower-quality	outcomes.	Yet	I	see	no	way	of	showing	that	 it	would	necessarily	do	so.	There	are	many	ways	in	which	vote	buying	might	be	implemented,	some	of	which	might	avoid	
																																																						54	See	Brennan	and	Lomasky	(1993)	on	expressive	voting.		55	The	less	resources	one	has,	the	greater	the	utility	one	stands	to	gain	from	selling	one’s	vote.	56	Freiman	(2014,	p.	765)	responds	that	since	votes	are	 likely	to	sell	cheaply,	selling	one’s	vote	 is	unlikely	 to	 be	 ‘irresistible’	 to	 the	worse-off.	 Yet	 prices	 need	 not	 be	 ‘irresistibly’	 high	 to	 induce	 a	substantial	proportion	of	the	worse-off	to	sell.	They	need	only	be	greater	than	the	(generally	very	minimal)	expected	value	of	each	individual’s	vote.	57	Responsiveness	to	the	worse-off	might	be	further	diminished	by	the	fact	that	the	worse-off	would	be	encouraged	to	make	voting	decisions	on	the	basis	of	the	benefits	they	stand	to	gain	by	selling	their	vote,	rather	than	judgements	as	to	which	of	the	parties	will	better	promote	their	interests	(Stokes,	2007).	
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these	costs	(c.f.	Taylor,	2016;	Forthcoming-b,	pp.	12-4).	Wealth	effects,	for	instance,	might	not	be	so	prevalent	under	a	regime	in	which	only	persons	below	a	certain	net	wealth	were	permitted	to	buy.	Contextual	factors	are	significant,	also.	There	would,	for	instance,	be	no	risk	of	elite	bias	if	vote	buying	were	introduced	under	conditions	of	 distributive	 equality.	 Vote	 buying	might	 even	 give	 rise	 to	 valuable	 incentive-effects.	 For	 instance,	 voters,	 given	 their	 causal	 inefficacy,	 tend	 to	 be	 ‘rationally	ignorant’	of	political	matters	(c.f.	Downs,	1957).	Giving	citizens	the	opportunity	to	acquire	a	more	substantial	degree	of	political	power,	then,	might	prompt	them	to	gather	more	information.	It	at	least	possible	–	though	very	unlikely	–	that	with	the	right	institutional	design,	and	under	the	right	conditions,	a	plausible	instrumental	case	for	vote	buying	of	some	form	could	be	constructed.			Instrumental	considerations,	though	important,	do	not	offer	a	conclusive	case	for,	or	against	vote	buying.	Our	intuitions,	however,	are	more	categorical.	Were	we	to	be	presented	with	 an	 ironclad	 instrumental	 case	 in	 favour	of	 vote	buying,	 I	 suspect	most	 of	 us	 would	 continue	 to	 regard	 the	 practice	 as	 intuitively	 objectionable.	Accounting	for	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying,	then,	requires	us	to	consider	its	non-
instrumental	properties.			3.2.	The	Non-Instrumental	Case	Against	Vote	Buying		We	shall	consider	three	attempts	to	account	for	the	wrongness	of	vote-buying	non-instrumentally:	appeals	to	exploitation,	effective	participation,	and	equality.58	Each,	we	shall	show,	is	problematic.			3.2.1.	Exploitation		One	 natural	 thought	 is	 that	 vote	 buying	would	 allow	 the	wealthy	 to	 exploit	 the	worse-off.	We	can	make	sense	of	this	idea	at	the	collective	level	easily	enough.	For	A	to	exploit	B	is	for	A	to	take	unfair	advantage	of	some	weakness	or	vulnerability	of	
																																																						58	One	important	argument	I	do	not	discuss	is	Sunstein’s	(1994,	p.	849)	charge	that	vote	buying	would	lead	 citizens	 to	 value	 to	practice	 of	 voting	 inappropriately.	 The	 argument	has	been	 already	been	powerfully	critiqued	by	Lippert-Rasmussen	(2011,	pp.	135-6).	It	is	also	unlikely	to	be	dialectically	effective	 against	 proponents	 of	 vote	 buying,	 some	 of	 whom	 (e.g.	 Brennan	 and	 Jaworski,	 2016)	express	scepticism	about	all	arguments	of	that	kind.		
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B’s	(Zwolinski	and	Wertheimer,	2016).	As	discussed	above,	it	is	likely	that	votes	will	largely	be	bought	by	the	wealthy,	and	sold	by	the	worse-off.	Yet,	if	many	among	the	worse-off	sell,	the	worse-off	will	lose	their	collective	political	power,	a	resource	of	far	 greater	 value	 than	 the	 aggregate	 sum	 the	 wealthy	 (for	 reasons	 explained	momentarily)	would	be	required	to	transfer	to	the	worse-off	to	acquire	those	votes.	Vote	buying	would	 therefore	 allow	 the	wealthy	 to	 take	unfair	 advantage	of	 –	 i.e.	exploit	–	the	worse-off.		This	line	of	argument	faces	a	major	difficulty.	It	is	widely	accepted	that	the	rightness	of	 actions	 is	 fundamentally	 a	 matter	 of	 their	 impact	 upon	 individuals	 qua	individuals,	 not	 their	 impact	upon	groups	qua	groups.	We	 cannot	 claim	 that	 any	individual	 member	 of	 the	 worse-off	 suffers	 exploitation	 merely	 in	 virtue	 of	belonging	to	an	exploited	group	without	committing	the	fallacy	of	division.	We	need	an	argument	 to	explain	why	this	 is	 the	case.	 I	do	not	 think	any	such	argument	 is	available.	To	see	why,	we	need	to	get	more	precise.			The	following	function	expresses	the	expected	value	of	a	set	of	votes	to	an	individual,	
I;59		
VI(S)	=	P(DS)UI	
S	=	some	set	of	votes	controlled	by	I	
VI(S)	=	the	expected	value	of	S	for	I	
P(DS)	=	the	probability	that	S	will	be	decisive	
UI	=	the	utility	for	I	of	their	preferred	outcome		Suppose	1	001	people	are	choosing	between	f	and	ψ.	900	have	voted	already,	500	for	f,	and	400	for	ψ.	Suppose	I	is	a	ψ	supporter,	is	yet	to	vote,	and	would	gain	$5000	from	ψ’s	victory	(i.e.	UI	=	$5000).		Let	us	refer	to	the	other	100	persons	yet	to	vote,	collectively,	as	G.	All	members	of	G	are	strong	f	supporters,	each	of	whom	would	gain	$5000	from	f’s	victory.	Let	us	refer	to	the	set	of	G’s	100	votes	as	S’.	Suppose	I	purchases	S’	 in	 its	entirety,	such	that	S	contains	101	votes	(S’,	plus	I’s	own	single	vote).	I	can	now	guarantee	victory	for	ψ	–	i.e.	P(DS)	=	~1.	So;		
																																																						59	Strictly,	these	formulae	should	include	the	costs,	and	expressive	payoffs,	of	voting.	We	can	safely	set	these	aside	for	present	purposes.	
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VI(S)	=	~1	´	$5000	=	~$5000		The	following	function	expresses	the	expected	value	of	a	single	vote	to	an	individual,	
J;		
VJ(BJ)	=	P(DJ)UJ	
BJ	=	J’s	single	vote	
VJ(BJ)	=	the	expected	value	of	B	for	J	
P(DJ)	=	the	probability	that	BJ	will	be	decisive		Suppose	 J	 is	 a	 member	 of	G.	VJ(BJ)	 is	 virtually	 zero.	 Only	 one	 additional	 vote	 is	required	to	secure	victory	for	f.	Save	for	I’s	vote	buying	venture,	all	members	of	G	are	certain	to	vote	for	f.	P(DJ)	=	~0.	Which	yields;		
VJ(BJ)	=	~0	´	$5000	=	~$0		This	case	illustrates	the	fact	that,	because	P(DS)	increases	exponentially	as	the	size	of	S	increases,	VI(S)	is	not	a	simple	additive	function	of	the	expected	value	of	each	vote	in	S.	This	explains	why	group-level	exploitation	is	possible	under	vote	buying.60	The	value	to	G	of	S’	is	very	high.	S’	would	easily	guarantee	victory	for	f.	Each	member	of	G	gains	$5000	from	f’s	victory.	So;		
VG(S’)	=	~1	´	$500	000	=	~$500	000		Yet,	suppose	I	offers	each	member	of	G	$20	for	their	vote,	and	each	accepts,	at	a	total	cost	of	$2000	to	I.	For	each	individual	member	of	G,	selling	their	vote	is	rational.	The	expected	 value	 of	 their	 individual	 votes	 is	 ~$0.	 Yet	 G,	 as	 a	 group,	 loses	 out	enormously,	 gaining	 $2000,	 but	 losing	 ~$500	 000.	 I	 plausibly	 takes	 unfair	advantage	of	G,	gaining	a	resource	worth	~$5000	to	themselves,	and	~$500	000	to	
G,	 for	 only	 $2000.	 Surely,	 however,	 no	 individual	 member	 of	 G	 can	 complain	 of	exploitation.	Exploitation,	after	all,	implies	that	one	has	been	treated	unfairly.	But	
																																																						60	See	also	Levmore	(2000-2001,	pp.	122-5).	
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no	 individual	 can	 complain	of	unfairness.	After	 all,	 it	 really	 is	 the	 case	 that	 their	individual	votes	were	worth	very	little.	I	offered	a	price	well	in	excess	of	each	vote’s	expected	 value	 –	 $20	 –	 and	 each	 voluntarily	 accepted.	 I	 gains	 the	 value	 of	 G’s	collective	political	power.	But	that	power	never	belonged,	de	facto	or	de	jure,	to	any	individual	member	 of	G.	 No	 individual	member	 of	G,	 therefore,	 can	 complain	 of	unfair	treatment	(and,	hence,	exploitation)	in	being	deprived	of	it.		Might	 vote	 buying	 be	 exploitative	 in	 some	 other	 way?	 It	 is	 certainly	 possible.	Consider;		
Ignorance:	Unbeknownst	to	Cathryn,	her	vote	stands	to	be	decisive	in	an	upcoming	election.	If	Cathryn	votes	for	f,	she	will	be	$10	000	better	off.	If	she	votes	for	Y,	she	will	get	nothing.	Richard	knows	this.	He	also	knows	that	if	Cathryn	votes	for	Y,	he	will	be	$10	000	better	off	than	if	she	votes	for	f.	Cathryn	agrees	to	sell	her	vote	to	Richard	for	$20,	and	votes	for	Y.			Richard	 exploits	 Cathryn	 by	 taking	 unfair	 advantage	 of	 her	 lack	 of	 knowledge.	Richard’s	 exploitation	 of	 Cathryn,	 however,	 crucially	 depends	 upon	 the	 fact	 that	Cathryn’s	vote	is	of	significant	instrumental	value.	It	is	this	which	renders	Richard’s	conduct	exploitative.	$20	is	an	unfair	price	for	a	resource	worth	$10	000.	Such	cases	are	possible	 in	 the	 real-world.	 Yet	 they	 are	 also	 extremely	 rare.	 Individual	 votes	virtually	never	have	non-trivial	 instrumental	value	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	4).	A	relatively	low	price	(say,	$20)	for	a	vote	will	generally	not,	as	such,	be	unfair.	Some	 citizens	 value	 their	 votes	 more	 highly	 for	 other	 reasons	 –	 e.g.	 for	 the	expressive	 opportunities	 voting	 affords.	 But	 such	 citizens	 can	 demand	 a	 price	commensurate	 with	 that	 value,	 selling	 only	 if	 they	 receive	 a	 satisfactory	 offer.	Perhaps	the	very	poor	would	be	unable	 to	engage	 in	bargaining	of	 this	kind,	and	would	be	forced	to	accept	just	any	offer,	regardless	of	whether	they	thought	it	fair.	Simple	institutional	devices	–	e.g.	a	mandated	minimum	price	for	votes	–	could	be	deployed	to	guard	against	this	risk.	Moreover,	this	argument	at	most	vindicates	the	idea	that	buying	votes	from	the	worse-off,	on	unfair	terms,	is	wrongful.	We	should	surely	also	want	an	explanation	of	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	in	a	wide	range	of	
other	cases.	Exploitation,	then,	can	at	most	account	for	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	in	a	very	small	subset	of	the	cases	with	which	we	ought	to	be	concerned.		
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	3.2.2.	Effective	Participation		Susan	Stokes	(2007,	pp.	90-1)	writes	that;		 The	essence	of	 the	violation	of	democracy	represented	by	vote	buying	can	hence	be	summarised	thus:	because	of	their	material	poverty,	a	sub-
set	 of	 the	 citizenry	 is	 deprived	 of	 effective	 participation	 in	 collective	
decisions	to	which	they	will	be	subject.		On	its	face,	Stokes’	claim	is	puzzling.	Permitting	vote	buying	would	not	deprive	the	worse-off	 of	 their	 right	 to	participate	by	 voting.	 It	would	merely	 allow	 them	 the	opportunity	to	enter	contracts	to	either	transfer	their	votes	to	others,	or	exercise	their	votes	in	a	particular	way.		Stokes,	though,	has	a	more	particular	claim	in	mind:	vote	buying	would	render	the	participatory	 efforts	 of	 the	 worse-off	 less	 effective,	 diminishing	 their	 political	impact.	 There	 is	 an	 obvious	 instrumental	 reading	 of	 this	 argument,	 according	 to	which	reducing	the	political	impact	of	the	worse-off	would	lead	to	worse	political	outcomes.	We	have	already	shown,	however,	 that	such	considerations	do	not	 tell	decisively	against	vote	buying.	An	alternative,	noninstrumental	reading,	however,	would	hold	that	the	fact	that	vote	buying	would	diminish	the	political	impact	of	the	worse-off,	 in	 itself,	 explains	 the	 wrongness	 of	 vote	 buying.	 This	 reading	 of	 the	argument	faces	a	similar	difficulty	to	the	exploitation	objection.	Vote	buying	would	almost	 certainly	 diminish	 the	 political	 impact	 of	 the	 worse-off,	 considered	collectively.	But,	if	we	are	to	explain	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	in	terms	of	a	loss	of	effective	participation,	we	must	explain	why	it	is	that	individuals	qua	individuals	would	lose	out	in	this	respect.	This,	I	think,	cannot	be	done.	To	see	why,	we	must	first	get	more	precise	about	the	notion	of	political	impact.		There	 are	 four	 salient	 forms	 of	 political	 impact:	 decisiveness,	 probabilification,	contributory	influence,	and	responsiveness.	One	is	decisive	in	an	election	where	the	outcome	counterfactually	depends	upon	one’s	vote.	If	eleven	people	are	voting	over	whether	 to	f	 or	Y,	 and	 the	 vote	 is	 tied	 five-five,	 the	 final	 voter	will	 be	 decisive.	
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Probabilification	 involves	 increasing	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 outcome	 one	 prefers	being	selected.	In	the	case	above,	for	example,	if	the	first	voter	casts	their	ballot	in	favour	 of	 fing,	 that	 voter	 raises	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 group	 fing.	 Contributory	influence	 can	 be	 understood,	 following	 Goldman	 (1999),	 as	 the	 imposition	 of	 a	vector	of	force	over	the	political	process.	Suppose	that	the	first	six	voters	in	our	case	above	 vote	 to	 f.	 The	 seventh	 voter	 can	 neither	 be	 decisive,	 nor	 probabilify	 the	outcomes	to	any	degree.	They	can,	however,	exert	force	in	favour	of	their	preferred	outcome.	Just	as	one	exerts	force	for	one’s	team	by	pulling	on	a	rope	in	a	tug	of	war,	one	can	exert	force	for	one’s	preferred	political	outcomes	by	casting	a	ballot	in	their	favour.	Responsiveness,	finally,	involves	a	disposition	on	the	part	of	elected	officials	to	satisfy	some	agent’s	preferences.	Labour	parties,	for	example,	are	often	said	to	be	highly	responsive	to	the	preferences	of	labour	unions,	insofar	as	they	are	strongly	disposed	to	satisfy	their	preferences	in	political	decision-making.		For	the	argument	to	hold,	vote	buying	must	cause	individuals,	qua	 individuals,	to	wrongfully	suffer	 losses	 in	one	or	more	of	 these	forms	of	 impact.	We	can	quickly	dismiss	both	decisiveness	and	responsiveness.	Vote	buying	cannot	reasonably	be	said	to	deprive	anyone	of	decisiveness	since,	as	we	have	already	pointed	out,	no-one	can	 expect	 to	 be	 decisive	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 vote	 buying.	 Nor	 can	 any	 individual	complain	 of	 a	 loss	 of	 responsiveness.	 Politicians	 are	 responsive	 to	 groups	 qua	groups,	not	individuals	qua	individuals	(individuals,	in	themselves,	can	make	little	difference	to	politicians’	electoral	prospects).			One	might	 claim	 that	 those	who	 sell	 their	 votes	 lose	 their	 ability	 to	 probabilify,	and/or	exert	contributory	influence	in	favour	of,	their	preferred	political	outcomes.	This	 is	 not	 obvious.	Were	 vote	 buying	 permitted,	 there	 would	 presumably	 be	 a	competitive	 market	 for	 votes.	 Individuals	 could	 sell	 to	 a	 buyer	 with	 the	 same	political	preferences	as	themselves.	In	that	case,	they	will	be	able	to	vote	for	(as	well	as	contribute	to,	and	probabilify)	their	preferred	outcomes,	just	as	they	would	have	done	had	vote	buying	not	been	permitted.	Even	if	this	were	not	so,	individuals	who	voluntarily	enter	contracts	to	sell	their	votes	surely	cannot	reasonably	complain	of	a	loss	of	political	impact.	Such	persons	seem	straightforwardly	to	have	waived	–	i.e.	contracted	away	–	whatever	claims	they	had	in	this	respect.			
	 57	
What,	then,	of	citizens	who	do	not	sell	their	votes?	Such	citizens	do	not	lose	out	on	contributory	 influence.	 Their	 votes	 will	 continue	 to	 impose	 a	 vector	 of	 force	 in	favour	of	their	preferred	outcomes	of	the	same	magnitude	they	would	have	imposed	
without	vote	buying.	Where	vote	buying	leads	to	more	lopsided	electoral	outcomes,	citizens	will	have	a	diminished	capacity	 to	probabilify	political	outcomes.61	Yet	 it	seems	 entirely	 implausible	 that	 this	 can	 explain	 the	 wrongness	 of	 vote	 buying.	Consider	the	following	case;		
Persuasion:	A	referendum	is	to	be	held	over	the	legal	recognition	of	same-sex	marriage.	A	televised	debate	is	held	in	advance.	During	the	debate,	Jeremy	 makes	 a	 series	 of	 powerful	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 marriage	equality.	He	persuades	10,	000	people	who	would	otherwise	have	stayed	home	to	vote.		Jeremy’s	 actions	 in	Persuasion	 substantially	 increase	 the	 total	 number	 of	 voters.	Other	 things	 equal,	 his	 doing	 so	 will	 diminish	 each	 voter’s	 impact	 upon	 the	probabilities	 of	 the	 relevant	 outcomes.62	 We	 should	 hardly	 wish	 to	 conclude,	however,	that	Jeremy	has	somehow	wronged	his	fellow	citizens.	Citizens,	intuitively,	simply	do	not	have	claims	to	probabilify	political	outcomes	to	any	particular	degree.	The	 mere	 fact	 that	 vote	 buying	 might	 diminish	 citizens’	 abilities	 to	 probabilify	political	 outcomes,	 then,	 goes	 no	 distance	 to	 explaining	 the	 wrongness	 of	 vote	buying.		One	 group	 remains:	 citizens	 who	 involuntarily	 sell	 their	 votes	 (perhaps	 out	 of	material	 poverty,	 for	 example).	 Such	 persons	 obviously	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 have	waived	any	claims	to	political	impact	they	might	have	had.	I	am	happy	to	concede	that	such	citizens	would	be	wronged	by	any	loss	in	political	impact	they	might	suffer	under	vote	buying.	But,	again,	we	should	surely	want	to	explain	the	wrongness	of	vote	 buying	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 other	 cases,	 as	 well.	 The	 appeal	 to	 effective	participation,	then,	can	at	most	account	for	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	in	a	small	subset	of	the	cases	with	which	we	ought	to	be	concerned.		
																																																						61	Individuals’	votes	have	a	lower	probability	of	decisiveness	where	the	expected	margin	is	greater	(Brennan	 and	 Lomasky,	 1993,	 ch.	 4).	 We	 should	 note	 in	 passing	 that,	 given	 the	 possibility	 of	competitive	markets	in	votes,	vote	buying	will	not	necessarily	lead	to	more	lopsided	outcomes.	62	 Individuals’	 votes	 also	have	a	 lower	probability	of	decisiveness	where	 the	number	of	 voters	 is	greater	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	4).	
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	3.2.3.	Political	Equality		By	 far	 the	 most	 popular	 objection	 to	 vote	 buying	 appeals	 to	 political	 equality.	Trappenburg	(2000,	p.	355),	for	example,	writes;			 All	 voters	 should	 count	 equally,	 because	 the	 distribution	 of	 political	power	has	everything	to	do	with	equal	citizenship.	The	sphere	of	political	power	should	not	be	 invaded	by	market	principles,	one	should	not	be	able	to	buy	the	voters	favour.		However,	Trappenburg	is	unacceptably	vague.	What	are	the	requirements	of	equal	citizenship?	Why	does	vote	buying	violate	them?	Some	advance	an	instrumentalist	view,	holding	that	vote	buying	would	lead	to	inegalitarian	outcomes	by	diminishing	the	 responsiveness	 of	 elected	 officials	 to	 the	 worse-off	 (Hasen,	 2000,	 p.	 1330;	Karlan,	1994,	p.	1470;	Rose-Ackerman,	1985,	p.	963).	I	have	discussed	instrumental	arguments	of	this	kind	already,	and	will	say	nothing	further	about	them.	There	are	two	 non-instrumental	 egalitarian	 arguments,	 however,	 that	 merit	 closer	investigation.		First,	Stokes	(2007)	appeals	to	Dahl’s	(1989,	p.	86)	‘equal	consideration	of	interests’	principle,	according	to	which	“…during	a	process	of	collective	decision-making,	the	interests	of	every	person	who	is	subject	to	the	decision	must	(within	the	limits	of	feasibility)	be	accurately	interpreted	and	made	known.”	Vote	buying,	Stokes	claims,	violates	this	principle.	Sellers’	votes	do	not	carry	information	as	to	sellers’	interests.	The	 interests	 of	 vote	 sellers,	 therefore,	 are	 neither	made	 known,	 nor	 accurately	interpreted,	 where	 vote	 buying	 is	 permitted.	 Unfortunately,	 Stokes’	 argument	proves	 too	 much.	 Individuals’	 votes	 often	 fail	 to	 carry	 information	 about	 their	interests.	Many	voters	–	20%-30%	in	US	Presidential	elections,	by	some	estimates	(Lau	et	al.,	2008,	p.	402)	–	simply	do	not	know	which	of	the	parties	would	better	promote	their	perceived	interests,	and	end	up	voting	‘incorrectly’	in	consequence.	Moreover,	 there	 is	 the	well-documented	 phenomenon	 of	 sociotropic	 voting	 (e.g.	Feddersen	et	al.,	 2009),	wherein	 individuals	vote	 in	accordance	with	 their	moral	attitudes,	rather	than	their	interests.	Stokes’	argument,	then,	condemns	democratic	
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systems	that	do	not	permit	vote	buying	quite	as	much	as	it	condemns	systems	which	do.		More	promising	is	the	appeal	to	equal	political	power.	David	Copp	(2000,	p.	90),	for	example,	claims	that:			 …a	market	 in	 votes	would	 undermine	 the	 ideal	 of	 equalising	 political	power…	It	would	permit	some	people	to	acquire	greater	political	power	than	others	by	permitting	them	to	buy	and	exercise	more	votes	than	they	are	initially	assigned	by	the	system.63		It	is	overwhelmingly	plausible	that	equal	respect	for	persons	in	the	political	domain	requires	 that	 citizens	enjoy	equal	political	power	of	 some	sort	or	other.64	Yet,	 as	presented	in	the	literature,	the	argument	is	crucially	incomplete.	Some	inequalities	of	political	power	are	obviously	inconsistent	with	equal	respect	–	e.g.	those	which	obtain	between	hereditary	monarchs	and	their	subjects.	Others,	however,	are	not.	In	Persuasion,	for	example,	Jeremy	exercises	far	greater	political	power	(in	at	least	some	sense)	than	the	average	citizen.	There	is	counterfactual	dependence	between	his	television	appearance,	and	10	000	additional	votes	for	same-sex	marriage.	Still,	there	does	not	 seem	 to	 be	 anything	 objectionable	 about	 this	 from	an	 egalitarian	point	of	view.	It	is	not	as	though	Jeremy	has	come	to	command	a	greater	than	equal	share	of	society’s	resources,	or	else	occupy	some	elevated	social	status,	for	example.		It	is	not	enough,	then,	for	proponents	of	the	egalitarian	objection	to	point	out	that	vote	buying	entails	political	inequalities	of	some	kind.	What	needs	to	be	shown	is	that	vote	buying	would	engender	political	inequalities	of	an	objectionable	kind.	Yet,	distinguishing	 between	 malignant	 political	 inequalities	 of	 the	 kind	 plausibly	engendered	 by	 vote	 buying,	 and	 benign	 inequalities	 of	 the	 sort	 described	 in	
Persuasion,	is	not	straightforward.	To	see	this,	consider	two	initially	plausible	ways	in	which	such	a	distinction	might	be	drawn.		
																																																						63	See	also	Christiano	(2003,	p.	55),	Satz	(2010,	p.	102),	Sunstein	(1994,	p.	849),	and	Tobin	(1970,	p.	269).	64	See	Beitz	(1989),	Christiano	(2008),	and	Kolodny	(2014b)	for	contrasting	arguments	to	this	effect.	See	chapter	four	for	an	overview	of	these	arguments.	I	defend	a	requirement	of	this	sort	in	chapter	seven.	
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One	might,	first,	appeal	to	equal	opportunity.	Everyone,	it	might	be	said,	has	equal	opportunities	to	persuade	others	of	their	point	of	view.	Whereas,	given	inequalities	in	wealth,	 persons	 do	 not	 have	 equal	 opportunities	 to	 buy	 votes.	 However,	 it	 is	patently	 false	 that	 individuals	have	equal	opportunities	 to	persuade	one	another.	Persuasion	 requires	 resources	 (e.g.	 knowledge,	 time,	 and	 credibility)	 that	 are	distributed	 very	 unequally	 in	 contemporary	 democratic	 societies.	Moreover,	 this	view	 would	 entail	 that	 vote	 buying	 is	 unobjectionable	 under	 conditions	 of	distributive	 equality.	 If	 persons	 had	 equal	 resources,	 they	 would	 have	 equal	opportunities	to	acquire	additional	votes.	Most	of	us,	I	suspect,	would	still	find	vote	buying	objectionable	under	such	conditions,	however.	This	line	of	argument,	then,	is	unpromising.			Alternatively,	one	might	distinguish	between	political	power	and	political	influence.	We	might	 define	 power,	 on	 this	 view,	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 direct,	 personal	control	over	governmental	decisions.	Influence,	on	the	other	hand,	we	might	define	as	 the	ability	 to	cause	others	 to	mobilise	their	political	power	 in	 the	manner	one	desires.	Jeremy	exercises	unequal	influence,	but	not	unequal	power.	He	causes	10	000	 people	 to	 cast	 their	 votes	 for	 same-sex	 marriage.	 Just	 like	 everyone	 else,	however,	he	has	just	a	single	vote	of	his	own	to	cast.	The	same,	obviously,	cannot	be	said	 of	 Ronald	 the	 rich	 magnate	 who	 purchases	 10	 000	 absentee	 ballots	 to	personally	 fill	 out	 and	 cast	 for	 his	 preferred	 option	 in	 the	 same-sex	 marriage	referendum.	The	latter	enjoys	a	form	of	direct	control	over	the	decision	the	former	does	 not.	 Ronald’s	 conduct,	 moreover,	 seems	 obviously	 objectionable	 in	 a	 way	Jeremy’s	does	not.		Proponents	of	the	egalitarian	view	might	take	our	divergent	intuitions	in	these	cases	as	 evidence	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 inequalities	 of	 power	 are	 objectionable	 from	 an	egalitarian	point	of	view,	whereas	inequalities	of	influence	are	not.	They	might,	then,	go	 on	 to	 claim	 that	 vote	 buying	 (unlike	 persuasion)	 necessarily	 gives	 rise	 to	inequalities	in	power,	and	is	objectionable	on	that	basis.			There	 is	clearly	something	to	this.	 Inequalities	 in	power	are	constitutive	of	many	paradigmatic	relations	of	objectionable	social	inequality.	The	relation	between	lord	and	servant,	for	example,	is	objectionable	partially	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	the	lord	
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is	able	to	exercise	direct,	asymmetric	control	over	his	servants’	lives.65	Husbands	in	the	Victorian	era	 stood	 in	positions	of	objectionable	 superiority	over	 their	wives	partially	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	they	enjoyed	a	great	deal	of	power	and	authority	over	 their	wives’	 access	 to	 resources,	 liberties	 and	 so	 on.	 Contrast	 this	with,	 for	example,	George,	Gerald,	and	Gregory,	who	go	out	for	dinner	once	a	week.	George	is	a	gastronomic	expert,	who	always	succeeds	 in	persuading	the	others	 to	go	to	his	preferred	 restaurants.	 George,	 intuitively,	 does	 not	 occupy	 a	 position	 of	objectionable	 superiority	 over	 his	 friends.	 He	 simply,	 by	 dint	 of	 his	 superior	knowledge,	 is	 able	 to	mobilise	 his	 friends	 to	 act	 so	 as	 to	 conform	 to	his	 desires.	Inequalities	 of	 influence	 (on	 the	 definition	 above)	 do	 not	 seem	 intrinsically	inegalitarian.	I	am	therefore	inclined	to	accept	the	general	point,	here.	Inequalities	of	influence,	unlike	inequalities	in	power,	are	not	necessarily	objectionable	from	an	egalitarian	point	of	view.			The	trouble,	however,	is	that	vote	buying	does	not	necessarily	involve	inequalities	in	 power,	 thus	 defined.	 Direct	 vote	 buyers	 acquire	 property	 rights	 over	 sellers’	ballot	papers,	thereby	increasing	their	own	‘stock’	of	political	power.	A	person	with	10	000	votes	in	their	possession	plainly	enjoys	a	great	deal	more	direct,	personal	control	over	the	political	process	than	a	person	with	a	single	vote.	The	egalitarian	argument,	 on	 this	 interpretation,	 unproblematically	 explains	 the	 wrongness	 of	direct	 vote	 buying.	 Indirect	 vote	 buying,	 however,	 does	 not	 involve	 transfers	 of	property	rights	over	votes.	Indirect	vote	buying,	then,	does	not	necessarily	change	the	 amount	 of	 direct,	 personal	 control	 any	 particular	 agent	 enjoys	 over	governmental	 decisions.66	 Indirect	 vote	 buying,	 on	 the	 definitions	 above,	 rather	affords	vote	buyers	additional	influence.	Vote	buyers	cause	others	to	mobilise	their	own	voting	power	in	the	manner	desired	by	the	vote	buyer,	via	the	offer	of	material	incentives.	The	inequalities	inherent	in	indirect	vote	buying	are	not	distinct	in	kind	from	 those	 which	 obtain	 between	 Jeremy	 and	 the	 citizenry	 in	 Persuasion.	 The	difference,	 instead,	 lies	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 these	 inequalities	 are	 established.	 It	seems	 doubtful,	 then,	 that	 any	 appeal	 to	 the	 sheer	 inequalities	 of	 power	 (or	
																																																						65	I	offer	an	argument	to	the	effect	that	such	relations	are	inherently	inegalitarian,	and	objectionable	in	virtue	of	that	fact,	in	chapter	seven.		66	Though,	of	course,	it	might	do	so	contingently.	Officials	might,	for	example,	be	prepared	to	literally	take	policy	directions	from	a	person	able	to	direct	thousands	of	others’	voting	behaviour.	
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influence)	engendered	by	vote	buying	can	plausibly	differentiate	between	indirect	vote	buying	and	persuasion.67			***		Most	of	the	objections	raised	to	the	accounts	above	take	the	same	form.	Namely,	that	there	are	important	cases	of	objectionable	vote	buying,	the	wrongness	of	which	the	account	in	question	cannot	explain.	That	is	not	to	say	that	any	of	these	arguments	is	entirely	mistaken.	An	account	of	the	wrongness	of	some	act-type	is	not	shown	to	be	wholly	false	merely	because	it	fails	to	explain	the	wrongness	of	every	token	instance	of	 that	 act-type.	 All	 such	 objections	 show	 is	 that	 the	 accounts	 in	 question	 are	incomplete	 explanations	 of	 the	 wrongness	 of	 the	 act-type	 under	 discussion.	We	must	look	to	some	novel	account	if	we	wish	to	explain	the	wrongness	of	the	cases	existing	accounts	fail	to	cover.	In	what	follows,	I	aim	to	offer	just	such	an	account.		3.3.	Vote	Buying	and	Respect	for	Autonomy		I	will	argue	 that	vote	buying	 involves	a	peculiar	 failure	of	 respect	 for	persons	as	autonomous	agents,	and	is	wrong	for	that	reason.68	Call	this	the	‘respect	account’.	Setting	out	the	argument	requires	us	first	to	get	more	precise	over	two	concepts	–	respect,	and	autonomy.		Darwall	 (1977,	 p.	 38)	 distinguishes	 between	 recognition	 respect	 and	 appraisal	respect.	 Appraisal	 respect	 consists	 in	 “…an	 attitude	 of	 positive	 appraisal	 of	 [a]	person	either	as	a	person	or	as	engaged	in	some	particular	pursuit.”	One	might	have	appraisal	 respect	 for	Nelson	Mandela	 as	 an	 exemplar	of	human	 character,	 or	 for	Donald	Bradman	as	an	exceptional	sportsman,	for	instance.	Recognition	respect,	by	contrast,	 consists	 in	 “…giving	 appropriate	 consideration	 or	 recognition	 to	 [some	object	or	property	thereof]	in	deliberating	about	what	to	do.”	Respect	of	this	sort	might	be	extended	to	persons	simply	as	persons,	or	as	bearers	of	particular,	valuable	
																																																						67	I	do	not	claim	that	no	satisfactory	egalitarian	account	of	the	wrongness	of	indirect	vote	buying	is	available.	 Nothing	 I	 say	 in	 the	 following	 section	 is	 incompatible	 with	 vote	 buying	 also	 being	objectionable	on	egalitarian	grounds.	68	Stokes	(2007,	p.	96)	offers	a	different	autonomy-centric	argument	against	vote	buying.	Lippert-Rasmussen	(2011,	p.	134)	offers	a	powerful	critique	of	Stokes’	argument.	
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properties	(e.g.	sentience,	rationality,	moral	equality).	The	intentional	or	negligent	infliction	of	unnecessary	pain	upon	another	person,	for	instance,	evinces	a	failure	of	appropriate	consideration	for	that	person	as	a	bearer	of	the	valuable	property	of	sentience.	It	thereby	constitutes	a	failure	of	recognition	respect	for	that	person	as	a	sentient	 being.	 The	 charge	 I	 shall	 advance	 is	 that	 vote	 buying	 involves	 an	objectionable	failure	of	recognition	respect.	I	shall	therefore	use	the	term	respect	to	refer	only	to	recognition	respect	for	the	remainder	of	the	chapter.		Persons	 possess	 many	 valuable	 properties	 in	 virtue	 of	 which	 they	 are	 owed	recognition	respect.	Prominent	among	these	is	individual	autonomy.	Autonomy	is	a	matter	of	self-governance:	 “…being	one’s	own	person,	directed	by	considerations,	desires,	conditions,	and	characteristics	that	are	not	simply	imposed	externally	on	one,	 but	 are	 part	 of	 what	 can	 somehow	 be	 considered	 one’s	 authentic	 self”	(Christman	 and	 Anderson,	 2005,	 p.	 3).	 There	 is	 extensive	 controversy	 over	 the	sufficient	conditions	for	autonomous	agency.69	Fortunately,	we	need	not	enter	such	debates.	We	need	only	appeal	to	a	single,	uncontroversial	necessary	condition.	The	idea	 of	 autonomous	 agency	 implies	 acting	 for	 reasons.	 Autonomous	 agents,	paradigmatically,	act	on	the	basis	of	considerations	they	recognise	as	counting	 in	favour	of	the	course	of	action	they	are	pursuing.	That	is	to	say,	such	agents	act	on	the	 basis	 of	 reasons.	 By	 contrast,	 very	 young	 children	 do	 not	 plausibly	 count	 as	autonomous	agents	precisely	because	their	behaviour	is	not	plausibly	directed	by	considerations	 they	 can	 recognise	 as	 counting	 in	 favour	of,	 or	 against,	 particular	courses	of	action.	To	count	as	autonomous,	then,	one	must	possess	the	capacity	to	
recognise,	and	respond	to	reasons	 for	action,	 to	a	sufficient	degree.70	Without	that	capacity,	 acting	 for	 reasons	 –	 and,	 thus,	 autonomously	 –	 would	 necessarily	 be	impossible.			Respect	for	persons	as	autonomous	agents	requires	us	to	show	sufficient	regard	for	others’	 valuable	 autonomy-capacities	 (including	 their	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	respond	 to	 reasons),	 and	 refrain	 from	 actions	which	 fail	 to	 display	 such	 regard.	Actions	are	pro	tanto	wrong	to	the	extent	that	they	fail	to	express	such	regard.	Such	actions	 typically	 involve	 some	 form	 of	 unwanted	 interference.	 Paternalistic	
																																																						69	Contrast	Dworkin	(1988)	and	MacKenzie	and	Stoljar	(2000),	for	example.	70	Certainly,	such	a	capacity	is	not	sufficient	for	autonomy.	Slaves	paradigmatically	suffer	impaired	autonomy,	and	yet	could	still	surely	possess	the	capacity	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.	
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interference,	 for	 example,	 involves	 substituting	 one’s	 own	 (allegedly	 superior)	judgement	for	another’s,	wrongfully	displaying	insufficient	regard	for	the	target’s	own	autonomy-capacities	(Shiffrin,	2000,	p.	220).		Respect	for	persons	as	autonomous	agents	in	the	political	domain,	however,	cannot	plausibly	be	a	matter	of	simple	non-interference.	Political	decisions	determine	the	conditions	 under	 which	 the	 state	 subjects	 citizens	 to	 coercion.	 Yet	 the	‘circumstances	of	politics’	are	such	that,	though	there	is	a	need	to	come	to	decisions	as	to	how	our	collective	affairs	are	to	be	structured,	we	cannot	reasonably	expect	any	 such	 decision	 to	 command	 unanimous	 assent,	 given	 the	 inevitable	 fact	 of	disagreement	(Waldron,	1999,	pp.	102-3).	If	political	decisions	are	to	be	taken	at	all,	then,	 it	 is	 simply	 inevitable	 that	 some	 persons	 will	 be	 subject	 to	 unwanted	interference.	 Citizens	 might	 reasonably	 complain	 that	 the	 content	 of	 political	decisions	 subjects	 them	 to	objectionable,	disrespectful	 forms	 of	 interference	 (e.g.	paternalism).	But	they	cannot	reasonably	object	to	the	fact	of	interference,	as	such.			Given	these	facts,	then,	I	hold	that	respect	for	persons	as	autonomous	agents	in	the	political	 domain	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 procedures	 by	 which	 political	 outcomes	 are	realised.71	Political	decisions	must	be	made	in	accordance	with	procedures	which,	in	themselves,	express	sufficient	regard	for	the	autonomous	agency	of	those	who	are	to	be	subject	to	those	decisions.	I	think	vote	buying	is	wrong	because,	as	an	aspect	of	political	procedure,	it	is	deeply	disrespectful	of	citizens	as	autonomous	agents.			To	see	this,	it	will	be	easiest	to	begin	with	a	non-political	case.			
Business:	Dominic,	Matthew,	and	Jane	jointly	own	a	business.	They	must	collectively	decide	whether	to	f	or	Y.	Jane	argues	in	favour	of	Ying	on	the	grounds	that	fing	will	cause	wrongful	harm	to	John,	whereas	Ying	will	 not.	 Matthew,	 however,	 has	 paid	 Dominic	 $100	 to	 simply	 ignore	whatever	 Jane	 has	 to	 say.	 Dominic,	 therefore,	 gives	 no	weight	 to	 this	consideration	 in	his	deliberations.	A	vote	 is	eventually	 taken.	Dominic	
																																																						71	This	general	line	of	argument	is	familiar.	See	Valentini	(2013,	pp.	192-5)	and	Waldron	(1999,	ch.	5),	for	example.	
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and	 Matthew	 vote	 to	 Y	 anyway,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 doing	 so	 will	maximise	profit.		Matthew’s	 behaviour	 is	 egregiously	 disrespectful	 of	 Jane.	 In	 general,	 the	 fitting	response	to	becoming	cognisant	of	some	consideration	which	counts	in	favour	of	(or	against)	some	action	is	to	give	weight	to	that	consideration	in	one’s	deliberations	–	i.e.	to	treat	that	consideration	as	a	reason	for	action	(Smith,	1994,	pp.	71-6).72	That,	in	turn,	suggests	that	the	fitting	attitude	to	adopt	towards	agents	one	recognises	as	having	the	capacity	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons	is	a	kind	of	openness.	One	ought,	at	least,	acknowledge	the	possibility	that	considerations	advanced	by	others	might	amount	to	reasons	in	favour	of,	or	against,	the	course	of	action	in	question,	and	might	therefore	merit	weight	in	the	deliberations	of	those	making	the	decision.			It	is	for	this	reason	that	Matthew’s	conduct	is	objectionable.	His	actions	express	the	conviction	 that	no	 considerations	 advanced	by	 Jane	 ought	 to	 be	 given	weight	 by	others,	 whatever	 those	 considerations	 might	 be.	 That	 constitutes	 a	 highly	objectionable	 failure	 of	 respect	 for	 Jane’s	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	reasons.	 If	Matthew	did	 recognise	 Jane’s	 capacities	 in	 this	 respect,	he	would	also	recognise	that	Jane	might	advance	considerations	that	amount	to	reasons.	In	which	case,	as	we	have	argued,	the	fitting	response	on	the	part	of	others	would	be	to	attach	weight	 to	 those	 considerations,	 rather	 than	 ignore	 them.	 Given	 the	 central	importance	 of	 the	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons	 for	 individual	autonomy,	 Matthew’s	 actions	 express	 a	 profound	 lack	 of	 respect	 for	 Jane	 as	 an	autonomous	agent.		Here,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 precise.	 The	 wrongness	 of	 Matthew’s	 conduct	 is	 not	explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	he	causes	Dominic	 to	 give	no	weight	 to	 considerations	advanced	 by	 Jane.	 It	 is	 not	 necessarily	 disrespectful	 to	 fail	 to	 give	 weight	 to	considerations	advanced	by	others	 in	deliberation.	 It	 is	 therefore	not	necessarily	wrong	to	cause	others	to	fail	to	do	so.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	Jane	had	instead	argued	in	favour	of	fing	on	the	grounds	that	doing	so	would	cause	wrongful	harm	to	John.	Clearly,	there	would	be	nothing	wrong	with	Dominic’s	failing	to	regard	that	
																																																						72	Individuals	who	fail	to	give	weight	to	considerations	which	count	in	favour	of	some	contemplated	action	are,	to	that	extent,	rationally	criticisable.	
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consideration	as	counting	in	favour	of	fing.	His	doing	so	would	reflect	a	legitimate	judgement	 as	 to	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 particular	 consideration	 to	 which	 Jane	 has	appealed,	rather	than	a	judgement	as	to	Jane’s	capacity	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons	in	general.		Nor	does	the	wrong	of	Matthew’s	conduct	consist	in	his	causing	Dominic	to	ignore	
reasonable	 considerations	 advanced	 by	 Jane.	 Suppose	 that	 Dominic	 would	 have	ignored	 Jane	 even	 if	 Matthew	 had	 not	 paid	 him	 to	 do	 so.	 Matthew’s	 actions,	intuitively,	would	remain	highly	objectionable.	This,	I	suggest,	is	because	Matthew’s	actions	express	the	conviction	that	none	of	the	considerations	Jane	might	potentially	advance	ought	to	be	regarded	as	reasons	for	action	in	the	relevant	context.	It	is	that	which	derogates	 Jane’s	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons	 –	 and	 that,	therefore,	which	expresses	disrespect	for	her	as	an	autonomous	agent.		I	think	that	the	wrong	of	vote	buying	is	continuous	with	the	wrong	exemplified	by	Matthew’s	behaviour	in	Business.	The	typical	objective	of	vote	buying	is	to	guarantee	(or,	at	 least,	 raise	 the	probability)	 that	one’s	preferred	political	outcomes	will	be	realised	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 considerations	 others	 might	 advance	 in	 the	 deliberative	process	prior	to	the	vote.	Buying	votes	would	make	no	sense	 if	one	expected	the	citizenry	to	support	one’s	preferred	political	outcome	on	its	merits	or,	alternatively,	if	one	were	willing	to	accept	the	citizenry’s	 judgement	on	the	matter.	Buyers	pay	sellers	 to	 vote	 simply	 as	 the	 buyer	 directs.	 In	 effect,	 sellers	 are	 paid	 to	 be	
unresponsive	 to	countervailing	considerations	advanced	by	others	 in	determining	how	they	will	vote,	whatever	those	considerations	might	be.	That,	I	think,	amounts	to	 a	 clear	 failure	 of	 appropriate	 regard	 for	 one’s	 fellow	 citizens’	 capacities	 to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.		As	we	have	argued,	the	appropriate	recognition	of	such	capacities	in	others	involves	acknowledging	the	possibility	that	others	might	advance	considerations	that	ought	to	be	treated	as	reasons	by	the	relevant	decision-makers.	In	the	political	case,	this	requires	one	to	acknowledge	the	possibility	that	one’s	fellow	citizens	might	advance	considerations	that	genuinely	count	in	favour	of,	or	against,	the	various	options	on	the	 political	 agenda.	 Vote	 buying	 expresses	 the	 opposite:	 that	 citizens	 ought	 not	treat	considerations	advanced	by	others	(or,	at	least,	considerations	which	militate	
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against	the	buyer’s	preferred	outcome)	as	reasons.	Given	the	central	importance	of	the	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons	 for	 autonomous	 agency,	 vote	buying	 thus	 expresses	 a	 profoundly	 disrespectful	 attitude	 towards	 one’s	 fellow	citizens	as	autonomous	agents.		It	 is,	 as	 ever,	 important	 to	 be	 precise.	 Vote	 buyers	 pay	 sellers	 to	 disregard	considerations	advanced	by	others	in	the	deliberative	process.	But	that,	in	itself,	is	not	what	is	fundamentally	wrong	with	vote	buying.	It	is	not	disrespectful	to	refuse	to	give	weight	to	unreasonable	considerations	(e.g.	racist	or	sexist	considerations)	advanced	 by	 others	 in	 political	 deliberation,	 for	 example.	 Doing	 so	 does	 not	necessarily	derogate	others’	capacities	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.	It	might	simply	express	the	reasonable	conviction	that	a	particular	consideration	advanced	by	others	ought	to	be	discounted.		Vote	 buyers,	 of	 course,	 also	 cause	 citizens	 to	 fail	 to	 give	 weight	 to	 reasonable	considerations	advanced	by	others.	But	such	failures	are	ubiquitous	in	democratic	societies.	 No	 citizen	 has	 the	 time	 or	 resources	 to	 give	 sufficient	 attention	 to	 all	considerations	–	reasonable	or	unreasonable	–	advanced	in	public	deliberation.	It	seems	 doubtful	 that	 the	wrong	 of	 vote	 buying	 consists	 in	 causing	 citizens	 to	 do	something	they	were	virtually	certain	to	do	in	any	case.		The	wrong	of	vote	buying,	rather,	consists	in	the	disrespectful	attitude	it	expresses	concerning	the	capacity	of	one’s	fellow	citizens	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons	–	i.e.	that	citizens	ought	not	treat	considerations	advanced	by	others,	whatever	they	
might	 be,	 as	 reasons	 for	 action.	 Vote	 buyers	 express	 a	 deep	 disrespect	 for	 their	fellow	citizens	as	autonomous	agents,	just	as	Matthew	expresses	a	deep	disrespect	for	 Jane.73	 It	 is	 this,	 I	 claim,	which	 fundamentally	explains	 the	wrongness	of	vote	buying.		
																																																						73	 One	might	 object	 that	 the	 two	 cases	 are	 distinct	 in	 the	 following	way.	 Vote	 buyers	 express	 a	negative	 attitude	 towards	 their	 fellow	 citizens	de	 dicto.	 Matthew,	 however,	 expresses	 a	 negative	attitude	towards	Jane	de	re.	The	latter,	one	might	claim,	is	disrespectful,	whereas	the	former	is	not.	I	don’t	see	why.	Suppose	that	Matthew	and	Dominic	were	about	to	go	 into	a	business	meeting,	but	were	unsure	who	else	was	going	to	be	there.	Dominic’s	paying	Matthew	to	ignore	whatever	anyone	else	has	to	say	–	whoever	they	might	be	–	still	seems	intuitively	disrespectful.		
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However,	 to	 explain	 the	 wrongness	 of	 vote	 buying	 is	 not	 yet	 to	 justify	 its	criminalisation.74	 Verdicts	 as	 to	 the	 wrongness	 of	 some	 act-type	 do	 not	automatically	entail	verdicts	as	to	the	rightness	of	criminalising	that	act-type.	My	intentionally	breaking	a	promise	to	meet	Connie	for	lunch	is	morally	wrong.	Still,	no-one	should	think	it	appropriate	for	the	state	to	punish	me	for	doing	so.	It	might,	moreover,	be	thought	that	the	respect	account	faces	a	particular	difficulty	on	this	score.	There	are,	after	all,	many	ways	in	which	one	can	express	disrespect	for	others’	capacities	as	autonomous	agents.	Sexists	who	argue	for	the	disenfranchisement	of	women	 by	 appeal	 to	 their	 purportedly	 inferior	 mental	 capacities,	 for	 instance,	clearly	 express	 an	 objectionable	 failure	 of	 respect	 for	 women’s	 capacities	 as	autonomous	agents.	Yet,	most	of	us	would	regard	punishing	such	persons	for	public	utterances	of	that	sort	as	an	unacceptable	infringement	upon	freedom	of	expression.			Proponents	of	the	respect	account	might,	as	such,	be	thought	to	face	a	dilemma.	They	might	insist	that	vote	buying	ought	to	be	punished,	given	its	disrespectful	character.	They	will	then,	however,	be	unable	to	explain	why	sexist	public	utterances	and	the	like	ought	not	 also	be	punished.	On	 the	other	hand,	 they	might	 concede	 that	 the	latter	ought	not	be	punished.	However,	they	will	then	be	unable	to	explain	why	vote	buying	ought	to	be	punished.	Either	way,	the	account	is	problematic.		This,	however,	is	a	false	dilemma.	The	appropriateness	of	punishing	a	particular	act-type	is	a	matter	not	merely	of	the	wrongness	of	the	act-type,	but	also	of	the	other	considerations	in	play.	The	wrongness	of	a	given	act-type	renders	the	proportionate	punishment	of	acts	of	that	type	prima	facie	appropriate.	But,	if	the	punishment	of	some	wrongful	 action	would	have	unacceptable	moral	 costs,	 punishment	will	 be	inappropriate,	 all	 things	 considered.	This	 explains	why	punishing	 individuals	 for	breaking	minor	promises	is	inappropriate.	The	institutional	mechanisms	required	to	carry	out	such	punishments	would	be	hideously	intrusive,	for	example.		Proponents	of	the	respect	account,	then,	can	respond	to	the	 ‘dilemma’	as	follows.	Publicly	degrading	the	capacities	of	women	is	wrongful,	because	disrespectful.	But	criminalising	disrespectful	public	utterances	of	this	sort	would	entail	unacceptable	
																																																						74	This	is	important.	One	of	motivations	with	which	we	began	the	discussion	was	to	explain	why	it	is	that	the	state	might	legitimately	punish	vote	buying.	
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moral	 costs.	 Doing	 so	 would	 risk	 a	 chilling	 effect,	 wherein	 persons	 self-censor	legitimate	speech	out	of	fear	of	criminal	prosecution.	There	is	the	risk	that	judges	interpreting	 statutes	 criminalising	 such	 speech	 will	 read	 them	 too	 broadly,	punishing	legitimate	acts	of	expression.	There	is	also	the	risk	of	causing	a	backlash	against	the	communities	such	laws	might	aim	to	protect.	And	so	on.	Criminalising	vote	buying,	by	contrast,	would	entail	no	such	costs.	Indeed,	given	that	vote	buying	will	almost	always	be	instrumentally	bad	(as	we	have	argued	above),	bans	on	the	practice	are	likely	beneficial,	rather	than	harmful.		Proponents	 of	 the	 respect	 account,	 therefore,	 have	 a	 straightforward,	 three-part	explanation	for	why	vote	buying	ought	to	be	punished.	First,	vote	buying	is	morally	wrongful.	Punishing	vote	buying	is	thus	prima	facie	appropriate.	That	justification	might	be	defeated	if	it	could	be	demonstrated	that	punishing	vote	buying	is	likely	to	entail	unacceptable	moral	costs	of	other	kinds.	However,	secondly,	punishing	vote	buyers	would	not	entail	unacceptable	moral	costs	of	other	kinds.	 Indeed,	 thirdly,	bans	on	vote	buying	almost	certainly	have	a	range	of	good	consequences	of	other	kinds.	The	respect	account,	then,	explains	both	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying,	and	the	appropriateness	of	banning	the	practice.		The	 respect	 account	 also	 avoids	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 alternative	 accounts.	 The	account	makes	no	 reference	 to	 the	outcomes	 realised	by	vote	buying.	Unlike	 the	instrumental	 account,	 then,	 it	 is	 able	 to	 explain	what’s	 objectionable	 about	 vote	buying	 even	 in	 cases	 where	 it	 might	 realise	 favourable	 results.	 Unlike	 the	exploitation	and	participatory	accounts,	the	respect	account	can	explain	why	vote	buying	 wrongs	 individuals	 qua	 individuals.	 All	 citizens	 have	 claims	 that	 others	respect	their	autonomous	agency.	Others	have	duties	not	to	perform	actions	which	fail	 to	express	such	respect.	Vote	buyers	violate	 those	duties.	Finally,	 the	respect	account	 offers	 us	 the	 resources	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 malignant	 political	inequalities	engendered	by	vote	buying,	and	the	benign	inequalities	exemplified	in	
Persuasion.75	Political	inequalities	founded	upon	(sufficiently	respectful)	persuasion	and	 argument	 do	 not	 constitute	 failures	 of	 respect	 for	 persons	 as	 autonomous	agents.	Indeed,	such	inequalities	arise	in	virtue	of	a	process	(rational	persuasion)	
																																																						75	Though,	 to	be	clear,	 I	do	not	 think	all	 inequalities	which	arise	 in	argument	and	persuasion	are	morally	unproblematic	(see	Sanders,	1997).	
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which	implies	a	recognition	of	such	capacities.	It	would	make	no	sense	to	seek	to	rationally	 persuade	 others	 of	 one’s	 point	 of	 view	 unless	 one	 recognised	 others’	capacities	 to	 recognise	 the	 considerations	 to	which	 one	 appeals	 as	 reasons,	 and	respond	 appropriately	 (agents	 without	 such	 capacities,	 presumably,	 cannot	 be	moved	by	reasons	and	thus	cannot	be	persuaded	of	anything).	The	same,	obviously,	cannot	be	said	of	vote	buying.			The	 respect	 account	 also	 has	 the	 resources	 to	 resolve	 two	 important	 puzzles	concerning	 vote	 buying.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 Lippert-Rasmussen’s	 (2011)	 puzzle	over	the	moral	difference	between	vote	buying	and	election	promises	mentioned	in	the	 introduction.	 Unlike	 vote	 buying,	 there	 is	 no	 sense	 in	 which	 promising	 to	promote	 the	 interests	 of	 citizens	 if	 elected	 expresses	 disrespect	 for	 citizens’	capacities	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons.	 Indeed,	 issuing	 such	 promises	implies	a	recognition	of	such	capacities.	Pursuing	such	a	strategy	makes	sense	only	insofar	as	one	believes	citizens	can	recognise	and	respond	to	an	important	sort	of	reason	for	action	–	i.e.	self-interest.		The	second	puzzle	is	raised	by	Freiman	(2014,	pp.	765-6),	who	asks	why	vote	buying	ought	 to	 be	 legally	 prohibited	 if	 relevantly	 similar	 practices	 like	 pork-barrelling	ought	 to	 be	 legally	 permitted?	 The	 respect	 account	 supplies	 us	 with	 a	straightforward	 answer.	 Pork-barrelling	 might	 generally	 be	 regrettable	 on	instrumental	 grounds.	 In	 itself,	 however,	 it	 does	 not	 involve	 any	 expression	 of	disrespect	for	persons	as	autonomous	agents.	Rather,	like	election	promises,	pork-barrelling	 only	makes	 sense	 as	 a	 political	 strategy	 insofar	 as	 one	 recognises	 the	capacity	of	one’s	fellow	citizens	to	recognise	reasons	of	self-interest.76		The	 respect	 account,	 then,	 offers	 an	 independently	 compelling	 account	 of	 the	wrongness	 of	 vote	 buying,	 an	 explanation	 as	 to	 why	 vote	 buying	 ought	 to	 be	criminalised,	avoids	the	problems	of	competing	views,	and	resolves	two	important	puzzles	about	vote	buying.	Still,	there	is	an	important	line	of	objection	it	is	worth	briefly	exploring.		
																																																						76	Vote	buyers	also,	of	course,	acknowledge	the	capacity	of	vote	sellers	to	recognise	reasons	of	self-interest.	The	difference	between	vote	buying	and	pork	barrelling	is	the	attitude	expressed	by	vote	buyers	 towards	 third	 parties	 to	 those	 transactions	 –	 i.e.	 those	 whose	 deliberative	 contributions	buyers	pay	others	to	ignore.	
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	3.4.	Objections		Much	the	most	obvious	way	in	which	one	might	object	to	the	respect	account	would	be	 to	 contend	 that	 the	 account	 proves	 too	much.77	One	 version	 of	 this	 objection	would	 claim,	 following	 Iris	 Marion	 Young’s	 (2001)	 critique	 of	 deliberative	democracy,	 that	 the	 respect	 account	 unacceptably	 rules	 out	 a	 range	 of	 valuable	forms	of	political	activism.	The	respect	account	requires	that	citizens	pursue	their	political	 objectives	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 expresses	 sufficient	 regard	 for	 others’	autonomy-capacities	 –	 particularly,	 their	 capacity	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	reasons.	It	might	be	thought	that	this,	in	turn,	would	require	that	individuals	pursue	their	 preferred	 political	 outcomes	 only	 via	 processes	 of	 rational,	 deliberative	persuasion	and	argument	of	 the	sort	 familiar	 from	(some!)	philosophy	seminars.	That,	in	turn,	rules	out	a	range	of	other	forms	of	political	activity	–	political	protest	and	civil	disobedience,	 for	example.	That	 is	surely	unacceptable.	Opportunities	to	engage	in	such	activism	are	among	the	most	valuable	aspects	of	democratic	social	arrangements.			This,	 however,	 simply	misunderstands	 the	 respect	 account.	 The	 respect	 account	does	 require	 that	 citizens,	 in	 advancing	 their	 political	 objectives,	 show	 sufficient	regard	for	others’	capacities	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.	Political	protest	and	civil	disobedience	will	often	be	perfectly	acceptable	on	that	score,	insofar	as	the	object	 and	 effect	 of	 such	 exercises	 is	 simply	 to	 raise	 issues	 in	 the	 public	consciousness,	and	persuade	others	of	the	activists’	point	of	view.	Such	exercises	do	not	express	disrespect	of	any	sort.	 Indeed,	as	noted	above,	attempts	 to	persuade	others	of	anything	imply	a	recognition	of	others’	capacities	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.		More	militant	acts	of	protest	and	civil	disobedience	cannot	be	described	in	this	way,	insofar	 as	 their	 object	 is	 to	 bring	 about	 political	 outcomes	 by	 force.	 The	 respect	account	 does	 entail	 that	 these	 forms	 of	 activism	 are	 objectionable.	 That	 seems	exactly	right.	Arson	attacks	on	abortion	clinics	are	a	form	of	political	activism.	They	
																																																						77	One	version	of	this	objection	would	hold	that	the	respect	account	would	require	the	criminalisation	of	an	excessively	expansive	set	of	expressive	acts.	I	have	responded	to	this	charge	already,	above.		
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are	also	obviously	wrongful.	Part	of	the	explanation	of	that	fact	is,	plausibly,	their	disrespectful	character.		This	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 however,	 that	 more	 militant	 forms	 of	 activism	 can	 never	 be	justified.	Respect	for	autonomy	is	a	significant	moral	value.	In	my	view,	however,	it	is	 not	 lexically	 prior	 to	 all	 other	 values.	 If	 the	 goods	 which	 might	 plausibly	 be	realised	by	more	militant	forms	of	activism	are	weighty	enough,	then	such	activism	may	sometimes	be	justified	–	though	always,	in	some	sense,	morally	regrettable,	in	virtue	of	its	disrespectful	character.			This,	of	course,	commits	proponents	of	 the	respect	account	 to	 the	view	that	vote	buying	might	 also	 sometimes	 be	 justified	 all-things-considered	 (though	 in	 some	sense	morally	regrettable),	if	the	goods	it	might	achieve	are	weighty	enough.	That,	though,	is	hardly	an	objectionable	feature	of	the	respect	account.	On	the	contrary,	it	will	be	a	consequence	of	any	view	of	vote	buying	which	does	not	regard	the	value	upon	which	it	is	premised	as	lexically	prior	to	all	others.	It	also	seems	exactly	right.	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	vote	buying	was	the	only	way	to	stop	a	government	hell-bent	on	genocide	or	enslavement	coming	to	power.	Surely,	 in	such	a	case,	buying	votes	 would	 not	 merely	 be	 permissible,	 but	 required,	 all-things-considered.	 We	should	reject	any	view,	I	think,	which	entails	otherwise.			In	practice,	as	we	have	argued	above,	 there	will	be	very	 few	cases	 in	which	vote	buying	is	likely	to	have	anything	other	than	bad	effects.	There	will	therefore	be	still	fewer	in	which	vote	buying’s	good	effects	outweigh	the	disvalue	of	the	practice,	all-things-considered.	 Certainly,	 such	 instances	will	 be	 so	 uncommon	 as	 to	 lend	 no	plausibility	to	any	claim	that	legal	prohibitions	on	the	practice	should	be	lifted.	This	line	of	objection,	then,	is	unsuccessful.		We	 might,	 however,	 reframe	 the	 objection	 as	 follows.	 The	 charge	 against	 vote	buying,	on	the	respect	account,	 is	that	vote	buyers	express	the	conviction	that	no	considerations	others	might	advance	in	the	deliberative	process	ought	to	be	treated	as	reasons	for	action.	As	such,	vote	buyers	fail	to	express	sufficient	regard	for	others’	capacities	 to	 recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons	 in	 the	political	 process	 –	 and,	 by	extension,	express	disrespect	for	such	persons	as	autonomous	agents.	Yet	speech	
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acts	urging	that	the	deliberative	contributions	of	others	ought	to	be	disregarded	are	commonplace	in	democratic	life.	In	many	cases,	they	seem	entirely	unproblematic.	Public	 health	 advocates	 urge	 us	 to	 disregard	 the	 deliberative	 contributions	 of	tobacco	lobbyists,	for	example.	The	respect	account	would	appear	to	condemn	such	speech	acts	as	wrongful.	That,	surely,	cannot	be	right.		I	have	a	two-part	response,	here.	First,	we	should	notice	that	there	are	many	speech	acts	 of	 this	 general	 sort	 that	 are	 objectionably	 disrespectful.	 Sexists	 might	 urge	citizens	to	discount	the	deliberative	contributions	of	women	on	the	grounds	of	their	purportedly	inferior	mental	capacities,	for	example.	Speech	acts	of	that	sort	express	an	adverse,	unwarranted	judgment	as	to	others’	capacities	to	recognise	and	respond	to	reasons.	We	are	right	to	condemn	such	utterances	as	wrongful.	It	is	a	virtue,	not	a	defect,	of	the	respect	account,	that	it	is	able	to	explain	the	precise	character	of	the	wrong	such	utterances	involve.78		Secondly,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 look	closely	at	cases	 in	which	such	utterances	do	not	seem	objectionable.	In	my	view,	public	health	advocates	(and	the	like)	are	not	best	interpreted	 as	 advancing	 any	 claims	 as	 to	 the	 capacities	 of	 tobacco	 lobbyists	 to	recognise	 and	 respond	 to	 reasons.	 Rather,	 their	 claims	 are	 better	 interpreted	 as	pertaining	 to	 the	 conduct	 and	 motivations	 of	 such	 persons.	 Namely,	 that	 the	considerations	 such	persons	advance	 in	public	deliberation	do	not	proceed	 from	good-faith	attempts	to	exercise	their	deliberative	capacities.	Rather,	they	represent	disingenuous	attempts	 to	 advance	 the	 interests	of	 the	groups	 they	 represent	–	 a	claim	 for	which	 there	 is	 ample,	widely	 accepted	 evidence.	 Such	utterances,	 then,	represent	 legitimate	 judgments	 as	 to	 the	merits	 of	 the	 particular	 considerations	tobacco	lobbyists	(and	their	ilk)	advance	–	not	global	judgements	as	to	the	capacities	of	such	persons.	The	respect	account,	then,	does	not	condemn	such	utterances	as	wrongful.		One	might	worry,	at	this	point,	that	this	commits	proponents	of	the	respect	account	to	 the	 view	 that	vote	 buying	might	 sometimes	be	 unobjectionable.	 After	 all,	 vote	buyers	might,	perhaps,	choose	to	buy	votes	not	out	of	a	desire	to	promote	their	own	
																																																						78	Though,	as	we	have	argued	above,	this	in	no	way	commits	proponents	of	the	respect	account	to	the	view	that	such	speech	acts	ought	to	be	criminalised.	
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political	 interests	but,	rather,	 in	response	to	some	legitimate	 judgement	as	to	the	merits	 of	 the	 particular	 deliberative	 contributions	 advanced	 by	 some	 political	opponent.79	To	fix	ideas,	we	might	imagine	that	some	tobacco	control	measure	was	up	 for	 direct	 referendum,	 and	 some	 wealthy	 public	 health	 advocate	 chose	 to	purchase	votes	out	of	a	legitimate	concern	that	the	deliberative	contributions	of	the	tobacco	lobby	were	without	merit.			Notice,	 however,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 crucial	 difference	 between	 the	 expressive	significance	 of	 purchasing	 votes,	 and	 publicly	 declaring	 that	 the	 deliberative	contributions	of	 some	particular	agent	or	agents	 should	be	disregarded.	Namely,	that	 in	 the	 latter	case,	one	expresses	a	specific	 judgement	as	 to	 the	merits	of	 the	considerations	advanced	by	some	proper	subset	of	ones’	political	opponents.	Vote	buyers,	by	 contrast,	 enter	 into	 contracts	with	vote	 sellers,	 requiring	 the	 latter	 to	disregard	the	deliberative	contributions	of	all	one’s	political	opponents,	regardless	of	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 particular	 considerations	 they	 might	 advance.	 It	 is	 simply	implausible,	in	any	real-world	political	decision,	that	there	will	be	nothing	of	merit	that	might	be	said	in	favour	of	political	propositions	with	which	one	disagrees.	The	buying	of	votes,	then,	will	be	disrespectful	in	a	way	that	the	mere	expression	of	a	legitimate	judgement	as	to	the	merits	of	a	particular	set	of	considerations	advanced	by	others	will	not	be.	This	line	of	objection,	then,	is	also	unsuccessful.		3.5.	Conclusion		In	 this	piece,	 I	have	sought	 to	defend	 the	orthodox	wisdom	–	 that	vote	buying	 is	morally	 wrong,	 and	 that	 prohibitions	 on	 vote	 buying	 are	 morally	 justified.	Instrumental	considerations	tell	heavily	against	vote	buying,	but	are	not	decisive.	And	 while	 existing	 non-instrumental	 accounts	 typically	 gesture	 towards	 serious	concerns	with	vote	buying,	they	all,	ultimately,	fail	to	explain	the	wrongness	of	vote	buying	 in	 an	 unacceptably	 wide	 range	 of	 cases.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 the	disrespectful	character	of	vote	buying	which	ultimately	explains	what’s	wrong	with	the	practice.	Existing	bans	on	the	practice	are,	as	such,	morally	justified.			 	
																																																						79	Such	persons	are	surely	vanishingly	rare.	
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4.	Enfranchising	the	Youth:	An	Argument	from	Convergence		The	twentieth	century	bore	witness	to	a	great	expansion	in	access	to	voting	rights	worldwide.	Australia	enfranchised	women	at	the	federal	level	in	1902,	followed	by	the	UK	between	1918	and	1928,	and	the	US	in	1920.	Indigenous	Australians	were	gradually	enfranchised	between	1949	and	1965.	The	passage	of	the	Voting	Rights	
Act	 in	1965	ended	the	most	egregious	cases	of	the	disenfranchisement	of	African	Americans	 in	 the	 South.	 The	 blanket	 exclusion	 of	 children,	 however,	 remains	 a	virtually	constant	feature	of	democratic	societies.	The	vast	majority	of	democracies	extend	voting	rights	only	to	those	over	the	age	of	18.80	Survey	data	shows	that	an	overwhelming	majority	of	people	support	these	arrangements.81	Many	major	works	in	democratic	theory	do	not	mention	the	issue	at	all	(e.g.	Estlund,	2008;	Kolodny,	2014b;	Pettit,	2012;	Waldron,	1999).	Those	which	do	tend	to	assume	that	children’s	exclusion	is	justified	without	much	argument	(e.g.	Dahl,	1989,	pp.	56,	126-7).	In	this	chapter,	I	challenge	the	conventional	wisdom.	I	argue	that	children,	from	around	the	age	of	twelve	ought,	morally,	be	enfranchised,	and	that	their	ongoing	exclusion	is	unjust.82		The	 argument	 developed	 over	 the	 following	 pages	 is	 an	 argument	 from	
convergence.83	There	are	many	different	accounts	of	the	justification	of	voting	rights.	I	 show	 that	 each	 of	 these	 accounts,	 when	 read	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 relevant	evidence	 from	 developmental	 psychology,	 yields	 a	 positive	 requirement	 to	enfranchise	children	from	the	age	of	twelve	or	so.	Moreover,	I	show	that	attempts	to	modify	or	re-interpret	such	accounts	so	as	to	defend	the	exclusion	of	children	tend	to	 have	 unacceptably	 exclusionary	 consequences	 with	 respect	 to	 other	 social	
																																																						80	Some	(e.g.	Singapore	and	Malaysia)	set	 the	age	as	high	as	21.	A	small	number	(e.g.	Austria	and	Brazil)	have	lowered	the	age	to	16.		81	In	the	2010	Australian	Election	Study	when	asked	“Do	you	think	that	the	voting	age	in	elections	should	be	lowered	to	16,	or	should	it	stay	at	18?”,	72%	of	respondents	replied	that	it	should	definitely	stay	at	18,	and	22%	replied	that	it	should	probably	stay	at	18	(McAllister,	2012,	pp.	5-8).	The	United	Kingdom	Electoral	Commission	found	that	78%	of	people	favoured	keeping	the	voting	age	at	18	in	2004	(Commission,	2004).	82	 I	 am	not	 the	 first	 to	 challenge	 the	orthodoxy.	 See	Cook	 (2013),	Goodin	and	Lau	 (2011),	Harris	(1982),	Hart	and	Atkins	(2011),	Lau	(2012),	López-Guerra	(2014,	ch.	3),	Merry	and	Schinkel	(2016),	Munn	(2012a;	2012b),	Peto	(Forthcoming),	and	Schrag	(1975;	2004).	83	 Schrag	 (2004)	attempts	 a	 somewhat	 similar	 strategy.	However,	his	discussion	neglects	 several	prominent	approaches,	as	well	as	several	significant	objections.	
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groups.	Arguments	of	this	form	are	quite	uncommon	in	democratic	theory.84	That,	I	think,	 is	 surprising.	 Arguments	 from	 convergence	 have	 at	 least	 two	 significant,	distinctive	virtues	it	is	worth	briefly	setting	out.			By	far	the	most	important	virtue	of	such	arguments	is	epistemic.	There	are	–	as	we	shall	see	–	several	conflicting	approaches	to	the	justification	of	voting	rights	on	offer	in	democratic	 theory.	Powerful	 arguments	have	been	marshalled	 for	 and	against	each.85	Some	uncertainty	over	which	is	correct	is	both	rationally	appropriate	and	inevitable.	We	can,	at	most,	be	as	confident	in	the	soundness	of	an	argument	rooted	in	any	one	approach,	as	we	are	in	the	approach	itself.	Arguments	from	convergence,	on	the	other	hand,	ought	to	inspire	a	substantially	higher	degree	of	confidence	since,	if	 successful,	 they	 demonstrate	 that	 one	 should	 accept	 the	 claim	 over	which	 the	diverse	theoretical	approaches	converge,	regardless	of	one’s	degree	of	confidence	in	each	of	the	underlying	theoretical	approaches.		A	second,	related	virtue	is	robustness.	Arguments	from	convergence	do	not	stand	or	fall	with	any	particular	 theoretical	approach.	That	 is	because	 the	success	of	 such	arguments	does	not	depend	upon	the	soundness	of	any	particular	approach.	The	conclusion	holds,	whichever	of	the	underlying	theoretical	approaches	turns	out	to	be	right.		In	 what	 follows,	 then,	 I	 stay	 neutral	 as	 to	 whether	 any	 particular	 theoretical	approach	we	shall	discuss	is	correct.	I	defend	only	the	following	two,	much	weaker	claims:	(a)	that	proponents	of	each	of	the	accounts	we	shall	discuss	have	powerful	reasons	to	endorse	the	enfranchisement	of	children	from	around	the	age	of	twelve,	and	(b)	that	this	convergence	is,	in	itself,	a	powerful	reason	to	accept	that	the	status	
quo	disenfranchisement	of	such	children	is,	in	fact,	unjust.		The	chapter	is	in	four	sections.	Section	one	discusses	instrumental	accounts.	I	argue	that	the	goods	to	which	proponents	of	these	views	have	characteristically	appealed	would	 be	 better	 promoted	 by	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 minors	 than	 by	 their	
																																																						84	They	are	a	little	more	prominent	in	other	areas	of	political	theory	(Carens	(1987),	for	example,	famously	employs	such	a	strategy	in	defence	of	open	borders),	and	widespread	in	other	fields	–	e.g.	applied	ethics.	85	See	Kolodny	(2014a)	for	an	excellent	critical	survey.	
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continued	exclusion.	Section	two	discusses	non-instrumental	accounts.	I	argue	that	the	 values	 to	 which	 proponents	 of	 these	 accounts	 characteristically	 appeal	 in	justifying	universal	adult	suffrage	also	ground	claims	to	enfranchisement	for	many	children.	 Both	 sections	 also	 engage	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 objections	 to	 child	enfranchisement.	 Section	 three	 briefly	 discusses	 some	 practical	 implications.	Section	four	concludes.		4.1.	Instrumental	Approaches		Instrumental	approaches	seek	to	justify	the	extension	of	voting	rights	to	citizens	by	appeal	to	the	values	that	democratic	decision-making	characteristically	promotes,	rather	 than	any	values	embodied	 in	democratic	 institutions	 themselves.	The	 two	most	 prominent	 instrumental	 approaches	 are	 the	 epistemic	 approach,	 and	 the	participatory	approach.	Let	us	consider	each	in	turn.		4.1.1.	The	Epistemic	Approach		Epistemic	democrats	(e.g.	Estlund,	2008;	Landemore,	2013b)	argue	that	democratic	institutions,	 including	 voting	 rights,	 are	 justified	 because	 they	 are,	 relative	 to	feasible/reasonable	 alternatives,	 likely	 to	 reliably	 produce	 the	 highest-quality	political	decisions,	as	judged	by	some	procedure-independent	standard.	The	quality	of	democratic	decisions	is	a	function	of	democracy’s	performance	at	three	tasks	–	devising	policy	options,	choosing	between	those	options,	and	revising	policies	over	time.	I	argue	that	enfranchising	minors	might	plausibly	lead	to	improvements	at	all	these	tasks	and,	therefore,	to	higher-quality	decisions.	Epistemic	democrats,	then,	have	reason	to	favour	the	enfranchisement	of	children.		The	enfranchisement	of	minors	might,	first,	lead	officials	and	candidates	to	generate	higher-quality	 options.	 Generally,	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 franchise	 to	 previously	excluded	 groups	 gives	 rise	 to	 powerful	 incentives	 for	 parties	 to	 account	 for	 the	interests	of	that	group,	so	as	to	promote	their	chances	of	electoral	success.	As	we	discussed	in	chapter	two,	numerous	empirical	studies	have	demonstrated	a	positive	connection	between	 the	 enfranchisement	of	previously	disenfranchised	groups	–	e.g.	 women	 (Aidt	 and	 Dallal,	 2008),	 the	 unwealthy	 (Abou-Chadi	 and	 Orlowski,	
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2015),	 and	 African	 Americans	 (Husted	 and	 Kenny,	 1997)	 –	 and	 an	 increased	allocation	 of	 resources	 to	 those	 groups	 by	 government,	 for	 example.	 We	 might	plausibly	 hope,	 then,	 that	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 children	 would	 give	 political	leaders	more	powerful	incentives	to	protect	and	promote	children’s	interests.	There	are	many	ways	in	which	politicians	might	seek	to	do	so.	They	might,	for	instance,	be	inclined	to	allocate	a	greater	proportion	of	social	resources	to	children,	promoting	their	 welfare	 in	 an	 absolute	 sense,	 and	 redressing	 some	 of	 the	 substantial	inequalities	that	presently	obtain	between	the	generations.86		The	 enfranchisement	 of	 children	 might,	 secondly,	 improve	 the	 ability	 of	 the	electorate	 to	 choose	 between	 these	 options.	 The	 Condorcet	 Jury	 Theorem	 –	 as	generalised	by	List	and	Goodin	(2001)	–	shows	that	where	individuals	(1)	are	on	average	more	likely	to	vote	for	the	right	option	than	any	other,	and	(2)	make	their	decisions	 independently,	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 group	 selecting	 the	 right	 option	rapidly	 approaches	 1	 as	 the	 size	 of	 the	 electorate	 increases.87	 The	 Condorcetian	argument	 for	 universal	 adult	 suffrage	 is	 obvious	 –	 the	 larger	 the	 electorate,	 the	greater	the	epistemic	competency	of	the	democratic	system,	other	things	equal.	But	the	jury	theorem,	as	Goodin	and	Lau	(2011)	and	Olsson	(2008)	point	out,	also	lends	support	 to	 the	enfranchisement	of	minors.	Provided	that	 the	addition	of	children	does	not	mean	that,	on	average,	the	electorate	is	more	likely	to	vote	for	the	wrong	answer	 than	 the	 right	 answer,	 the	 group	will	 still	 be	 virtually	 certain	 to	 choose	correctly.			Goodin	and	Lau	(2011,	p.	161)	offer	the	following	example.	Suppose	an	electorate	of	100,000,000	adults	 on	 average	0.52	 likely	 to	 select	 the	 correct	 answer	 in	 a	 two-option	choice.	Suppose	we	were	to	enfranchise	20,000,000	children.	These	children	would	 have	 to	 have	 an	 average	 competency	 of	 0.4	 or	worse	 for	 the	 electorate’s	average	competency	to	fall	below	0.5.	It	hardly	seems	likely	that	children	are	that	much	worse	than	adults	on	average.	Children	would	virtually	have	to	know	the	right	answer,	and	deliberately	vote	against	it.	Much	more	likely	is	that	their	addition	will	either	marginally	improve	the	competency	of	the	electorate,	in	which	case	there	is	a	
																																																						86	In	many	nations,	for	example,	a	higher	proportion	of	children	are	in	poverty	than	adults	(Brewer	et	al.,	2011).			87	In	this	context,	selecting	the	right	option	would	amount	to	selecting	the	item	on	the	agenda	which,	if	adopted,	would	be	morally	best	all-things-considered.	
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clear	 Condorcetian	 argument	 for	 their	 enfranchisement,	 or	 have	 no	 significant	impact,	in	which	case	Condorcetian	considerations	militate	neither	for,	nor	against,	their	enfranchisement.			Moreover,	evidence	from	various	civics	programmes	which	involve	‘mock’	political	participation	 (e.g.	 Kids	 Voting	 USA)	 appear	 to	 show	 that	 such	 programmes	 also	increase	adult	turnout,	as	well	as	adults’	consumption	of	political	news	and	levels	political	knowledge	 (Linimon	and	 Joslyn,	2002;	McDevitt	 and	Chaffee,	2000).	We	might,	as	such,	hope	that	allowing	children	to	participate	for	real	has	similar	effects.	This,	 by	 the	 lights	 of	 the	 jury	 theorem,	 should	 also	 promote	 the	 epistemic	competency	of	the	electorate	–	both	by	increasing	the	absolute	size	of	the	electorate,	and	its	average	competency.		Finally,	enfranchising	children	might	 improve	democracies’	abilities	to	assess	the	merits	 of,	 and	 revise,	 existing	 policies.	 Following	 Anderson	 (2006)	 and	 Putnam	(1990),	we	can	think	of	democracies	as	engaged	in	an	ongoing	process	of	‘hypothesis	testing’	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 various	 policies	 promote	 the	 common	 good.	Democratic	feedback	mechanisms	(deliberation,	voting,	and	so	on)	provide	data	to	be	integrated	into	an	assessment	of	policies,	on	the	basis	of	which	reforms	might	be	implemented.	 Universal	 suffrage	 is	 justified,	 on	 such	 accounts,	 as	 a	 means	 of	gathering	the	most	extensive	possible	data-set.	There	is	every	reason	to	think	that	minors’	contributions	might	well	be	valuable	 in	this	respect.	Minors	are	uniquely	situated	 with	 respect	 to	 government	 policy.	 Inter	 alia,	 they	 are	 subject	 to	substantially	more	governmental	control,	liable	to	experience	the	effects	of	changes	in	social	policy	to	deal	with	(or	fail	to	deal	with)	problems	with	longer	time-horizons	(e.g.	climate	change)	in	a	way	many	adults	will	not,	and	have	distinctive	interests	given	 their	 more	 limited	 capacities.88	 They	 might,	 as	 such,	 be	 expected	 bring	 a	distinctive	perspective	to	the	ongoing	assessment	of	social	policies.	Enfranchising	children	would	be	a	valuable	means	of	capturing	this	data,	both	because	their	votes	would	be	weighted	alongside	those	of	adults,	but	also	because	it	would	give	more	children	reason	to	participate	in	deliberation	(or,	at	least,	political	discussion)	with	other	citizens.	The	result	should	be	a	more	complete	assessment	of	 the	merits	of	
																																																						88	For	these	reasons,	the	enfranchisement	of	children	might	also	improve	the	cognitive	diversity	of	the	electorate.	On	the	epistemic	value	of	cognitive	diversity,	see	Landemore	(2013b).		
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existing	social	policies,	and	a	more	informed	reform	agenda.	For	all	these	reasons,	enfranchising	 minors	 might	 be	 expected	 to	 promote	 higher-quality	 decision-making.		One	rather	alarmist	line	of	objection,	however,	would	hold	that	the	enfranchisement	of	children	might	lead	to	disastrous	outcomes.	Politicians	might	propose	doubling	the	length	of	school	holidays,	for	example,	in	a	bid	to	win	children’s	votes.	Yet,	since	politicians	will	still	have	to	compete	for	the	support	of	adults	who	will	partially	vote	with	children’s	interests	in	mind,	outcomes	of	this	sort	seem	very	unlikely.		Hinrichs	(2002)	offers	a	more	challenging	critique.	The	epistemic	benefits	of	child	enfranchisement	 rely	 upon	 a	 sufficient	 proportion	 of	 the	 youth	 exercising	 the	franchise.	 No	 politician,	 for	 example,	 will	 try	 and	 capture	 the	 ‘youth	 vote’	 if	 the	number	of	likely	young	voters	is	too	small	to	make	a	meaningful	difference	to	their	electoral	prospects.	Moreover,	evidence	suggests	that	minors	will	not	participate	in	great	numbers.	Children,	on	 the	whole,	 are	 less	 interested	 in	politics	 than	adults	(Chan	and	Clayton,	2006,	pp.	542-6;	Hart	and	Atkins,	2011,	pp.	207-12).	In	German	municipal	 elections	 in	 which	 16-17	 year-olds	 have	 been	 enfranchised,	 turnout	among	16-17	year-olds	is	lower	than	that	of	all	other	age	groups	(Hinrichs,	2002,	p.	41).	16-17	year-olds	in	Austria	(which	lowered	the	voting	age	to	16	in	2007)	report	the	lowest	overall	average	levels	of	 intended	voter	turnout	in	federal	elections	of	any	age-group	(Wagner	et	al.,	2012,	pp.	373,	376-8).	The	epistemic	benefits	of	child	enfranchisement,	then,	seem	unlikely	to	materialise.		Such	pessimism	is	misplaced.	Turnout	is	affected	by	a	wide	range	of	highly	variable	factors	(Blais	and	Dobrzynska,	1998).	We	must	therefore	be	cautious	extrapolating	from	this	limited	set	of	cases	to	likely	rates	of	youth	participation	across	the	board.	Indeed,	there	are	examples	which	point	in	the	opposite	direction.	The	UK	Electoral	Commission	 (2014,	 p.	 64)	 reports	 that,	 in	 the	 2014	 referendum	 on	 Scottish	independence,	turnout	amongst	16-17	year	olds	(75%)	was	significantly	higher	than	turnout	amongst	18-24	year-olds	(54%).	Zeglovits	and	Aichholzer	(2014)	found	that	turnout	among	16-17	year-olds	was	not	significantly	lower	than	the	overall	average	in	a	study	of	recent	Austrian	municipal	elections.		
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Moreover,	 even	 if	 rates	of	youth	participation	are	 low,	 they	may	nevertheless	be	significant	enough	(in	tight	elections,	at	least)	to	give	politicians	incentives	to	appeal	to	that	proportion	of	the	youth	that	is	likely	to	turn	out.	There	are	also	institutional	means	of	promoting	youth	participation	–	compulsory	voting,	for	instance.	In	any	case,	even	if	participation	is	as	minimal	as	critics	of	child	enfranchisement	allege	it	is	likely	to	be,	the	epistemic	consequences	of	enfranchising	children	will	simply	be	
neutral,	making	no	difference	for	good	or	ill.	In	that	case,	whether	children	ought	to	be	enfranchised	will	be	a	matter	of	weighing	the	other	values	at	stake.	These,	I	will	argue	throughout	the	rest	of	the	paper,	overwhelmingly	favour	the	enfranchisement	of	children.		4.1.2.	The	Participatory	Approach		Participatory	 democrats	 point	 out	 that	 voting	 rights	 also	 promote	 goods	 (e.g.	valuable	 personal	 qualities)	 via	 the	 participatory	 opportunities	 they	 afford	 to	citizens.	 These	 theorists	 –	most	 notably	Mill	 (1861)	 and	Pateman	 (1970)	 –	 have	frequently	appealed	to	such	goods	as	part	of	the	justificatory	basis	for	voting	rights.	A	number	of	these	arguments,	I	suggest,	lend	support	to	child	enfranchisement.	Let	us	consider	three	such	arguments.		First,	‘buy-in’.	Several	democratic	theorists	have	argued	that	citizens	are	more	likely	to	take	collective	decisions	to	be	legitimate	where	they	have	had	opportunities	to	contribute	to	the	making	those	decisions,	and	will	have	opportunities	to	contribute	to	the	ongoing	process	by	which	those	decisions	are	to	be	revised	(e.g.	Gutmann	and	Thompson,	2004,	p.	10).89	Disenfranchised	minors	have	little	reason	to	feel	this	way,	since	 they	 are	 denied	 such	 opportunities.	 Enfranchising	 minors,	 then,	 might	 be	expected	 to	 increase	 the	proportion	of	 persons	who	accept	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	collective	decisions	to	which	they	are	subject.		Second,	 the	 expression	 of	 political	 attitudes.	 Voting	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	 one	 to	express	 one’s	 political	 attitudes.	 The	 fact	 that	 citizens	 continue	 to	 vote	 in	 large	
																																																						89	 One	 might	 be	 sceptical	 as	 to	 whether	 this	 (or	 indeed,	 any	 of	 the	 other)	 goods	 touted	 by	participatory	democrats	are	really	worth	promoting.	I	take	no	position	on	that,	here.	My	only	claim	is	 that	 participatory	 democrats,	 who	 do	 endorse	 these	 goods,	 have	 reason	 to	 endorse	 the	enfranchisement	of	children	–	not	that	the	participatory	approach	itself	is	right	or	wrong.	
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numbers,	despite	the	fact	that	they	are	virtually	certain	to	make	no	difference	to	the	outcome,	suggests	this	an	opportunity	adults	value	for	its	own	sake	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	10).	The	majority	of	minors	have	political	attitudes	(Easton	and	Hess,	 1962),	 and	more	might	 develop	 them	were	 they	 to	 be	 enfranchised.	 They	might,	as	such,	value	the	opportunity	to	express	these	attitudes	at	the	ballot	box,	just	as	adults	do.			Finally,	valuable	personal	qualities.	Many	have	sought	to	defend	voting	rights	on	the	grounds	 that	 opportunities	 for	 political	 participation	 promote	 valuable	 personal	qualities	 like	 public-spiritedness,	 self-esteem,	 the	 ability	 to	 assess	 the	 merits	 of	competing	proposals,	engage	in	moral	thought	and	argument,	and	so	on	(e.g.	Mill,	1861,	ch.	3;	Pateman,	1970;	Rawls,	1971,	p.	234).	If	political	participation	is	a	means	of	 promoting	 such	 attributes	 for	 adults,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 they	might	 not	perform	a	similar	function	for	many	(though,	of	course,	not	all)	children.		The	age	at	which	the	instrumentalist	should	favour	the	enfranchisement	of	children	depends	upon	empirical	evidence	as	to	the	likely	effects	of	enfranchising	different	age-groups.	 For	 the	most	 part,	 direct	 evidence	 is	 unavailable.	 There	 is	 reason	 to	think,	however,	that	an	age	of	around	twelve	would	be	appropriate.	Evidence	from	developmental	psychology	suggests	 that	children	of	 this	age	have	 the	capacity	 to	engage	 in	pro-social	behaviour,	reason	 in	 terms	of	abstract	moral	principles,	and	make	 relatively	 sophisticated	 judgements	of	distributive	 justice	 (Eisenberg	et	 al.,	2007,	pp.	654-62;	Turiel,	2007,	pp.	824-5).	Children	of	such	an	age	might	therefore	benefit	 from	 opportunities	 to	 develop	 and	 exercise	 these	 capacities	 through	 the	political	 process.	 Political	 socialisation	 research	 shows	 that	 children	 begin	 to	develop	 rudimentary	 political	 attitudes	 in	 around	 the	 second	 grade,	 with	 more	sophisticated	 attitudes	 directed	 towards	 more	 abstract	 concepts	 –	 fairness,	democracy,	voting,	freedom,	and	so	on	–	emerging	(again)	around	the	age	of	twelve	(Easton	and	Hess,	1962,	pp.	237-8,	245).	Presumably,	such	children	would	derive	utility	from	the	expression	of	those	attitudes	in	much	the	same	way	as	adults.		The	 epistemic	 consequences	 of	 enfranchising	 different	 age-groups	 are	 harder	 to	predict.	Yet,	 it	 again	 seems	 likely	 that	 children	of	 around	 twelve	would	have	 the	capacity	to	make	some	positive	contribution,	because	the	requirements	for	doing	so	
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are	quite	undemanding.	They	need	only	be	willing	to	vote	(in	large	enough	numbers)	and	have	the	capacity	to	recognise	some	of	the	differences	between	the	parties	for	candidates	 to	 have	 incentive	 to	 appeal	 to	 their	 interests.	 They	 need	 only	 be,	 on	average,	more	likely	to	select	the	right	answer	than	any	alternative	to	contribute	to	democracy’s	ability	to	choose	correctly	between	policy	proposals.90	And	they	need	only	 be	 able	 to	 express	 their	 attitudes	 with	 respect	 to	 prevailing	 government	policies	to	contribute	to	the	democratic	assessment	of	those	policies.	 If,	as	seems	likely,	a	child	of	twelve	can	perform	at	least	one	of	these	tasks,	then	their	inclusion	might	potentially	improve	democracy’s	epistemic	performance.			Any	instrumentalist	case	for	enfranchising	children	must	also	account	for	the	costs	of	doing	so.	In	this	vein,	Beckman	(2009,	pp.	114-9)	has	argued	that	imposing	the	responsibilities	 of	 voting	 upon	 children	 would	 undermine	 their	 fundamental	interests.	 Children,	 he	 asserts,	 have	 fundamental	 interests	 in	 growth	 and	development,	 and	 therefore	must	 enjoy	 (Beckman,	2009,	p.	116):	 “…both	playful	challenges	 and	 protection	 from	 the	 demands	 of	 adult	 life.”	 Voting	 responsibly	requires	 citizens	 to	 gather	 information	 and	 deliberate	 over	 the	 options	 on	 the	agenda.	Children	would	likely	find	doing	so	both	psychologically	burdensome	and	time-consuming,	leaving	them	without	the	space	or	inclination	to	play,	potentially	undermining	their	development	and	future	autonomy.		Beckman’s	objection	invites	two	responses.	First,	minors	for	whom	voting	would	be	unacceptably	 costly	 will	 not	 necessarily	 bear	 those	 costs	 because	 (absent	compulsory	 voting)	 not	 all	 children	 will	 vote.	 Secondly,	 and	 more	 importantly,	voting	does	not	seem	likely	to	constitute	an	unacceptable	burden	for	most	children.	Adults	do	not	generally	find	the	responsible	exercise	of	the	franchise	burdensome.	Things	 need	not	 be	 all	 that	 different	 for	 children.	 Children	might	 be	 required	 to	spend	a	greater	amount	of	time	than	adults	gathering	information	if	they	are	to	vote	responsibly,	since	they	are	likely	to	possess	less	political	knowledge.	Yet	there	are	obvious	 institutional	means	 available	 for	mitigating	 these	 costs.	 Civics	 education	
																																																						90	Children	might	fail	to	meet	this	standard	in	two	ways.	First,	they	might	vote	randomly,	in	which	case	we	should	expect	their	votes	to	distribute	evenly	over	the	options,	making	no	difference	to	the	probability	of	 the	right	answer	emerging	(Goodin,	2007,	pp.	58-9).	Secondly,	 they	might	be	worse	than	random.	This	will	be	of	concern	only	in	the	very	improbable	instance	in	which	there	is	a	very	large	number	of	children	who	are	very	much	worse	than	average	adults.		
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could	 easily	 be	 integrated	 into	 existing	 school	 curricular.91	 The	 informational	shortcuts	upon	which	many	adults	rely	in	order	to	mitigate	their	own	informational	shortfalls	 would	 also	 be	 perfectly	 accessible	 to	 minors	 (Lupia	 and	 McCubbins,	1998).		In	any	case,	persons	must	presumably	incur	the	costs	of	gathering	this	information	at	some	time	in	their	lives.92	It	is	unclear	why	it	is	better	that	people	incur	those	costs	as	adults.	Indeed,	it	might	be	better	to	do	so	at	a	younger	age	where	individuals	(in	most	cases)	have	fewer	competing	responsibilities.	Whatever	costs	children	might	suffer	 are	 as	 such	 likely	 to	 be	 very	 minor	 (and	 temporary,	 since	 elections	 are	relatively	 infrequent).	 They	must	 also	 be	 balanced	 against	 the	 benefits	 likely	 to	accrue	 to	 children	 who	 participate.	 As	 with	 almost	 all	 policy	 choices,	 the	enfranchisement	of	children	may	leave	some	worse	off.	But,	for	the	reasons	I	have	set	out	in	this	section,	the	costs	to	this	group	are	likely	to	be	heavily	outweighed	by	the	benefits	overall.	Instrumentalists,	I	conclude,	have	powerful	reasons	to	favour	the	enfranchisement	of	children.		4.2.	Non-instrumental	Approaches		Proponents	 of	 non-instrumental	 approaches	 argue	 that	 democratic	 institutions	(including	voting	rights),	in	themselves,	are	among	the	requirements	of	respect	for	some	value	or	other,	 independent	of	 the	results	 they	realise.	There	are	two	main	approaches	in	the	literature	–	liberty-based,	and	equality-based.	Proponents	of	both	kinds	of	approaches,	I	shall	argue,	have	reason	to	endorse	the	enfranchisement	of	children.		4.2.1.	Liberty		
																																																						91	Numerous	studies	of	civics	programmes	such	as	Kids	Voting	USA	(e.g.	Meirick	and	Wackman,	2004;	Simon	and	Merrill,	1998)	have	been	shown	that	such	programmes	can	boost	students’	levels	of	civic	knowledge,	as	well	as	their	consumption	of	political	news.	92	One	might	object	 that	many	children	won’t	acquire	 information.	This	 is	perfectly	 true.	 I	doubt,	however,	 that	 it	 constitutes	 grounds	 for	 disenfranchisement.	 Many	 adults	 fail	 to	 acquire	 basic	political	 information.	 Few	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 accept,	 however,	 that	 such	 persons’	 claims	 to	enfranchisement	are	thereby	undermined.		
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There	are	two	principal	liberty-based	approaches	in	the	literature:	neorepublican	approaches,	and	positive	 liberty	approaches.	Neorepublicans	such	as	Philip	Pettit	(1997;	 2012)	 conceive	 of	 liberty	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 subjection	 to	 the	 arbitrary,	uncontrolled	 will	 of	 others;	 or	 nondomination.	 A	 dominates	 B	 where	 A	 has	 the	capacity	to	interfere	with	B	in	a	manner	B	does	not	control.	All	governments	visit	interference	upon	their	citizens.	In	order	to	ensure	that	that	interference	does	not	amount	to	domination,	then,	citizens	must	enjoy	control	over	government	(Pettit,	2012,	ch.	3-5).	The	franchise	is	crucial	in	this	respect,	being	the	most	basic	means	by	which	citizens	can,	in	concert	with	others,	exert	such	control.	It	is	also	enables	other	forms	of	control.	Governments	have	incentives	to	take	protestors	seriously	where	their	actions	threaten	to	change	citizens’	voting	behaviour,	for	example.		Positive	liberty	approaches	are	similar	in	many	respects.	Liberty,	on	such	accounts,	consists	in	self-governance	–	“…being	one’s	own	person,	directed	by	considerations,	desires,	conditions,	and	characteristics	that	are	not	simply	imposed	externally	on	one,	 but	 are	 part	 of	 what	 can	 somehow	 be	 considered	 one’s	 authentic	 self”	(Christman	and	Anderson,	2005,	p.	3).	There	are	many	positive	liberty	approaches	in	 the	 literature	 (e.g.	 Gould,	 1988;	 Gutmann,	 1993;	 Hanisch,	 2013;	 Jacob,	 2015;	Philpott,	1995).	These	vary	widely,	but	these	details	need	not	concern	us,	here.	The	general	 thrust	of	 them	all	 is	much	 the	 same:	 control	over	 the	 terms	of	 social	 co-operation,	as	regulated	by	the	political	institutions	to	which	we	are	subject,	is	said	to	 be	 constitutive	 of	 one’s	 individual	 autonomy,	 an	 essential	means	 of	 exercising	control	over	oneself.	The	franchise,	in	turn,	is	thought	to	be	an	essential	means	of	
exercising	such	control.			Proponents	 of	 both	 liberty-based	 accounts	 have	 reason	 to	 endorse	 the	enfranchisement	of	 a	 substantial	proportion	of	 the	youth.	 In	 the	 case	of	 children	around	16	and	over,	the	argument	for	doing	so	is	simply	that	children	of	that	age,	by	the	lights	of	the	theories	under	consideration,	have	claims	to	liberty	in	the	political	domain	as	legitimate	as	most	adults’.	On	standard	accounts,	agents	have	claims	to	liberty	 in	 some	 domain	 if	 and	 only	 if	 they	 possess	 the	 capacities	 necessary	 for	making	meaningful	 choices	 in	 that	 domain.	 This	 obviously	 rules	 out	 very	 young	children.	 But	 the	 matter	 grows	 more	 complex	 as	 children	 mature.	 Numerous	psychological	studies	show,	for	example,	that	minors	of	around	15	or	16	years	of	age	
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possess	adult-like	cognitive	capacities	for	decision-making.	On	the	other	hand,	the	development	of	psychosocial	characteristics	such	as	impulse-control,	temperance,	and	the	capacity	to	resist	peer	pressure	persists	well	into	adulthood;	well	beyond	the	 age	 at	 which	 we	 generally	 think	 persons	 have	 claims	 to	 have	 their	 liberty	respected	(and,	certainly,	beyond	the	age	at	which	persons	gain	the	right	to	vote	in	
status	quo	democracies).93			Yet,	 complexity	 notwithstanding,	 there	 are	 important	 reasons	 for	 thinking	 that	average	16	 year-olds	do	 indeed	possess	 capacities	 sufficient	 to	 ground	 claims	 to	liberty	in	the	political	domain	–	and	therefore,	by	the	lights	of	the	accounts	under	consideration,	to	enfranchisement.	Steinberg	et	al.	(2009,	pp.	592-3)	point	out	that	the	capacities	necessary	for	mature	decision-making	vary	according	to	context.	16	year-olds	may	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	make	meaningful	decisions	 in	 contexts	where	they,	 for	 instance,	 face	 heavy	 peer	 pressure,	 given	 their	 limited	 psychosocial	development.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 decision-contexts	 that	 allow	 for	 sustained	reflection,	 time	 to	 consult	 others	 for	 advice,	 and	 so	 on,	 minors	 may	 well	 be	 as	capable	of	making	mature	decisions	as	adults.	This,	to	some	extent,	is	reflected	in	the	law,	where	the	‘mature	minor’	doctrine	recognises	the	capacity	of	suitably	well-informed	 minors	 to	 give	 consent	 to	 medical	 procedures,	 for	 example	 –	 these	characteristically	being	decisions	that	allow	time	for	minors	to	gather	information,	consult	with	others	and	so	on	(Steinberg,	2013).94		There	is	every	reason	to	think	that	sufficiently	mature	minors	will	generally	have	sufficient	capacities	in	the	political	domain.95	Modern	election	campaigns	and	media	coverage	expose	persons	to	a	wide	range	of	perspectives,	and	afford	substantial	time	for	deliberation.	We	are	not	called	upon	to	make	voting	decisions	impulsively.	Even	if,	 then,	 16	 year	 olds	 do	 not	 possess	 sufficient	 psychological	maturity	 to	 ground	claims	 to	 liberty	 across	 all	 domains	 of	 life,	 they	 do	 at	 least	 possess	 capacities	
																																																						93	Overviews	of	the	relevant	evidence	may	be	found	in	Kuhn	and	Franklin	(2007,	pp.	975-82),	Scott	et	al.	(1995),	Steinberg	et	al.	(2009),	and	Steinberg	(2013,	p.	263).	94	See	also	Munn	(2012a;	2012b).		95	Hart	and	Atkins	(2011,	pp.	219-20)	cite	similar	evidence	in	defence	of	the	idea	that	16	and	17	year	olds	are	capable	of	‘responsible’	voting.	
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sufficient	to	ground	such	claims	in	the	political	domain.96	That	ought	to	be	sufficient,	by	the	lights	of	the	accounts	under	discussion,	to	ground	claims	to	enfranchisement.		There	are	also	good	reasons	for	proponents	of	liberty-based	approaches	to	favour	the	enfranchisement	of	children	under	16.	In	the	first,	many	children	below	the	age	of	 16,	 too,	 will	 have	 capacities	 sufficient	 to	 ground	 liberty-based	 claims	 to	enfranchisement.	 Many,	 of	 course,	 will	 not.	 However,	 younger	 children	 do	 have	liberty-based	 claims	 to	 opportunities	 for	 the	 development	 of	 these	 capacities	(Feinberg,	 1980).	 The	 opportunity	 to	 vote	 might	 well	 prove	 a	 valuable	 in	 this	respect.97	As	we	have	argued	already,	allowing	children	from	the	age	of	12	or	so	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	the	political	process	might	aid	in	their	development	of	important	decision-making	skills	–	the	ability	to	balance	competing	moral	claims,	assess	 the	plausibility	of	 fact-claims,	and	so	on.	Of	course,	 these	benefits	will	not	obtain	for	all	such	children.	Some	will	be	too	immature,	others	simply	uninterested.	But	 that	 is	not	a	 reason	not	 to	extend	such	children	 the	opportunity	 to	vote.	The	potential	benefits	for	children	who	do	vote	might	be	substantial.	And,	as	we	have	argued	already,	the	costs	to	those	who	do	not	vote,	or	do	not	benefit	from	voting,	are	likely	very	minor,	or	non-existent.			One	might	object,	at	 this	point,	 that	even	 if	 children	have	 liberty-based	claims	 to	enfranchisement,	we	have	powerful	moral	reason	to	paternalistically	override	such	claims.	Children	cannot	generally	be	relied	upon	to	make	sensible	decisions	in	their	own	interests.	Younger	children	lack	the	necessary	capacities.	Older	children	with	sufficient	capacities	will	often	lack	necessary	information.	Society,	then,	is	justified	in	restricting	children’s	choices	(e.g.	 limiting	their	access	to	alcohol	and	tobacco),	given	the	probability	that	children	will	otherwise	cause	themselves	harm.	Perhaps	such	considerations	also	apply	in	the	voting	case.	Children	are	ill-equipped	to	assess	the	 probable	 impact	 of	 political	 proposals	 upon	 their	 interests,	 and	 are	 liable	 to	
																																																						96	 Opponents	 of	 child	 enfranchisement	 might	 demand	 a	 higher	 standard	 of	 psychological	competency.	The	trouble	with	this,	as	Lau	(2012,	pp.	861-5)	points	out,	is	that	doing	so	will	tend	to	entail	disenfranchisement	of	many	adults	(e.g.	elderly	persons	whose	capacities	are	in	decline).	97	Cook	(2013,	pp.	446-50)	argues,	relatedly,	that	since	voting	might	develop	children’s	capacities,	age-based	 denials	 of	 the	 franchise	 constitute	 failures	 of	 appraisal	 respect	 for	 children.	 Cook’s	argument	is	uncompelling,	however.	Appraisal	respect	is	a	matter	of	the	respect	we	owe	to	persons	in	virtue	of	the	capacities	they	have	(Darwall,	1977,	p.	38).	Cook’s	argument,	however,	appeals	to	the	idea	 that	 children	might	develop	 these	capacities	 through	enfranchisement,	which	would	seem	to	imply	that	they	do	not	yet	possess	such	capacities.	
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make	bad	decisions,	in	consequence.	We	are	therefore	justified	in	denying	children	the	vote	until	 they	 can	 reasonably	be	 expected	 to	make	 sound	decisions	 in	 their	interests.98		However,	notice	that	in	typical	cases	of	justified	paternalistic	interference,	agents	are	 deprived	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 make	 some	 decision	 (e.g.	 to	 purchase	 harmful	substances)	on	the	grounds	that	they	would	be	likely	to	cause	harm	to	themselves	if	allowed	to	do	so.	Voting	differs	crucially	from	these	cases.	Individual	voters	do	not	decide	 the	outcomes	of	political	processes.	The	probability	of	any	voter	casting	a	decisive	ballot	is	always	asymptotically	close	to	zero	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	ch.	4).	It	is	hardly	as	though,	in	preventing	any	given	child	from	voting,	we	thereby	prevent	 that	 child	 from	 subjection	 to	 some	 harm	 they	 would	 otherwise	 have	suffered.	Nor	 is	 it	 plausible	 that	disenfranchisement	prevents	minors	 considered	collectively	from	being	subjected	to	some	harm	they	would	otherwise	have	suffered.	As	our	discussion	of	the	epistemic	approach	showed,	the	enfranchisement	of	minors	might	plausibly	be	expected	to	yield	higher-quality	decisions	with	respect	to	minors’	interests	(or,	at	worst,	to	make	no	difference).			Moreover,	the	appeal	to	paternalism	entails	unacceptable	conclusions	in	the	adult	case.99	Many	adults	are	deeply	ignorant	on	political	matters.	Lau	et	al.	(2008,	p.	402)	estimate	 that	 between	 20%	 and	 30%	 of	 American	 voters,	 on	 average,	 vote	‘incorrectly’	–	i.e.	for	candidates	they	would	not	have	supported	had	they	been	fully	informed	–	 in	US	Presidential	elections,	 for	example.	 If	 the	appeal	 to	paternalism	licenses	depriving	children	of	the	franchise,	it	would	also	seem	to	license	depriving	these	adults	of	the	franchise,	since	they	too	will	predictably	make	low-quality	voting	decisions	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 interests.	 No	 democrat,	 surely,	 can	 accept	 that	conclusion.			I	conclude,	then,	that	proponents	of	liberty-based	justifications	of	democracy	have	reason	to	favour	the	enfranchisement	children	from	around	the	age	of	twelve.			4.2.2.	Equality	
																																																						98	Of	course,	there	is	also	the	question	of	children’s	capacity	to	make	sound	decisions	with	respect	to	
others’	interests.	I	deal	with	this	issue	below.	99	Harris	(1982,	pp.	36-45)	makes	a	similar	point.	
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	Equality-based	 approaches	 come	 in	 three	 general	 varieties	 –	 distributive,	expressive,	and	social.	Let	us	consider	each,	in	turn.			4.2.2.1.	The	Distributive	Approach		Proponents	 of	 the	distributive	 approach	 (e.g.	 Brighouse,	 1996;	 Christiano,	 2008)	hold	that	the	franchise	is	a	valuable	good	to	which	all	adults	citizens	have	positive,	equal	claims.	Distributive	fairness,	therefore,	requires	an	equal	distribution	of	the	franchise	 among	 all	 adults.	 There	 is	 every	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 distributive	approach	 also	 requires	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 children.100	 Even	 very	 young	children	 have	 claims	 to	 goods	 in	 general	 (e.g.	 food,	 shelter,	 and	 education).	Principles	of	distributive	fairness	clearly	apply	to	the	distribution	of	these	goods.	It	is	 obviously	 unjust	 that	 children	 of	 poorer	 families	 generally	 have	 worse	educational	outcomes	than	children	of	wealthier	families,	for	example	(Schlee	et	al.,	2009).	 If	 minors	 have	 claims	 to	 enfranchisement	 equal	 to	 those	 of	 adults,	 then,	distributive	fairness	will	require	that	minors	be	enfranchised.		Proponents	of	the	distributive	approach	ground	adults’	claims	to	the	franchise	on	the	 interests	enfranchisement	 serves.	We	have	mentioned	most	of	 these	already.	Enfranchisement,	 inter	 alia,	 is	 thought	 to	 contribute	 to	 individuals’	 autonomous	agency,	to	be	a	resource	individuals	can	draw	on	to	protect	and	promote	their	other	interests,101	 to	 be	 a	 valuable	 opportunity	 for	 the	 expression	 of	 one’s	 political	attitudes,	 and	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 valuable	 character	 traits.	 Not	 all	minors	have	the	capacity	to	enjoy	these	goods,	and	so	not	all	minors	have	claims	to	enfranchisement.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	suppose	this	to	be	true	of	all	children.	Indeed,	as	we	have	already	argued,	children	from	around	the	age	of	12	or	so	might	reap	 many	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 democratic	 participation	 that	 proponents	 of	 the	distributive	view	claim	ground	adults’	claims	to	enfranchisement.	This	suggests	that	such	 children	also	have	 claims	 to	 enfranchisement.	 It	 follows,	 straightforwardly,	
																																																						100	For	another	distributive	argument	for	enfranchising	children,	see	López-Guerra	(2014,	ch.	3).	101	Mill	(1869,	pp.	526-7)	famously	advocated	for	the	enfranchisement	of	women	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	vital	means	of	protecting	their	interests.	Christiano	(2008,	pp.	88-95),	similarly,	appeals	to	the	need	to	correct	for	others’	cognitive	biases	in	political	decision-making.	
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that	 children	have	 claims	of	distributive	equality	 to	be	enfranchised	on	an	equal	basis	with	adults.102		Three	responses	suggest	themselves.	First,	Weale	(1999,	p.	154)	argues	that	age-based	discrimination	does	“…not	discriminate	unfairly	among	persons	or	groups,	since	[it	falls]	evenly	on	everyone	in	the	normal	course	of	life.	In	this	sense	[it	is]	compatible	with	the	requirements	of	political	equality.”103	This	argument,	however,	fails	to	explain	why	only	children	can	permissibly	be	excluded	from	the	franchise	on	that	basis.	The	costs	of	a	voting	age	of	45	would	also	fall	evenly	on	everyone	in	the	normal	course	of	life.104		Perhaps	Weale	has	a	narrower	claim	in	mind:	since	age-based	discrimination	does	not	target	any	particular	social	group,	it	is	not	objectionably	discriminatory	in	the	way	that	disenfranchising	women	or	African	Americans	was,	 for	 instance.	That	 is	surely	right.	But	it	still	begs	the	question	of	why	there	should	be	such	discrimination	
at	all.	Distributive	fairness	requires	that	claims	of	equal	strength,	where	possible,	be	satisfied	 equally	 (Broome,	 1990-1).	 Age-based	 discrimination	 avoidably	 creates	inequalities	 in	 claim-satisfaction	 between	 adults	 and	 children.	 It	 is,	 as	 such,	distributively	unfair,	even	if	it	is	not	unfair	in	the	same	way	as	the	race	or	gender-based	disenfranchisement.		Second,	Spitz	(1975)	argues	that	children	lack	claims	to	enfranchisement	because	they	do	not	contribute	to	the	community’s	resource	stock,	the	distribution	of	which	is	regulated	by	the	political	process.	Yet	Spitz’s	notion	of	‘contribution’	is	ambiguous.	A	narrow	reading	would	understand	Spitz’s	argument	in	economic	terms.	Citizens,	on	this	view,	contribute	to	the	community’s	collective	resource	stock	by	engaging	in	economic	 activity	 and,	 thereby,	 contributing	 to	 public	 goods	 via	 taxation.	 This	interpretation	of	the	argument	proves	too	much,	insofar	as	it	would	unacceptably	legitimate	 the	 disenfranchisement	 of	 many	 adults.	 Persons	 with	 physical	disabilities,	for	example,	are	often	unable	to	contribute	in	this	narrow	sense,	being	
																																																						102	Of	course,	not	all	children	will	benefit	in	this	way.	That,	however,	is	just	as	true	of	a	great	many	adults	 (e.g.	 those	 who	 never	 exercise	 the	 franchise)	 –	 and	 is	 plainly	 not	 sufficient	 grounds	 for	disenfranchisement.	103	See	also	Cowley	and	Denver	(2004,	p.	61).	104	There	are	also	important,	general	reasons	to	be	skeptical	of	appeals	to	long-run	equality	of	this	sort.	See	McKerlie	(1989)	and	Temkin	(1993,	ch.	8).	
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unable	 to	 take	 up	 the	 employment	 opportunities	 their	 societies	 make	 available.	Disenfranchising	such	persons,	however,	would	surely	be	deeply	unjust.	One	might,	then,	 interpret	Spitz	more	broadly,	 so	as	 to	allow	the	production	of	various	non-economic	goods	to	count	as	contributions	of	the	relevant	kind.	Persons	might	be	said	to	contribute	to	the	good	of	public	order	by	complying	with	the	law,	for	example.	The	trouble,	here,	is	that	most	children	do	contribute	in	this	sense	in	many	ways	(e.g.	by	complying	with	the	law).	Read	narrowly,	then,	Spitz’s	argument	is	indefensibly	exclusionary.	Read	broadly,	it	fails	to	justify	the	exclusion	of	children.		Finally,	 one	 might	 respond	 that	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 children	 would	 create	distributive	unfairness.	Parents	would	be	able	to	substantially	determine	how	their	children	 would	 vote.	 Enfranchising	 children,	 then,	 would	 effectively	 amount	 to	giving	additional	votes	to	parents	without	any	compensating	increase	in	the	political	power	of	 childless	 adults.	Much	might	be	done	 to	mitigate	 this	worry	 (e.g.	 civics	education	 emphasising	 the	 need	 for	 children	 to	 make	 such	 decisions	independently).	Still,	I	concede	that	it	is	simply	inevitable	that	parents	will	exercise	substantial	influence	over	their	children	in	many	cases.	We	should	be	reluctant	to	accept	that	this	justifies	the	disenfranchisement	of	children,	however.	First,	this	line	of	argument	cannot	possibly	show	that	 the	disenfranchisement	of	children	 is	not	unjust	from	a	distributive	perspective.	All	it	can	show	is	that	distributive	unfairness	of	some	kind	is	inevitable,	however.105	Secondly,	and	more	importantly,	this	line	of	argument	proves	too	much.	There	is	abundant	evidence	that	parents	often	transmit	their	 own	 partisan	 affiliations	 to	 their	 adult	 children,	 and	 that	 children	 often	maintain	those	political	preferences	well	into	later	life	(Jennings	et	al.,	2009).	This	line	of	argument,	 then,	threatens	to	 legitimate	the	disenfranchisement	of	persons	well	above	the	age	of	eighteen	–	a	conclusion,	once	again,	no	democrat	can	accept.			4.2.2.2.	Expressive	Approaches		A	 number	 of	 philosophers	 have	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 on	expressive	grounds	(e.g.	Beitz,	1989,	ch.	5;	Griffin,	2003,	pp.	118-21;	Waldron,	1999,	pp.	113-4,	238-9).	On	such	approaches,	each	of	us	has	an	interest	in	being	publicly	
recognised	 as	 equals,	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	 contribute	 equally	 to	 collective	
																																																						105	The	choice	we	face	is	whether	unfairness	ought	to	be	visited	upon	children,	or	childless	adults.	
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judgements	as	to	how	society’s	collective	affairs	ought	to	be	structured.	It	is	only	by	giving	each	an	equal	say	in	the	political	process	that	this	 interest	can	be	satisfied	equally	 for	 all	 citizens.	No-one	 seriously	 denies	 that	 children	 are	 of	 equal	moral	significance	to	adults.	Schrag	(2004,	pp.	367-8)	has	argued	that,	as	such,	expressive	approaches	straightforwardly	entail	a	requirement	to	enfranchise	children,	and	that	their	 ongoing	 disenfranchisement	 constitutes	 an	 objectionable	 failure	 of	 equal	recognition.106			I	 think	 Schrag	 is	 right.	 However,	 the	matter	 is	 considerably	more	 complex	 than	Schrag	 acknowledges.	 Opponents	 of	 child	 enfranchisement	 (generally)	 hold	 that	children	lack	the	capacity	to	exercise	the	franchise,	and	ought	to	be	excluded	on	that	basis.	Discriminating	between	persons	on	the	basis	of	reasonable	judgements	as	to	their	 capacities	 does	 not	 usually	 constitute	 a	 failure	 to	 recognise	 persons’	 equal	moral	standing.	A	 secondary	school	 looking	 to	hire	a	mathematics	 teacher	might	refuse	 to	 consider	 applicants	 without	 tertiary	 qualifications	 in	 mathematics,	without	thereby	derogating	the	moral	standing	of	those	without	such	qualifications.	The	school’s	policy	merely	reflects	a	legitimate	judgement	as	to	the	qualifications	necessary	to	teach	mathematics.	The	same,	one	might	argue,	holds	in	the	voting	case.	Age-based	 discrimination	 merely	 reflects	 a	 legitimate	 judgment	 as	 to	 children’s	(general)	incompetency	to	exercise	the	franchise.107	It	does	not	derogate	their	equal	moral	standing.		Now,	the	idea	that	incompetency	justifies	children’s	exclusion	from	the	franchise	is	the	most	common	claim	made	by	opponents	of	child	enfranchisement	 (Chan	and	Clayton,	2006;	Christiano,	2008,	pp.	116-30;	Clayton,	2006,	ch.	5;	Cohen,	1978;	Dahl,	1989,	pp.	126-7;	Hinrichs,	2002;	Spitz,	1975;	Weale,	1999,	p.	154).	Unfortunately,	most	are	unclear	over	what	 ‘competency’	amounts	 to.	Clayton	(2006,	ch.	5)	 is	an	important	exception.	He	argues	that	voting	involves	exercising	power	over	others,	and	 that	 since	 we	 have	 duties	 to	 treat	 others	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	 reasonable	conception	of	justice,	we	ought	only	to	enfranchise	those	whom	we	can	reasonably	
																																																						106	See	also	Archard	(2004,	pp.	98-105).	107	To	be	clear,	 the	argument	 (in	 its	most	plausible	 form)	 is	not	 that	 children	are	 incompetent	 to	exercise	the	franchise	just	in	virtue	of	being	children.	It	is,	rather,	that	the	exclusion	of	children	is	not	objectionably	arbitrary,	because	age	is	the	best	available	proxy	for	the	attributes	necessary	to	vote	competently	(Chan	and	Clayton,	2006,	p.	539-40;	Clayton,	2006,	pp.	185-7).	
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expect	 to	 vote	 in	 accordance	 with	 such	 a	 conception.	 Minors	 are	 not	 generally	competent	in	this	sense.	They	may	therefore	be	justifiably	disenfranchised.		Clayton’s	conception	of	competency,	however,	is	much	too	strong.	There	are	many	adults	whom	we	can	easily	identify	as	being	almost	certain	not	to	vote	in	accordance	with	reasonable	conceptions	of	justice.	Persons	with	extremist	political	views,	for	instance	 (e.g.	 Klansmen)	 presumably	 vote	 in	 accordance	 with	 profoundly	unreasonable	 conceptions	 of	 justice.	 Others	 do	 not	 vote	 in	 accordance	with	 any	conception	of	justice,	but	rather	in	accordance	with	their	interests.	No	democrat	can	reasonably	endorse	the	in-principle	permissibility	of	disenfranchising	such	persons,	let	alone	their	actual	disenfranchisement.			Of	course,	enfranchising	the	‘unreasonable’	gives	rise	to	the	risk	of	seriously	unjust	political	outcomes.	Yet	there	are	institutional	means	for	managing	these	risks	that	are	 standardly	 invoked	 in	 discussions	 of	 adult	 suffrage.	 The	 constitutional	entrenchment	 of	 individual	 rights,	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 powerful	 means	 of	 limiting	unreasonable	 voters’	 capacities	 to	 impose	 injustices	 upon	 the	wider	 community	(Dworkin,	 1996).	 It	 is	 unclear	 why	 the	 additional	 step	 of	 disenfranchisement	 is	either	necessary,	or	appropriate,	in	the	case	of	children.		Secondly,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 all	 minors	 really	 are	incompetent	 in	 Clayton’s	 sense.	 As	 we	 have	 already	 noted,	 research	 from	developmental	psychology	suggests	that	many	children	have	the	capacity	to	engage	in	moral	and	political	thought.	Empathy	begins	to	emerge	in	children	as	young	as	12-18	months	(Eisenberg	et	al.,	2007,	pp.	654-62).	Pro-social	behaviours	continue	to	 develop	 through	 early	 childhood	 and	 into	 adolescence,	 with	 the	 capacity	 to	engage	 in	 abstract	 moral	 reasoning	 oriented	 around	 principles	 beginning	 to	 be	present	 in	 late	elementary	school/early	high	school	students.	By	age	11,	children	have	the	capacity	to	make	quite	sophisticated	judgements	of	distributive	fairness,	showing	 the	 ability	 to	 account	 for	 factors	 such	 as	 desert,	 talent,	 advantage	 and	disadvantage	(Turiel,	2007,	pp.	824-5).		There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 children	 characteristically	 possess	 less	 political	
knowledge	than	adults	(Chan	and	Clayton,	2006,	pp.	542-53),	which	perhaps	might	
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hinder	their	ability	to	exercise	the	franchise	responsibly.	This,	too,	is	controversial,	at	 least	 in	 the	 case	 of	 older	 children	 (Hart	 and	 Atkins,	 2011,	 pp.	 207-14).	 But,	whatever	the	truth	of	the	matter,	there	are	obvious	institutional	remedies	for	this	concern	 we	 have	 already	 discussed.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 degree	 of	ignorance	children	exhibit	about	politics	 is	partially	a	 function	of	 their	exclusion.	Extending	 the	 franchise	 to	 children	would	 give	 those	with	 an	 interest	 in	 politics	reasons	to	become	more	informed	(perhaps	so	as	to	be	able	to	justify	their	political	behaviour	to	others).	Of	course,	not	all	children	will	be	interested	enough	in	politics	to	bother	acquiring	the	relevant	information.	Yet,	presumably,	such	children	are	also	unlikely	to	vote	in	any	case,	and	so	pose	little	threat	to	their	fellow	citizens’	interests.			Other	notions	of	competency	fare	little	better.	Christiano	(2008,	pp.	128-30)	holds	that	 one	must	 be	 capable	 of	 “elaborating,	 reflecting	 on,	 and	 revising	 ideas	 about	justice.”108	 Yet	 the	 evidence	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 previous	 paragraph	 suggests	 that	many	children	do	possess	capacities	of	this	kind.	We	might	suggest	that	competency	involves	 the	ability	 to	make	autonomous	choices	 in	one’s	 interests.109	But,	 as	we	have	noted,	concern	for	autonomy	lends	support	to	the	enfranchisement	of	children.	Finally,	 we	 might	 construe	 competency	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 enjoy	 the	 goods	 of	enfranchisement.	But,	again	as	we	have	already	argued,	many	minors	are	competent	in	this	sense,	too.110			The	appeal	to	competency	fails	to	vindicate	the	blanket	exclusion	of	children.	Many	children	might	reasonably	object,	then,	that	their	electoral	exclusion	constitutes	a	failure	to	recognise	their	equal	moral	standing	in	the	political	domain,	rather	than	a	legitimate	judgment	as	to	their	capacities	to	exercise	the	franchise.		4.2.2.3.	The	Social	Equality	Approach		Our	 final	egalitarian	approach	appeals	 to	 the	value	of	social	equality.	The	central	assertion	of	recent	work	in	so-called	relational	egalitarianism	is	that	equal	respect	for	persons	requires	that	they	stand	in	relations	of	social	equality	(Anderson,	1999;	Scheffler,	2003).	Kolodny	(2014b,	pp.	292-9)	offers	the	best	worked-out	account,	on	
																																																						108	For	other	criticisms	of	Christiano,	see	Schrag	(2004,	pp.	371-3).	109	Cohen	(1975)	might	be	interpreted	as	gesturing	towards	such	a	view.	110	See	also	López-Guerra	(2014,	ch.	3).	
	 95	
which	relations	of	social	equality	require	the	absence	of	asymmetries	in	power,	de	
facto	authority,	and	consideration.	Inequalities	in	political	influence	constitutively	involve	asymmetries	of	power,	authority	and	consideration	–	and	therefore	amount	to	objectionable	 social	 inequalities.111	 Social	 equality,	 then,	 requires	 that	 citizens	enjoy	equal	opportunities	for	political	influence.		I	 think	 that	such	considerations	also	militate	 in	 favour	of	 the	enfranchisement	of	children.	Children	certainly	do	seem	to	have	claims	against	being	treated	as	others’	social	inferiors.	A	twelve-year-old	victimised	and	socially	excluded	on	the	basis	of	their	gender	identity	certainly	seems	to	be	wronged	by	being	placed	in	a	position	of	social	 inferiority.	 If	 social	equality	constitutively	requires	equal	opportunities	 for	political	influence,	and	children	have	claims	to	be	treated	as	social	equals,	then	it	is	hard	to	escape	the	conclusion	that	they	have	claims	to	enfranchisement.	The	precise	
age	at	which	children	acquire	such	claims	is	hard	to	know,	because	it	is	unclear	quite	what	relational	egalitarians	take	claims	of	social	equality	to	be	grounded	in	(aside	from	 citizens’	 equal	 moral	 standing).	 But	 it	 certainly	 seems	 (as	 our	 example	demonstrates)	at	least	that	children	from	the	age	of	twelve	or	so	do	intuitively	have	such	claims.		One	 might	 object	 that	 this	 entails	 unacceptable	 conclusions	 in	 other	 domains.	Asymmetries	 in	power,	authority,	and	consideration	are	essential	 to	parent-child	relations,	for	example.	Surely,	however,	parent-child	relations	are	not	unjust.	This,	in	 turn,	 shows	 that	 claims	 of	 social	 equality	 hold	 only	 between	 adults,	 and	 that	children,	therefore,	have	no	claim	to	enfranchisement	on	such	views.	This	position,	however,	is	arguably	even	more	problematic,	insofar	as	it	entails	that	children	are	not	wronged	 by	 being	 subject	 to	 objectionably	 inegalitarian	 forms	 of	 treatment,	such	 as	 that	 to	 which	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 children	 are	 sometimes	 subjected	 in	conservative	communities.	That,	surely,	is	unacceptable.			A	more	nuanced	response,	then,	might	accept	that	children	have	claims	to	be	treated	as	 social	 equals,	but	hold	 that	 the	 requirements	of	 social	 equality	differ	between	children	 and	 adults.	 The	mere	 fact,	 then,	 that	 disenfranchisement	 would	 violate	adults’	claims	to	social	equality	does	not	necessarily	show	that	disenfranchisement	
																																																						111	I	defend	a	similar	view	in	chapter	seven.	
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would	violate	children’s	claims	of	social	equality.	However,	it	is	not	enough	to	simply	assert	 that	 social	 equality	 permits	 the	 disenfranchisement	 of	 children,	 but	 not	adults.	 There	must	 be	 some	 difference	between	 children	 and	 adults	 in	 virtue	 of	which	these	differential	forms	of	treatment	might	be	legitimate	from	the	perspective	of	social	equality.	I	see	no	way	of	ruling	out	the	possibility	that	there	might	be	such	differences	a	priori.	Yet	we	have	now	surveyed	a	very	wide	range	of	ways	in	which	theorists	have	sought	 to	distinguish	between	children	and	adults	with	respect	 to	their	 claims	 to	 enfranchisement	 –	 the	 capacity	 to	 enjoy	 the	 goods	 of	enfranchisement,	 capacities	 for	 autonomous	 decision-making,	 fittingness	 for	paternalism,	 contribution	 to	 the	 community’s	 resource	 stock,	 and	 psychological	competency	 –	 and	 found	 all	 of	 them	 wanting.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 just	 what	 other	grounds	proponents	of	the	exclusion	of	children	might	appeal	to.	In	the	absence	of	such	a	justification,	we	are	obliged	to	conclude	that	if	social	equality	requires	that	adults	be	enfranchised	on	equal	terms,	it	requires	the	same	thing	for	children.		4.3.	Practical	Implications		We	have	now	surveyed	all	of	 the	major,	plausible	accounts	of	 the	 justification	of	voting	rights,	and	seen	that	each	entails	that	the	blanket	exclusion	of	minors	from	the	 franchise,	 at	 least	 from	 the	 age	 of	 twelve	 or	 so,	 is	 unjust.	 That	 suggests	powerfully	 that	 their	 exclusion	 is	 in	 fact	unjust.	 It	 does	 not	 follow	 immediately,	however,	that	we	should	simply	enfranchise	everyone	aged	twelve	and	over.	Social	arrangements	ought	to	be	judged	by	their	consequences	all-things-considered.	We	cannot	hope	have	to	fully	accounted	for	these	from	the	armchair.			Nevertheless,	 I	do	venture	 two	more	modest	claims.	First,	 that	 there	 is	no	sound	justification	in	principle	for	the	exclusion	of	children	from	around	the	age	of	twelve	and	over.	Secondly,	 that	 this	gives	us	pro	tanto	reason	to	 lower	the	voting	age	to	twelve.	One	might	challenge	this	second	claim.	Age-based	discrimination	inevitably	involves	failures	to	enfranchise	some	who,	by	the	lights	of	all	these	accounts,	have	the	moral	right	to	vote.	There	are,	after	all,	some	precociously	talented	10	year-olds.	Why	not	–	as	Cook	(2013)	suggests	–	instead	favour	a	system	of	universal	capacity	testing,	under	which	these	inevitable	injustices	might	be	avoided?		
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Yet	capacity	testing	would	entail	a	range	of	other	costs.	Those	who	fail	such	tests	would	 likely	suffer	serious	 losses	 in	self-esteem.	The	authors	of	such	tests	would	enjoy	 enormous	 power	 over	 the	 citizenry	 given	 their	 capacity	 to	 substantially	determine	the	composition	of	 the	electorate.112	Capacity	testing	would	also	 likely	lead	to	outcomes	skewed	in	favour	of	groups	most	likely	to	pass	the	tests;	those	who	enjoy	existing	social	advantage.113	We	might	avoid	some	of	these	costs	by	opting	for	a	very	modest	test.	Cook	(2013)	himself	favours	testing	for	little	more	than	basic	literacy	and	mental	 independence.	But	this	would	tend	to	overinclusion	–	6	year-olds	might	pass,	for	example.	It	also	threatens	to	exacerbate	the	damage	to	the	self-esteem	of	those	who	fail.	Surely	it	 is	more	demoralising	to	fail	a	basic	test	than	a	demanding	one.	There	are	no	perfect	options	in	this	space.	It	seems	to	me	likely	that	age-based	discrimination	will	have	better	consequences	all	things	considered.114	A	more	determinate	verdict,	however,	must	await	further	empirical	evidence.	
	4.4.	Conclusion		No	 prominent	 account	 of	 the	 justification	 of	 voting	 rights	 licenses	 the	 blanket	exclusion	 of	 children.	 Though	 critics	 of	 child	 enfranchisement	 sometimes	 raise	legitimate	concerns,	their	arguments	do	not	characteristically	justify	the	exclusion	of	children	to	anything	like	the	extent	that	prevails	under	the	status	quo.	A	voting	age	of	around	twelve,	 I	have	argued,	 is	much	more	defensible.	No	doubt	 this	will	strike	many	readers	as	radical.	Yet	radical	conclusions	cannot	be	simply	dismissed	as	 such.	We	 should	ask	whether	 there	 is	 any	basis	upon	which	 such	 conclusions	might	be	resisted.	I	have	argued,	here,	that	no	such	basis	exists.			 	
																																																						112	Such	power	is	liable	to	be	abused.	Literacy	tests	were	used	to	exclude	African	Americans	in	the	South	prior	to	1965,	for	example.	113	Socioeconomic	status	is	a	strong	predictor	of	political	knowledge,	for	example	(Althaus,	2003,	pp.	14-7).	114	Though	Munn’s	(2012a)	proposal	of	coupling	a	lowered	voting	age	with	optional	capacity	testing	for	those	below	the	age	limit	is	also	worthy	of	investigation.	
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5.	A	Citizens’	Assembly	for	the	Cognitively	Disabled		A	recent	study	of	92	democracies	found	that	76	restrict	the	voting	rights	of	persons	with	cognitive	disabilities	(Beckman,	2014).	Orthodox	democratic	theorists,	though	little-concerned	 with	 disability,	 are	 generally	 supportive	 of	 such	 restrictions.115	Robert	 Dahl	 (1989,	 pp.	 124-31),	 for	 example,	 held	 that	 persons	 “proved	 to	 be	mentally	 defective”	 can	 justifiably	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 franchise,	 given	 their	purported	inability	to	vote	competently.	Judges	and	politicians,	in	defence	of	such	restrictions,	often	appeal	to	the	fear	that	the	cognitively	disabled	are	vulnerable	to	manipulation,	and	 that	 their	 inclusion	might	 therefore	 lead	 to	distorted	electoral	outcomes.116		More	 recent	work,	 however,	 has	 been	 critical	 of	 such	 arrangements.	 Appelbaum	(2000)	and	Schriner	et	al.	(1997,	p.	89)	point	out	that,	in	practice,	the	cognitively	disabled	are	often	disenfranchised	on	totally	irrelevant	grounds.	Many	states	of	the	US,	for	example,	disenfranchise	persons	placed	under	guardianship	(Schriner	et	al.,	2000,	 p.	 442).	 Yet	 it	 is	 unclear,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	 whether	 persons	 placed	 under	guardianship	 for	an	 inability	 to	manage	 their	 finances,	 for	 instance,	have	 thereby	been	shown	to	be	incompetent	to	vote.	López-Guerra	(2014,	ch.	3)	argues	that	many	cognitively	disabled	persons	are	as	capable	of	understanding	elections,	and	deriving	benefits	 from	 voting,	 as	 other	 citizens.117	 Beckman	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 the	complexities	associated	with	determining	whether	persons	have	sufficient	cognitive	capacities	 to	 vote	 means	 that	 any	 attempt	 to	 exclude	 incompetent	 persons	 will	inevitably	also	exclude	competent	persons.	Barclay	(2013),	finally,	argues	that	such	restrictions	 publicly	 degrade	 the	 cognitively	 disabled,	 while	 yielding	 few,	 if	 any,	benefits.118		
																																																						115	Political	theorists	have	historically	had	little	to	say	on	disability.	More	recent	literature,	however,	has	seen	theorists	 take	up	 issues	such	as	 the	conceptual	analysis	of	disability	(Barnes,	2016),	 the	moral	standing	of	the	severely	disabled	(Kittay,	2005),	and	how	such	persons’	interests	should	ought	to	be	accounted	for	in	a	wider	theory	of	justice	(Nussbaum,	2007).	116	See	Beckman	(2014)	and	Savery	(2015)	for	an	overview	of	such	arguments.	117	Research	is	limited.	However,	one	recent	study	lends	support	to	López-Guerra’s	conjecture.	Link	et	al.	(2012)	surveyed	a	number	of	persons	with	traumatic	brain	injuries,	finding	that	such	persons	perform	similarly	to	average	college	students	on	political	knowledge	and	voter	competency	tests.	118	 Related	 arguments	 are	 offered	 in	 Beckman	 (2009),	 Green	 and	 Klein	 (1980),	 Notes	 (1979),	Nussbaum	(2009),	and	Savery	(2015).	
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I	 am	 inclined	 to	 agree	with	 the	 critics	 of	 such	 restrictions.	 There	 are	 important	general	reasons	to	be	suspicious	of	competency-based	justifications	for	restricting	the	 franchise	 (c.f.	 Lau,	 2012).	 It	 is	 also	 hard	 to	 see	 quite	 which	 harms	 such	restrictions	are	supposed	to	prevent.	The	best	available	evidence	suggests	that	the	cognitively	disabled	comprise	around	1%	of	the	population	on	average	(McKenzie	et	al.,	2016).	Were	such	persons	to	be	enfranchised,	many	would	fail	to	vote	through	either	 disinterest	 or	 incapacity.	 Of	 those	 who	 do	 vote,	 many	 would	 likely	 vote	competently.	Of	those	who	vote	incompetently,	some	are	likely	to	simply	spoil	their	ballots.	Those	who	do	not	are	(presumably)	 likely	 to	vote	randomly.	 In	 that	case,	such	persons’	votes	can	be	expected	 to	distribute	evenly	over	 the	options	on	 the	agenda,	almost	certainly	making	no	difference	to	the	end	result	(Goodin	and	Lau,	2011).			Worries	about	manipulation	are	also	overstated.	There	is	virtually	no	evidence	of	such	manipulation	occurring	in	any	systematic	way	(Fiala-Butora	et	al.,	2014,	pp.	86-7;	 Redley	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 pp.	 1028).	 Most	 recorded	 incidents	 involve	 political	operatives	 entering	 facilities	 (e.g.	 nursing	 homes)	 in	 which	 large	 numbers	 of	cognitively	 disabled	 persons	 are	 housed	 and	 attempting	 to	 manipulate	 such	persons’	completion	of	absentee	ballots,	a	practice	that	could	easily	be	outlawed.		However,	objectionable	though	the	disenfranchisement	of	the	cognitively	disabled	might	 be,	 the	 solutions	 are	 relatively	 straightforward.	 Legal	 provisions	disenfranchising	such	persons	ought	to	be	repealed,	as	has	been	done	recently	in	Austria,	Finland,	and	the	UK,	for	example	(Beckman,	2014,	p.	226).	Where	necessary,	assistance	should	be	made	available	to	cognitively	disabled	persons	wishing	to	vote	(Nussbaum,	2009,	pp.	347-9).		Much	harder,	I	suggest,	is	ensuring	that	democratic	processes	take	adequate	account	of	 such	 persons’	 interests	 –	 an	 issue	 that	 has	 received	 very	 little	 attention	 from	democratic	 theorists.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 structural	 factors	 in	virtue	of	which	elected	officials	 tend	 to	be	systematically	under-responsive	 to	 the	interests	of	 the	 cognitively	disabled.	These	are	unlikely	 to	be	ameliorated	 to	any	significant	degree	by	the	enfranchisement	of	such	persons.	These	factors	also	lead	to	 familiar	 injustices	 –	 the	 chronic	 under-resourcing	 of	 disability	 services,	 the	
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imposition	 of	 undue	 burdens	 upon	 unremunerated	 caregivers,	 and	 so	 on.	 Since	these	injustices	are,	at	least	partially,	the	product	of	the	way	in	which	democratic	processes	 are	 structured,	 there	 is	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 for	 considering	 how	 such	processes	might	be	reformed	to	ameliorate	this	state	of	affairs.			The	main	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	argue	that	the	best	way	of	rendering	democratic	institutions	adequately	sensitive	to	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled	would	be	 to	 establish	 a	 citizens’	 assembly,	 to	 be	 tasked	with	 reviewing	 existing	 policy	arrangements,	 and	 proposing	 reforms	 to	 those	 arrangements	 to	 be	 put	 to	 the	citizenry	in	direct	referenda.	The	argument	proceeds	in	four	steps.	First,	I	set	out	in	more	detail	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness	to	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled.	 Second,	 I	 consider	a	 range	of	 alternative	 institutional	 reforms,	 showing	that	each	is	likely	to	either	have	no	substantial	impact	upon	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness	or,	otherwise,	raises	serious	egalitarian	concerns.	Third,	I	set	out	the	argument	 for	 the	 citizens’	 assembly,	 drawing	 heavily	 upon	 the	wealth	 of	 recent	empirical	 studies	 of	 so-called	 ‘deliberative	 mini-publics’.	 Finally,	 I	 respond	 to	 a	range	of	possible	objections.		5.1.	The	Democratic	Neglect	of	the	Cognitively	Disabled		Though	the	area	is	under-studied,	it	is	generally	accepted	that	governments	tend	to	neglect	 the	 interests	of	 the	 cognitively	disabled,	 and	 that	 such	persons’	 interests	tend	 to	 suffer,	 in	 consequence.119	 Research	 conducted	 by	 the	 World	 Health	Organisation	in	2004,	for	example,	showed	that	35%-50%	of	persons	with	serious	mental	disorders	 in	developed	 countries,	 and	76%-85%	 in	developing	 countries,	had	received	no	treatment	in	the	previous	year	(Consortium,	2004).120	The	mentally	disabled	(including	the	cognitively	disabled)	are	substantially	more	likely	to	be	in	poverty	than	the	non-disabled,	in	both	developed	and	developing	nations	(Palmer,	2011).	 Several	 studies	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 are	substantially	 more	 likely	 than	 non-disabled	 persons	 to	 suffer	 from	 a	 range	 of	chronic	diseases	(e.g.	diabetes,	high	blood	pressure)	while,	at	the	same	time,	being	less	 likely	 to	 receive	 preventative	 care	 (e.g.	 Commission,	 2006;	 Havercamp	 and	
																																																						119	 The	World	 Health	 Organisation	 and	World	 Bank’s	World	 Report	 on	 Disability	 (2013)	 offers	 a	general	overview.	120	See	also	Kohn	et	al.	(2004).	
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Scott,	2015;	Reichard	et	al.,	2011).	The	majority	of	caregiving	responsibilities	 for	such	persons	are	discharged	informally,	typically	by	unpaid	family	members.	In	the	United	States,	for	example,	over	75%	of	adults	with	developmental	disabilities	live	at	 home	 with	 family	 caregivers,	 who	 themselves	 face	 problems	 as	 diverse	 as	increased	 stress,	 social	 isolation,	 and	 limited	 employment	 opportunities	(Organisation	and	Bank,	2013,	pp.	141-3).			This	state	of	affairs	is	intuitively	unjust,	a	verdict	upon	which	multiple	theoretical	perspectives	converge.	Luck	egalitarians,	for	example,	hold	that	inequalities	which	arise	in	virtue	of	factors	for	which	individuals	cannot	be	held	responsible	are	unjust	(c.f.	Cohen,	1989a).	Many	conditions	which	give	rise	to	cognitive	impairments	are	caused	by	factors	for	which	individuals	cannot	be	held	responsible	(e.g.	genetics).	The	disadvantages	such	persons	suffer	in	virtue	of	their	disabilities,	then,	are	unjust	on	the	luck	egalitarian	view.121		Utilitarians,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 hold	 that	 resources	 must	 be	 allocated	 so	 as	 to	maximise	overall	welfare.	The	cognitively	disabled	often	experience	lower	levels	of	welfare	 than	 they	 would	 otherwise	 under	 alternative	 arrangements.	 Failing	 to	improve	such	persons’	welfare	is	unjust,	for	utilitarians,	unless	all	feasible	ways	of	doing	 so	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 net	 decline	 in	 overall	 wellbeing,	 a	 claim	 which	 is	desperately	hard	to	believe,	here.		Finally,	sufficientarians	hold	that	justice	requires	that	all	individuals	have	access	to	a	threshold	level	of	those	goods	(rights,	capabilities,	etc…)	necessary	for	the	living	of	an	acceptable	life.	The	goods	allocated	to	the	cognitively	disabled	fall	below	this	threshold,	on	many	accounts.	Nussbaum	(2007,	ch.	3),	for	instance,	argues	that	the	cognitively	 disabled	 are	 frequently	 deprived	 of	 human	 capabilities	 –	 e.g.	opportunities	for	mental	stimulation	–	to	which	they	are	entitled	on	sufficientarian	grounds.			
																																																						121	Some	(e.g.	Anderson,	1999)	are	resistant	to	luck	egalitarian	treatments	of	disability,	believing	such	views	are	committed	to	the	claim	that	the	lives	of	the	disabled	are	somehow	less	valuable	than	those	of	the	non-disabled.	Luck	egalitarians	need	not	be	committed	to	any	such	claim.	They	can	simply	hold	that	the	fact	that	the	cognitively	disabled	suffer	disadvantages	(e.g.	poverty)	in	virtue	of	conditions	(e.g.	severe	autism)	for	which	they	cannot	be	held	responsible,	is	unjust.	
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It	does	not	matter,	 for	our	purposes,	whether	one	accepts	any	of	these	particular	arguments.	 All	 that	matters	 is	 that	 one	 be	 prepared	 to	 grant	 that	 the	 status	 quo	treatment	of	the	cognitively	disabled	is	unjust.	Promoting	justice	is	among	the	most	important	 functions	 governments,	morally,	 ought	 to	perform.	Failures	 to	 redress	these	injustices,	then,	are	serious	moral	failures.122	What	causes	such	failures?	And	what	can	be	done	to	ameliorate	them?	In	a	sense,	the	answer	to	the	former	question	is	obvious.	Politicians’	behaviour	 is	driven	by	electoral	 incentives,	and	politicians	have	little	incentive	to	attend	to	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled.	Let	us,	for	convenience,	refer	to	this	as	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness.	Some	proponents	of	enfranchising	the	cognitively	disabled	(e.g.	Appelbaum,	2000,	p.	850)	express	the	hope	that	doing	so	will	give	governments	more	powerful	incentives	to	attend	to	such	persons’	 interests.123	 Such	 hopes	 are	 naïve.	 For	 at	 least	 three	 reasons,	 the	enfranchisement	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 is	 unlikely	 to	 make	 any	 substantial	difference	to	politicians’	electoral	incentives,	and	therefore	to	their	behaviour.		First,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 noted,	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 comprise	 a	 very	 small	fraction	 of	 the	 overall	 population	 (around	 1%).124	 Even	 were	 they	 to	 be	enfranchised,	 many	 such	 persons	 will	 fail	 to	 vote	 through	 either	 disinterest	 or	incapacity.125	As	a	group,	then,	the	cognitively	disabled	will	generally	be	too	small	(or	else,	spread	too	thinly	across	electoral	districts)	to	make	a	meaningful	difference	to	any	politician’s	electoral	prospects	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases.	The	votes	of	the	cognitively	 disabled	 are	 therefore	 unlikely	 to	 have	 any	 substantial	 impact	 upon	politicians’	incentives.	Many	other	‘persistent	minorities’	experience	governmental	neglect	for	this	very	reason.	The	United	States’	treatment	of	Native	Americans	is	an	oft-cited	example.126	
																																																						122	I	presuppose,	here,	that	there	are	feasible	courses	of	actions	governments	could	pursue	that	might	help	ameliorate	these	injustices.	This	seems	overwhelmingly	plausible,	even	accepting	that	there	are	limits	to	the	capacities	of	government	to	ameliorate	the	disadvantages	suffered	by	the	cognitively	disabled.	Outlining	what	governments	specifically	ought	to	do,	however,	would	take	us	too	far	afield.	123	As	discussed	in	chapter	two,	a	substantial	body	of	evidence	indicates	that	the	enfranchisement	of	some	previously	excluded	groups	–	e.g.	women	(Aidt	and	Dallal,	2008),	the	unwealthy	(Abou-Chadi	and	Orlowski,	2015),	and	African	Americans	(Husted	and	Kenny,	1997)	–	caused	governments	 to	allocate	more	resources	to	those	groups.	124	The	case	of	the	cognitively	disabled	is	crucially	different	from	the	case	of	children	in	this	respect,	insofar	as	children	generally	comprise	a	much	greater	 fraction	of	 the	population.	For	example,	 in	2016,	persons	aged	0-17	comprised	22.8%	of	the	population	of	the	United	States	(Statistics,	2017,	p.	93).	125	We	might	compel	the	cognitively	disabled	to	vote.	There	are,	however,	important	reasons	not	to	do	so	particular	to	the	case	of	the	cognitively	disabled	(e.g.	the	risk	of	causing	psychological	distress).	126	See	Rights	(2003)	for	an	overview.	
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	Enfranchising	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	might	 have	 indirect	 effects	 on	 politicians’	electoral	incentives.	Doing	so	might,	for	example,	signal	to	society	at	large	that	such	persons’	interests	deserve	greater	consideration,	prompting	non-disabled	citizens	to	 give	 greater	weight	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 in	 their	 voting	behaviour.	It	is	hard	to	say	for	certain	whether	such	effects	are	likely	to	occur,	and	what	 their	 impact	might	 be.127	Most	 studies	 of	 the	 enfranchisement	 of	 formerly	excluded	groups	seek	to	control	for	such	effects,	rather	than	measure	them.	There	are	good	reasons	to	be	pessimistic,	however.	Many	minority	groups	whose	members	are	 enfranchised	 continue	 to	 suffer	 governmental	 neglect,	 the	 semiotic	 effects	 of	their	enfranchisement	notwithstanding.		Second,	 though	 I	 think	 many	 cognitively	 disabled	 persons	 capable	 of	 voting	competently,	it	is	undeniable	that	many	are	not.	Such	persons	are	unlikely	to	vote	at	all.	But,	even	if	that	were	not	the	case,	such	persons	are	likely	to	lack	the	ability	to	discern	between	 the	parties	on	 the	ballot	with	respect	 to	 their	historical,	 and/or	likely	future,	impact	upon	their	interests.	There	would	be	little	politicians	could	do	to	attract	such	persons’	support,	and	therefore	little	incentive	to	try.	Even	were	the	cognitively	 disabled	 numerous	 enough	 to	 make	 a	 significant	 difference	 to	politicians’	electoral	prospects,	there	would	be	a	substantial	subset	of	that	group	to	whose	interests	politicians	would	have	little	incentive	to	attend.		Finally,	 even	 assuming	 (plausibly)	 some	degree	 of	 humanitarian	 concern	 for	 the	cognitively	disabled	on	the	part	of	elected	officials,	governments	have	the	ability	to	effectively	compel	private	citizens	(typically,	family	members)	to	take	on	the	costs	of	caring	for	the	cognitively	disabled,	themselves.	As	Simon	Keller	(2016,	pp.	715-6)	points	out,	governments	are	able	to	engage	in	a	form	of	moral	blackmail	wherein,	by	failing	to	provide	adequate	state	support,	family	members	are	left	in	a	situation	in	which	 they	 are	morally	 obliged	 to	 take	 on	 the	 costs	 of	 caring	 for	 such	 persons.	Policymakers	 are	 thus	 able	 to	 allocate	 resources	 to	 other	 areas,	 safe	 in	 the	knowledge	that	others	will	take	up	the	slack.		
																																																						127	Studies	of	 the	effects	of	enfranchising	previously	excluded	groups	 typically	 seek	 to	control	 for	these	indirect	effects,	rather	than	measure	them.	
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It	 is	 unlikely,	 then,	 that	 enfranchising	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 will	 make	 a	substantial	 difference	 to	 politicians’	 electoral	 incentives.	 Doing	 so	 is	 therefore	unlikely	to	alleviate	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness	to	any	significant	degree.	This	 is	 not	 an	 argument	 against	 enfranchising	 such	 persons.	 It	 does,	 however,	suggest	a	prima	facie	case	for	considering	other	reforms	to	the	democratic	process	that	might	stand	a	better	chance	of	ameliorating	the	problem.	Such	reforms	come	in	two	 varieties	 –	 interventions	 upon	 existing	 mechanisms	 of	 legislative	 decision-making,	and	the	introduction	of	novel	mechanisms	of	legislative	decision-making.	Section	II	considers	the	former,	section	III	the	latter.128		5.2.	Interventions	on	Existing	Mechanisms		Interventions	on	existing	mechanisms	might	 follow	two	strategies	–	constraining	outputs,	and	manipulating	inputs.			5.2.1.	Output	Constraints		Output	constraints,	in	general,	aim	to	limit	the	ability	of	legislatures	to	set	back	the	interests	 of	 particular	 social	 groups.	 The	 standard	 mechanism,	 here,	 is	 judicial	review:	empowering	courts	to	strike	out	or	modify	legislation	injurious	to	certain	individual	 rights.	Nussbaum	(2007),	 in	 this	vein,	has	proposed	 the	 constitutional	entrenchment	of	an	expansive	set	of	human	rights	for	the	cognitively	disabled.	Some	democracies	–	e.g.	the	US	–	already	protect	some	rights	of	the	cognitively	disabled	in	 this	 way	 (Nussbaum,	 2009).	 Systems	 of	 judicial	 review	 vary	 along	 many	dimensions,	most	of	which	are	irrelevant	for	our	purposes	(c.f.	Waldron,	2006,	pp.	153-9).	What	is	significant	for	our	purposes,	however,	are	variations	in	the	rights	courts	are	empowered	to	protect.	Modest	proposals	would	allow	courts	to	intervene	only	where	the	most	fundamental	rights	(e.g.	to	life)	are	at	stake.	More	expansive	proposals,	including	Nussbaum’s,	would	also	allow	courts	to	intervene	where	less	fundamental	rights	(e.g.	to	‘play’)	are	at	stake.		
																																																						128	 Few	 of	 the	 proposals	 we	 shall	 canvass	 have	 been	 discussed	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	cognitively	disabled.	Democratic	 theorists,	however,	have	taken	an	 interest	 in	structurally	similar	problems	–	e.g.	accounting	for	the	interests	of	future	generations	(c.f.	González-Ricoy	and	Gosseries,	2016;		Van	Parijs,	1998).	We	shall	draw	upon	this	literature	as	we	proceed.	
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Judicial	review	has	often	been	an	effective	bulwark	for	individual	rights	including,	sometimes,	the	rights	of	the	cognitively	disabled.	I	would	support	the	introduction	of	sensible	regimes	of	this	sort	where	they	do	not	presently	exist.	 Judicial	review	alone,	however,	is	unlikely	to	constitute	a	sufficient	remedy	to	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness.	Courts	have	historically	proven	to	be	 fallible	 instruments	 for	 the	protection	of	the	rights	of	minority	groups	(Waldron,	2006).	It	is	also	unlikely	that	courts	 could	 ensure	 adequate	 consideration	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	disabled	without	impinging	excessively	upon	the	authority	of	the	legislature.	Even	the	most	ardent	supporters	of	judicial	review	(e.g.	Dworkin,	1996)	accept	that	the	appropriate	 role	 for	 courts	 in	 democratic	 societies	 is	 limited	 to	 protecting	 the	integrity	 of	 the	 democratic	 process,	 and	 preventing	 legislatures	 from	 violating	individuals’	fundamental	rights.	Justice	for	the	cognitively	disabled	involves	rights-protections.	But,	surely,	it	also	goes	beyond	such	matters	and,	therefore,	beyond	the	appropriate	province	of	courts.	Addressing	 the	problem	of	under-responsiveness	will	require	addressing	the	problem’s	underlying	causes,	not	merely	containing	its	effects.			5.2.2.	Input	Manipulations		Input	manipulations	would	aim	to	intervene	on	the	legislative	process	in	the	hope	of	producing	decisions	more	sensitive	to	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled.	Such	interventions	might	be	pitched	at	the	level	of	citizens,	or	officials.		Citizen-level	 interventions	 would	 aim	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 under-responsiveness	 by	 taking	 steps	 to	 improve	 the	 electoral	 prospects	 of	 candidates	sympathetic	 to	 the	 cognitively	 disabled,	 and/or	 give	 parties	 incentives	 to	 adopt	policy	platforms	which	take	better	account	of	such	persons’	interests.	One	strategy	would	involve	intervening	on	citizens’	behaviour,	to	encourage	them	to	vote	(and/or	engage	in	other	forms	of	activism)	with	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled	in	mind.	 Several	 such	 interventions	 are	 possible.	 Public	 education	 strategies	 (e.g.	advertising	 campaigns)	 might	 attempt	 to	 raise	 the	 salience	 of	 the	 issue.	Accountability	measures	might	be	 introduced	 in	an	attempt	 to	 lower	the	costs	of	gathering	information	with	respect	to	the	treatment	of	the	cognitively	disabled,	and	generate	public	pressure	to	address	policy	failures.	Various	bodies	(e.g.	disability	
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commissions,	ombudsmen)	might	be	tasked	with	producing	regular	public	reports	on	the	treatment	of	the	cognitively	disabled,	for	example.129			A	 second	 strategy	 might	 involve	 attempting	 to	 amplify	 the	 influence	 of	 citizens	already	 concerned	with	 the	 treatment	of	 the	 cognitively	disabled.	Brighouse	 and	Fleurbaey	(2010,	pp.	148-51)	and	Nussbaum	(2009,	pp.	347-9),	for	example,	have	proposed	allowing	the	guardians	of	cognitively	disabled	persons	incapable	of	voting	to	cast	a	proxy	ballot	on	their	behalf.	More	radical	proposals	are	possible.	One	might,	for	example,	introduce	plural	voting,	allocating	(say)	five	additional	votes	to	persons	likely	to	be	sympathetic	 to	the	cause	of	 the	cognitively	disabled	(e.g.	members	of	disability	advocacy	groups).		Both	strategies	are	problematic.	Attempts	to	intervene	upon	citizens’	behaviour	are	unlikely	 to	prove	effective.	Citizens	are	generally	politically	disengaged	–	 indeed,	rationally	 so,	 given	 their	 limited	 ability	 to	 affect	 political	 outcomes	 (c.f.	 Downs,	1957).	Attempts	to	increase	the	electoral	salience	of	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled,	 or	 cause	 individuals	 to	 become	more	 informed	by	 lowering	 the	 cost	 of	gathering	information,	face	an	uphill	battle	in	commanding	citizens’	attention	and,	therefore,	in	changing	their	behaviour.	That	is	not	to	say	that	such	interventions	will	make	 no	 difference.	 Lowering	 the	 cost	 of	 gathering	 information,	 for	 example,	 is	likely	to	cause	persons	with	prior	interests	in	the	issue	to	become	more	informed.	Perhaps	in	circumstances	where	such	persons	are	very	numerous,	such	strategies	might	 have	 substantial	 positive	 effects.	 Such	 circumstances,	 however,	 are	 surely	very	rare.		What,	then,	of	our	second	strategy?	Marginally	increasing	the	influence	of	persons	likely	to	be	sympathetic	to	the	cognitively	disabled	(e.g.	allowing	guardians	to	cast	proxy	votes	on	behalf	of	those	unable	to	vote)	is	unlikely	to	make	any	substantial	difference	 to	 political	 outcomes.	 Cognitively	 disabled	 persons	 unable	 to	 vote	competently	 are	 a	 tiny	 fraction	 of	 the	 overall	 population.	 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	additional	voting	power	guardians	would	enjoy	under	such	proposals	would	make	any	meaningful	difference	to	politicians’	incentives.		
																																																						129	 Similar	 proposals	 have	 been	 defended	 in	 the	 case	 of	 future	 generations	 by,	 among	 others,	Beckman	and	Uggla	(2016),	Caney	(2016),	and	Thompson	(2016).	
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	Perhaps	 increasing	 such	 persons’	 power	more	 substantially	 (e.g.	 by	 introducing	plural	voting)	might	prove	more	effective.	This	is	far	from	obvious.	Increasing	the	political	power	of	persons	sympathetic	to	the	cognitively	disabled	may	render	those	persons	 less	 likely	 to	 vote	with	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 in	mind.	Straightforwardly,	 increasing	an	agent’s	political	power	raises	the	relative	cost	to	that	 agent	 of	 acting	 altruistically,	 rather	 than	 self-interestedly	 (Brennan	 and	Lomasky,	1993,	pp.	22-4).		Even	setting	such	worries	aside,	democratic	theorists	are	generally	resistant	to	such	proposals	 for	 familiar	 reasons	of	political	equality.	There	are	several	accounts	of	political	equality.	Virtually	all,	however,	converge	upon	a	requirement	that	citizens	enjoy	 equal	 political	 power.130	 The	 proposals	 under	 discussion	 violate	 such	requirements.	Their	whole	point,	after	all,	is	to	create	inequalities	of	political	power	in	 favour	 of	 persons	 with	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 cognitively	disabled.	Egalitarian	considerations	are	not	necessarily	decisive.	The	disvalue	of	the	political	 inequalities	such	proposals	 involve	might,	potentially,	be	outweighed	by	the	gains	 in	wellbeing	 for	 the	 cognitively	disabled	 such	proposals	might	achieve.	Still,	 these	 concerns	 should	 prompt	 us	 to	 at	 least	 consider	 alternative	 paths	 of	reform	that	do	not	entail	such	concerns.		Let	us,	then,	consider	official-level	interventions.	One	strategy,	here,	would	seek	to	amplify	the	influence	of	officials	sympathetic	to	the	cognitively	disabled.	There	are	many	ways	in	which	this	might	be	achieved.	Ekeli	(2009;	2016),	for	example,	has	proposed	allowing	sufficiently	large	minorities	of	legislators	to	delay	the	passage	of	legislation	 they	 reasonably	 believe	 would	 have	 unacceptable	 effects	 on	 future	generations,	the	idea	being	to	guarantee	more	time	for	deliberation,	and/or	force	the	majority	 to	 improve	 the	 legislation.	We	might	 imagine	 similar	 systems	being	instituted	with	respect	to	legislation	that	takes	insufficient	account	of	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled.		
																																																						130	We	surveyed	the	principal	accounts	in	chapter	four.	I	defend	a	requirement	of	this	sort	in	chapter	seven.		
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Alternatively,	one	might	seek	to	alter	the	composition	of	legislative	bodies,	in	order	to	increase	the	proportion	of	officials	sympathetic	to	the	cognitively	disabled.	Many	have	proposed	the	introduction	of	quotas	for	female	candidates,	or	else	that	special	seats	 in	 parliament	 be	 reserved	 for	women,	 to	 combat	 under-responsiveness	 to	women’s	 interests	 (c.f.	 Phillips,	 1994).	 Direct	 analogues	 of	 such	 proposals	potentially	raise	concerns	over	the	capacity	of	the	cognitively	disabled	to	engage	in	the	 lawmaking	process.131	Whether	 such	 concerns	 are	warranted	 is	 an	 empirical	question	we	cannot	settle	here.	If	such	proposals	prove	inadvisable	for	this	reason,	however,	 similar	 proposals	 are	 not	 difficult	 to	 imagine.	 Special	 seats	 might	 be	established	 for	persons	who	are	 to	act	as	surrogates	 for	 the	cognitively	disabled,	advocating	on	their	behalf	in	the	legislature,	for	example.132			These	proposals,	 too,	 are	of	 limited	appeal.	Proposals	 to	 increase	 the	 capacity	of	politicians	to	act	on	behalf	of	the	cognitively	disabled	face	the	elementary	difficulty	that	 few	 will	 be	 willing	 to	 exercise	 such	 powers.	 The	 problem	 of	 under-responsiveness	arises	because	elected	officials	have	limited	incentive	to	attend	to	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled	in	the	first	place.	It	is	hard	to	see	why	simply	increasing	the	power	of	elected	officials	to	act	on	such	persons’	behalf	should	render	them	any	more	likely	to	do	so.		The	 effects	 of	 attempts	 to	 modify	 the	 composition	 of	 legislatures	 via	 the	appointment	of	‘special	representatives’	will	likely	vary	with	the	method	by	which	such	 representatives	 are	 selected.	 Two	 broad	 methods	 are	 possible	 –	 popular	election,	and	government	appointment.	Government-appointed	representatives	are	likely	to	be	ineffectual.	Governments	have	little	incentive	to	appoint	representatives	likely	 to	 disrupt	 their	 agenda.	 There	 are	 alternative	 means	 of	 appointing	 such	representatives.	Disability	advocacy	groups,	for	example,	might	be	empowered	to	do	 so.	 This,	 however,	 raises	 egalitarian	 concerns	 parallel	 to	 those	 which	 attend	plural	voting.	Agents	able	to	appoint	representatives	to	the	legislature	would	enjoy	substantially	greater	power	than	the	citizenry	at	large.	Most	of	us	would	be	inclined	to	object	to	such	proposals	for	that	reason.		
																																																						131	Working	directly	in	the	lawmaking	process	is	obviously	more	demanding	than	voting.	132	Dobson	(1996)	and	Ekeli	(2005)	have	proposed	similar	arrangements	for	the	representation	of	future	generations.	
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Special	 representatives	 elected	 by	 the	 citizenry	 will	 face	 the	 same	 electoral	pressures	as	ordinary	representatives.	For	that	reason,	they	likely	to	be	ineffectual.	If	 they	 not	 ineffectual,	 then	 they	 are	 likely	 superfluous.	 If	 it	 is	 electorally	advantageous	 for	 special	 representatives	 to	 agitate	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 the	cognitively	disabled,	then	it	would	presumably	also	be	advantageous	for	ordinary	representatives	to	do	so.133	Representatives	might	be	more	effective	were	they	to	be	elected	 by	 some	 subset	 of	 the	 electorate	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 concerned	 with	 the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled	–	the	cognitively	disabled	and	their	families,	for	example.	But	this,	again,	raises	egalitarian	concerns.	Citizens	who	enjoy	the	capacity	to	vote	for	both	ordinary	representatives	and	special	representatives	would	enjoy	greater	political	power	than	citizens	who	could	not.			These	egalitarian	concerns	are,	again,	not	necessarily	decisive.	But	it	is	unlikely	that	the	 proposals	 canvassed	 above	would	 realise	 goods	 sufficient	 to	 outweigh	 these	concerns.	Unless	the	governing	party	fails	to	command	a	majority	and	must	seek	the	support	of	other	representatives,	the	mere	presence	of	such	representatives	in	the	legislative	 chamber	 is	 unlikely	 to	 secure	 substantial	 policy	 advances.	 Special	representatives	might	publicly	agitate	for	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled,	but	they	will	almost	never	be	able	to	bring	about	policy	change.		***		There	 are	 many	 proposals	 I	 have	 not	 discussed,	 some	 of	 which	 might	 possibly	address	 the	 problem	 of	 under-responsiveness	 more	 effectively,	 without	 raising	egalitarian	concerns.	I	am	sceptical,	however.	The	problem	of	under-responsiveness	is	(among	other	things)	driven	by	the	limited	electoral	rewards	of	attending	to	the	interests	of	 the	cognitively	disabled.	The	difficulties	of	 intervening	upon	citizens’	motivations	being	as	they	are,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	politicians	might	be	incentivised	to	take	the	interests	of	such	persons	more	seriously	without	increasing	the	relative	political	 influence	of	 citizens	with	 the	 right	kinds	of	moral	 attitudes	 towards	 the	cognitively	 disabled.	 Yet	 it	 is	 precisely	 this	 which	 seems	 to	 be	 objectionable	 on	egalitarian	 grounds.	 For	 this	 reason,	 then,	 I	 think	 it	 worthwhile	 to	 consider	 the	
																																																						133	For	a	similar	criticism	of	proposals	of	this	sort	in	the	case	of	future	generations,	see	Jensen	(2015).	
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alternative	avenue	of	 reform:	 supplementary	mechanisms	of	 legislative	decision-making.		5.3.	Supplementary	Mechanisms		This	 family	 of	 proposals	 involves	 establishing	 legislative	 decision-making	institutions	 to	 supplement	 those	 of	 conventional	 representative	 democracy.	 The	promise	 of	 such	 arrangements	 is	 clear	 enough.	 The	 problem	 of	 under-responsiveness	is	created	by	the	incentive-structure	of	elected	officials.	Legislative	decision-making	 processes	 that	 bypass	 elected	 officials,	 then,	 might	 (though,	 of	course,	 will	 not	 necessarily)	 prove	 more	 responsive	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	cognitively	disabled.	There	is	a	virtually	unlimited	range	of	options,	here.	Legislative	power	could,	in-principle,	be	extended	to	almost	any	agent	or	agency.	Most	of	these	options,	 however,	 would	 be	 objectionable	 on	 egalitarian	 grounds.	 Delegating	legislative	power	to	a	council	of	experts	on	cognitive	disability	might	produce	high-quality	policies.	But	it	would	also	drastically	increase	the	political	power	of	some	small	subset	of	the	population,	without	any	compensating	increase	in	the	power	of	other	citizens.	I	therefore	set	such	proposals	aside	in	favour	of	a	more	familiar	class	of	proposals:	direct	democracy.		Direct	democracy	involves	legislative	decision-making	by	popular	vote	among	the	citizenry.	Such	arrangements	are	relatively	common.	Over	half	of	all	states	and	cities	in	the	US,	 for	example,	afford	citizens	opportunities	for	direct	decision-making	of	some	 kind	 (Lupia	 and	 Matsusaka,	 2004,	 p.	 463).	 Citing	 familiar	 risks	 –	 elite	dominance,	low-quality	decision-making	by	uninformed	citizens,	and	so	on	–	most	democratic	 theorists	 are	 suspicious	 of	 direct	 democracy.134	 That	 is	 unfortunate.	Empirical	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 though	 direct	 democracy	 certainly	 can	 exhibit	these	ills,	it	does	not	necessarily	do	so	(Budge,	2008;	Lupia	and	Matsusaka,	2004).	There	 is	 a	multiplicity	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 direct	 democracy	 can	 be	 implemented.	Different	institutional	arrangements	realise	radically	different	consequences.	Elite	dominance,	 for	example,	 is	more	prevalent	 in	 systems	(e.g.	California)	 that	allow	virtually	unrestricted	 campaign	 spending	 than	 in	 systems	 (e.g.	Quebec)	 in	which	spending	is	tightly	restricted	(Budge,	2008,	p.	605).	Obviously,	not	all	(or	even	most)	
																																																						134	These	concerns	have	a	long	history	–	see,	for	example,	Madison	(1787)	and	Plato	(1974,	p.	282).	
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forms	 of	 direct	 democracy	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 improved	 outcomes	 for	 the	cognitively	disabled.	However,	I	do	think	that	a	certain	kind	of	arrangement,	which	I	shall	now	outline,	might	well	do	so.		5.4.	A	Citizens’	Assembly	for	the	Cognitively	Disabled		My	proposal	is	modelled	upon	the	2004	British	Columbia	Citizens’	Assembly	(BCCA)	on	 electoral	 reform.135	 The	 BCCA	 consisted	 of	 160	 British	 Columbian	 citizens,	selected	by	near-random	procedure.	Over	eleven	months,	the	BCCA	was	tasked	with	considering	whether	British	Columbia’s	electoral	system	should	be	reformed	and,	if	so,	how.	The	process	was	conducted	in	several	stages.	Members,	first,	spent	several	weekends	learning	about	electoral	systems	in	consultation	with	experts.	They	then	deliberated	over	the	values	it	was	desirable	for	electoral	systems	to	serve,	and	which	system	best	embodied	those	values.	The	BCCA	then	conducted	public	consultations	and	drafted	a	final	report	recommending	that	British	Columbia	adopt	a	system	of	single	transferable	vote.	The	proposal	was	then	put	to	a	popular	referendum,	where	it	received	an	impressive	57.7%	of	the	province-wide	vote	(just	short	of	the	60%	success	threshold).		Many	have	noted	the	appeal	of	BCCA-like	processes	for	decision-making	in	policy	areas	in	which	conflicts	between	the	electoral	interests	of	politicians	and	the	public	interest	are	likely	to	lead	to	low-quality	decisions	(e.g.	decisions	over	the	drawing	of	 electoral	 boundaries).136	 Removing	 the	 influence	 of	 politicians’	 electoral	incentives,	 such	 authors	 suggest,	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 proposals	which,	 if	 adopted,	would	better	track	the	public	 interest.	 I	agree,	but	also	think	that	such	processes	potentially	have	wider	application.137	Conflicts	of	interest	are	not	the	only	cause	of	poor-quality	 decision-making.	 Failures	 of	 government	 policy	 also	 occur	 where	politicians	have	insufficient	electoral	incentive	to	seriously	engage	in	a	given	policy	area	at	all.	BCCA-like	processes	might	prove	better	able	to	account	for	the	interests	
																																																						135	The	BCCA	has	been	discussed	extensively	elsewhere.	See	especially	Warren	and	Pearse	(2008a).	A	number	of	other	 jurisdictions	have	experimented	with	similar	processes	–	e.g.	Ontario,	and	 the	Netherlands.		136	See	Fung	(2007a,	pp.	451-3),	Pettit	(2012,	pp.	231-2),	and	Thompson	(2008b).	Deliberative	mini-publics	of	various	kinds,	without	the	power	to	call	referenda,	have	been	run	on	a	plethora	of	issues	in	recent	years	(Dryzek,	2010,	ch.	8;	Fishkin,	2009;	Goodin	and	Dryzek,	2006).	137	For	a	quite	different	proposal	to	extend	the	application	of	such	processes,	see	Ferejohn	(2008,	pp.	212-3).	See	also	Smith	(2009,	pp.	188-93).	
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of	groups	characteristically	neglected	by	elected	officials,	including	the	cognitively	disabled,	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 such	 bodies	 are	 unaffected	 by	 the	 electoral	pressures	which	cause	politicians	to	neglect	such	groups	in	the	first	place.			I	 propose,	 then,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 citizens’	 assembly	 for	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	(CACD).	Its	task	would	be	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	existing	government	policy	upon	the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 (and	 other	 relevant	 parties),	 and	 devise	reform	proposals	to	be	put	to	the	public	in	popular	referenda.138	As	I	will	show,	there	is	good	reason	to	believe	that	the	CACD	would	have	the	capacity	to	(1)	deliberate	in	a	rational,	informed	manner	over	the	merits	of	status	quo	government	policy,	and	(2)	devise	high-quality	proposals	for	reform	that	(3)	stand	a	good	chance	of	being	adopted.		As	we	shall	see,	crucial	to	the	CACD’s	chances	of	success	would	be	its	capacity	for	high-quality	deliberation.	Such	deliberation	is	generally	infeasible	with	large	groups	(Fishkin,	2009,	ch.	2).139	The	assembly,	then,	must	be	fairly	small	–	say	200	citizens.	For	reasons	to	be	explained	momentarily,	members	are	to	be	selected	at	random	from	the	adult	population,	and	paid	a	salary	to	participate.	Initially,	members	are	unlikely	to	have	any	particular	policy	expertise.	Steps	would	therefore	need	to	be	taken	to	increase	members’	epistemic	competency.	Upon	selection,	then,	members	would	be	 required	 to	undergo	an	 intensive	education	process	 involving,	 at	 least,	consultations	with	policy	experts,	medical	professionals,	advocates,	carers,	and	the	cognitively	disabled	themselves.	We	cannot	expect	this	to	turn	ordinary	citizens	into	policy	experts	overnight.	 Still,	 a	 substantial	body	of	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 small	groups	of	ordinary	people,	under	good	deliberative	conditions,	are	able	to	rapidly	acquire	command	of	relatively	complex	subject	matter,	especially	where	they	are	brought	into	contact	with	experts	(c.f.	Dryzek,	2010,	pp.	158-9;	Fishkin,	2009,	ch.	5;	Fishkin	 and	 Luskin,	 2005,	 p.	 291).	 Such	 persons	 also	 appear	 to	 come	 to	 well-reasoned	 policy	 judgements,	 often	 revising	 their	 preferences	 in	 light	 of	 new	information.	Blais	et	al.	(2008),	for	example,	found	that	members	of	the	BCCA,	on	
																																																						138	A	weaker	proposal	would	involve	assembling	citizens	to	deliberate,	and	having	them	report	to	elected	officials	in	an	advisory	capacity.	The	obvious	worry,	however,	is	that	their	recommendations	will	 be	 ignored.	 This	 has	 often	 (though	not	 always)	 been	 the	 case	with	 similar	 exercises,	 though	effects	vary	with	background	political	conditions	(Dryzek,	2010,	pp.	170-6).	139	 Though,	 arguably,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 deliberative	 legitimacy	 is	 impossible	 with	 larger	numbers	(c.f.	Dryzek,	2001;	Mansbridge	et	al.,	2013).		
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the	whole,	were	able	to	clearly	and	consistently	articulate	the	criteria	according	to	which	 they	 believed	 competing	 electoral	 systems	 ought	 to	 be	 judged,	 accurately	assess	 and	 evaluate	 competing	 systems	 in	 accordance	 with	 those	 criteria,	 and	underwent	substantial	preference	changes.			Two	 further	 features	 of	 the	 assembly’s	 design	 should	 contribute	 to	 its	 epistemic	competency.	First,	in	ways	to	be	explained	momentarily,	both	experts	and	members	of	the	disability	community	would	have	input	at	all	stages	of	the	assembly’s	work.	Second,	 the	 random	 selection	 and	 payment	 of	 members	 should	 ensure	 that	 a	substantial	degree	of	cognitive	diversity	obtains	among	group-members.	Diversity	is	 an	 important	 epistemic	 asset,	 insofar	 as	 it	 creates	 opportunities	 for	 groups	 to	share	a	range	of	perspectives	and	information	(Landemore,	2013b).140		The	CACD’s	processes	would	be	similar	 to	 those	of	 the	BCCA.	First,	 the	assembly	would	be	required	to	deliberate	over	the	objectives	they	believe	government	policy	with	respect	to	the	cognitively	disabled	ought	to	promote	(e.g.	promoting	autonomy,	improving	wellbeing	etc…).	An	initial	list	of	possible	objectives	might	be	sought	from	experts,	to	be	refined	by	the	assembly.	Second,	the	assembly	would	be	required	to	hear	testimony	from	experts	on	the	merits	of	status	quo	policy.	The	assembly	would	then	 be	 required	 to	 decide,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 that	 testimony,	whether	 government	policy	 adequately	 serves	 the	objectives	 settled	upon	at	 the	previous	 stage.	 If	 the	assembly	judges	that	policy	falls	short	in	some	respect,	they	would	then	proceed	to	the	following	stages.		At	the	third	stage,	the	assembly	would	be	required	to	devise,	deliberate	over,	and	revise	 policy	 proposals.	 Several	 sub-steps	would	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 at	 this	 stage,	including	consultation	with	experts	and	members	of	the	disability	community	from	whom	policy	ideas	might	be	drawn,	modelling	the	likely	impact	of	possible	reforms	(both	upon	the	cognitively	disabled,	and	the	citizenry	at	large),	comparative	analysis	as	to	the	costs	and	benefits	of	competing	proposals,	and	deliberation	as	to	which	of	the	relevant	proposals	ought	to	be	pursued.	It	is	particularly	important,	at	this	stage,	to	ensure	that	the	cognitively	disabled	themselves	are	‘discursively	represented’	in	
																																																						140	 Paying	 members	 to	 participate,	 in	 particular,	 ought	 to	 minimise	 socioeconomic	 bias	 in	 the	assembly’s	makeup,	a	problem	which	affected	the	BCCA	(Warren	and	Pearse,	2008b,	pp.	10-11),	and	frequently	impacts	similar	endeavours	(Fung,	2007b,	pp.	162).	
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the	assembly’s	deliberations	(Dryzek	and	Niemeyer,	2008),	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	policies	proposed	are	genuinely	responsive	 to	such	persons’	 interests.141	The	ideal	 way	 in	 which	 this	 might	 be	 achieved	 would	 be	 to	 appoint	 a	 number	 of	cognitively	 disabled	 persons	 as	 members	 of	 the	 CACD	 itself.	 There	 are	 obvious	concerns,	 however,	 over	 such	 persons’	 capacity	 to	 participate.	 Whether	 these	concerns	are	valid	is	an	empirical	matter	we	cannot	adjudicate	here.	If	they	do	turn	out	 to	 be	 valid,	 however,	 there	 are	 a	 range	 of	 second-best	 options	 available.	We	might	arrange	for	policy	experts,	and	other	members	of	the	disability	community	to	be	 present	 during	 the	 CACD’s	 deliberations,	 for	 example,	 to	 represent	 the	cognitively	disabled’s	interests	in	the	assembly’s	discussions.142		Following	deliberation,	the	assembly	must,	fourthly,	decide	which	policy	or	policies	they	wish	to	take	forward.	Ideally,	such	decisions	ought	to	be	made	by	consensus,	in	order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 diverse	 perspectives	 of	 the	 group	 members	 are	 all	accounted	 for.143	 Consensus,	 however,	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 forthcoming,	 given	 the	plurality	of	views	likely	to	prevail	amongst	a	diverse	group	of	individuals.	For	that	reason,	 such	 decisions	 will	 likely	 have	 to	 be	 made	 by	 a	 vote.144	 Proposals	commanding	 sufficient	 support	 in	 the	 assembly	would	 then	be	 taken	 forward	 to	public	consultation.	Legislation	would	need	to	be	drafted	at	this	stage,	to	be	put	out	for	public	comment.	The	assembly	should	be	required	to	collate	and	consider	the	public	commentary,	revising	proposed	legislation	where	appropriate.			Finally,	provided	the	proposal	continues	to	enjoy	sufficient	support	in	the	assembly,	a	 referendum	 question	 must	 be	 formulated,	 together	 with	 a	 rationale	 for	 the	proposed	reforms,	to	be	widely	disseminated	among	the	citizenry	prior	to	the	vote.	Given	the	possibility	of	multiple	policy	proposals,	 this	process	might	be	repeated	several	times	through	the	assembly’s	term.145	
																																																						141	 There	 is	 evidence	 from	 studies	 of	 deliberative	 mini-publics	 that	 the	 perspectives	 of	 persons	under-represented	in	the	group	tend	to	be	neglected	in	deliberation	(Smith,	2009,	pp.	83-5).		142	Perhaps	the	ideal	arrangement	would	involve	a	mix	of	both	the	cognitively	disabled	themselves,	and	other	surrogate	representatives.	143	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 from	 other	mini-publics	 that	 consensus	 requirements	 (under	 certain	conditions)	enhance	deliberation,	causing	participants	to	engage	in	a	greater	degree	of	interpersonal	justification	for	their	favoured	points	of	view	(Steiner,	2012,	pp.	208-15).	144	A	supermajority	requirement	might	be	appropriate,	to	ensure	that	even	if	all	perspectives	are	not	accommodated,	a	wide	range	of	perspectives	will	have	been.	145	 A	 small	 bureaucracy	would	 have	 to	 be	 established	 to	 assist	 the	 assembly.	 Officials	 would	 be	required	to	keep	order,	provide	expert	advice,	assist	with	legislative	drafting,	and	so	on.	An	oversight	
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	To	minimise	public	fatigue,	referenda	should	be	held	concurrently	with	elections.	Referendum	propositions	should	take	the	form	of	binary,	‘yes/no’	questions	and,	for	familiar	reasons	of	fairness	(c.f.	May,	1952),	decisions	should	be	made	on	the	basis	of	simple	majority	rule.	The	ballots	issued	to	citizens	should	also	make	clear	that	the	proposed	 reforms	 were	 devised	 by	 the	 citizens’	 assembly.	 This	 is	 of	 particular	importance.	 Citizens	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 relatively	 ignorant	 over	 the	 details	 of	 the	proposals.	Risk-averse	citizens	may	be	disinclined	to	support	proposals	they	do	not	understand,	 or	 where	 they	 lack	 sufficient	 trust	 in	 such	 proposals’	 advocates	(Warren	and	Gastil,	2015,	pp.	566-7).	However,	if	citizens	can	be	made	aware	of	the	
process	by	which	the	proposals	were	devised,	they	may	be	more	likely	to	accept	such	proposals	as	those	which	they	themselves	would	have	come	to	favour,	if	they	had	deliberated	carefully	about	 the	 issue	 in	a	well-informed	manner.146	For	 the	same	reason,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 the	 assembly’s	 rationale	 for	 the	 proposed	 reforms	 be	widely	disseminated	among	the	citizenry.		Whether	voters	will	behave	this	way	is	an	empirical	question.	Fortunately,	two	real-world	cases	offer	hope	on	this	score.	First,	the	BCCA.	In	a	study	of	voter	behaviour	in	the	referendum	following	the	BCCA,	Cutler	et	al.	(2008,	p.	176)	found	that	citizens	with	some	degree	of	knowledge	of	the	BCCA	were	substantially	more	likely	to	vote	in	 favour	of	 the	proposed	reforms.	Second,	 the	Oregon	Citizens’	 Initiative	Review	process	 (CIR).	 Established	 in	 2010,	 the	 CIR	 involves	 assembling	 small	 groups	 of	randomly	 selected	 citizens	 who	 are	 tasked	 with	 deliberating	 over	 the	merits	 of	upcoming	ballot	initiatives,	and	writing	a	short	statement	outlining	their	views,	to	be	delivered	to	households	in	advance	of	the	vote.	Gastil	and	Knobloch	(2010,	pp.	39-40)	studied	the	CIR	process	over	an	initiative	to	introduce	mandatory-minimum	sentences	 for	 sex	 offenders.	 Most	 of	 the	 CIR	 panel,	 following	 deliberation,	 were	strongly	 opposed	 to	 the	 proposal,	 a	 fact	 reflected	 in	 the	 statement	 delivered	 to	households.	Experiments	which	exposed	a	subsample	of	voters	to	the	CIR	Statement	showed	 that	 whereas	 two-thirds	 of	 those	who	were	 not	 exposed	 supported	 the	
																																																						mechanism	would	need	to	be	established	to	ensure	the	assembly	confines	itself	to	issues	within	its	purview.	146	This	is	a	crucial	advantage	of	the	CACD	over	allowing	experts	to	devise	reforms	and	put	them	to	referenda.	Popular	trust	in	elites	is	in	decline,	whereas	evidence	indicates	that	citizens	are,	on	the	whole,	willing	 to	 trust	 the	 judgement	of	citizens’	assemblies	and	similar	bodies	precisely	because	such	bodies	are	comprised	of	ordinary	people	(Cutler	et	al.,	2008,	p.	179;	Levy,	2010,	pp.	132-8).		
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measure,	only	40%	of	those	exposed	supported	it.	The	suggestion,	in	both	cases,	is	that	 voters	 are	 prepared	 to	 treat	 such	 bodies	 as	 ‘trusted	 information	 proxies’	(Warren	and	Gastil,	2015,	pp.	567-72),	deferring	to	their	judgement	on	the	matter	in	hand.	We	have	good	reason	to	hope	that	voters	might	behave	the	same	way	with	respect	to	the	CACD,	given	the	similarity	between	it	and	these	other	exercises.		Of	 course,	 the	 whole	 exercise	 would	 be	 pointless	 –	 or,	 worse,	 harmful	 –	 if	 the	proposals	 that	 emerge	 from	 the	 CACD	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 of	 low	 quality.	 There	 are	obvious	potential	concerns	on	this	score.	CACD	members	are	to	be	ordinary	people,	few	 of	 whom	 are	 likely	 to	 possess	 any	 relevant	 expertise.	 Given	 the	 ongoing	prevalence	of	discriminatory	attitudes	towards	the	mentally	 ill	(Schomerus	et	al.,	2012),	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 those	 selected	 will	 hold	undesirable	beliefs	about	the	cognitively	disabled.	Further,	we	might	worry	that	the	deliberative	process	the	assembly	is	to	engage	in	is	problematic.	Groups	are	prone	to	 a	 range	 of	 deliberative	 pathologies	 (c.f.	 Sanders,	 1997;	 Sunstein,	 2006,	 ch.	 3)	which,	 in	 turn,	 are	 liable	 to	 severely	 diminish	 the	 quality	 of	 proposals	 likely	 to	emerge.			The	 empirical	 evidence,	 however,	 paints	 a	 rather	 more	 hopeful	 picture.	 Studies	reveal	little	evidence	of	the	deliberative	pathologies	prophesised	by	deliberation’s	critics,	 provided	 deliberative	 exercises	 are	 well-structured	 (Fishkin	 and	 Luskin,	2005).147	 Evidence	 from	 the	 BCCA	 and	 similar	 exercises	 (as	 discussed	 above)	suggests	 that	 the	 assembly	 is	 likely	 to	 deliberate	 in	 a	well-informed,	 competent	manner.	Crucially,	deliberation	also	often	brings	about	significant	shifts	in	persons’	attitudes	 (Fishkin,	 2009,	 pp.	 133-9).148	 Deliberative	 democrats	 have	 long	 argued	that	 well-structured	 deliberation	 is	 likely	 to	 promote	 empathy	 for	 persons	 who	suffer	 various	 forms	 of	 disadvantage	 (Goodin,	 1996).	 Experimental	 studies	 lend	support	 to	 this	 claim.	 A	 meta-analysis	 of	 deliberative	 polling	 experiments	 from	Gastil	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 for	 example,	 shows	 that	where	 persons’	 attitudes	 shift,	 they	typically	grow	more	egalitarian	and	more	collectivist.		
																																																						147	Several	of	the	essays	in	Grönlund	et	al.	(2014)	engage	with	the	various	ways	in	which	mini-publics	might	be	structured	in	order	to	avoid	these	pathologies.	Also,	as	Goodin	(2009)	points	out,	in	certain	instances,	some	of	these	‘pathologies’	(e.g.	the	common	knowledge	effect,	group	polarisation)	are	the	product	of	epistemically	rational	behaviour,	and	entirely	unproblematic	as	such.	148	Importantly,	Blais	et	al.	(2008),	found	substantial	evidence	of	these	effects	among	members	of	the	BCCA.	
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	Indeed,	where	citizens	are	asked	to	come	to	policy	judgements	in	‘mini-publics’	(e.g.	deliberative	 polls,	 citizens’	 juries),	 deliberation	 tends	 to	 cause	 persons	 to	 grow	markedly	more	public-spirited	(Smith,	2009,	pp.	97-98).149	Ackerman	and	Fishkin	(2004,	pp.	55-7),	 for	example,	recount	a	series	of	deliberative	polls	conducted	by	Texas	 utilities	 over	 energy.	 Initially,	 just	 52	 percent	 of	 participants	 on	 average	indicated	a	willingness	to	pay	more,	each	month,	for	renewable	energy.	Following	deliberation,	 however,	 84	 percent	 of	 persons	 expressed	 such	 a	 willingness.	Niemeyer	and	Jennstål	(2016,	pp.	254-8)	document	several	mini-publics	in	which	citizens	grew	more	supportive	of	taking	action	to	address	climate	change	(partially)	for	the	sake	of	future	generations’	interests.	Similar	results	have	been	found	in	many	other	policy	areas.	There	are	good	reasons	to	be	optimistic,	then,	as	to	the	quality	of	proposals	likely	to	emerge	from	the	CACD.		We	cannot,	of	course,	be	certain	that	all	the	proposals	the	assembly	will	devise	will	universally	be	of	high-quality.	Yet	similar	risks	attend	any	institutional	innovation	–	and	we	 should	 hardly	 think	 ourselves	 free	 from	 of	 low-quality	 proposals	 under	conventional	representative	democracy.	Moreover,	members	of	the	CACD	would	not	be	expected	to	come	up	with	reforms	by	themselves,	but	rather	to	do	so	 in	close	consultation	with	policy	experts.	The	CACD’s	proposals	will	not	also	necessarily	be	implemented.	Low-quality	proposals	will	likely	be	called	out	as	such	in	the	period	of	campaigning	likely	to	take	place	in	advance	of	any	referendum.		The	 CACD	 is	 also	 compatible	 with	 two	 crucial	 safeguards	 against	 low-quality	proposals.	First,	we	might	insist	that	legislation	resulting	from	successful	referenda	have	 the	 status	of	 ordinary	 statute,	 subject	 to	modification	and/or	 repeal	by	 the	legislature.	Legislation	which	proves	to	have	serious	adverse	consequences	can	thus	be	 repealed,	 or	 modified.	 Second,	 the	 CACD	 is	 compatible	 with	 regimes	 of	constitutional	rights-protections	for	the	cognitively	disabled,	wherein	courts	have	the	power	to	modify	or	strike	out	particularly	objectionable	legislative	decisions	–	i.e.	those	which	violate	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	cognitively	disabled.		
																																																						149	 Interestingly,	 there	 is	 also	 some	 evidence	 that	where	 real-world	 political	 processes	 are	more	deliberative,	they	tend	to	produce	more	egalitarian	policy	outcomes	(Steiner,	2012,	pp.	225-9).	
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The	CACD,	 then,	offers	a	plausible	path	by	which	policy	progress	might	be	made	towards	justice	for	the	cognitively	disabled.	The	CACD	itself	–	free	from	the	electoral	pressures	which	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 under-responsiveness	 –	 is	 likely	 be	substantially	more	 sensitive	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 than	 the	standard	processes	of	representative	democracy.	Of	course,	a	majority	of	citizens	need	to	be	willing	to	vote	for	the	proposals	in	question	if	they	are	to	be	passed	into	law.	Very	unpopular	proposals	are	unlikely	 to	 succeed,	no	matter	how	beneficial	they	might	be.	Still,	there	are	grounds	for	hope.	The	evidence	discussed	above	would	seem	to	suggest	 that	many	citizens	might	be	prepared	to	defer	 to	 the	assembly’s	judgement,	 and	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	 its	 proposed	 reforms.	 Certainly,	 the	 chances	 of	policy	progress	seem	greater	under	the	CACD	than	either	the	status	quo,	or	the	any	of	the	alternative	reforms	discussed	in	section	two.			Moreover,	 the	 CACD	 is	 perfectly	 consistent	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 political	equality.	Members	of	 the	CACD	do	not	 enjoy	 any	more	or	 less	power	 than	other	citizens,	for	the	simple	reason	that	they	lack	the	power	to	impose	policies	upon	the	citizenry	 at	 large.	 Rather,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distinction	 drawn	 in	 chapter	 three,	members	of	the	CACD	enjoy	mere	influence	–	the	ability	to	propose	policy	changes,	and	to	persuade	others	to	support	them.	With	a	little	exaggeration,	then,	the	CACD	offers	us	the	best	of	both	worlds.	Policy	progress	on	one	hand,	and	political	equality	on	the	other.		The	CACD	might	also	have	two	other	important	benefits.	First,	the	CACD	might	have	substantial	expressive	value.	The	problem	of	under-responsiveness	is	objectionable	not	merely	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 giving	 rise	 to	 poor-quality	 results,	 but	 also,	 plausibly,	because	it	expresses	an	objectionable	attitude	towards	the	cognitively	disabled.	The	neglect	of	such	persons’	 interests	 in	 the	policy	process	publicly	signals	 that	 their	interests	are	not	as	significant	as	those	of	other	citizens.	The	CACD	would	constitute	an	 important	 corrective,	 insofar	 as	 its	 explicit	 purpose	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 such	persons’	interests	are	taken	seriously.	Secondly,	and	relatedly,	the	establishment	of	the	CACD,	insofar	as	it	signals	that	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	disabled	ought	to	be	taken	seriously,	might	prompt	at	least	some	individuals	to	revise	their	attitudes	towards	such	persons.150	
																																																						150	Though,	of	course	this	might	also	be	a	benefit	of	many	of	the	proposals	discussed	above.	
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	There	is,	then,	a	powerful,	positive	case	to	be	made	for	the	CACD.	Notwithstanding,	there	are	three	lines	of	objection	worth	considering.151		5.5.	Objections	
	5.5.1.	Legislative	Neglect		One	might,	first,	object	that	politicians	will	use	the	existence	of	the	CACD	to	disclaim	responsibility	for	the	cognitively	disabled,	deepening	the	legislative	neglect	of	such	persons.			Even	supposing	this	were	right,	however,	 it	 is	quite	unclear	what	the	objection	is	supposed	to	be.	Perhaps	the	concern	is	supposed	to	be	consequentialist:	deepening	the	legislature’s	neglect	of	the	cognitively	disabled	would	lead	to	worse	outcomes.	Yet	 politicians	 already	 neglect	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 quite	substantially.	 Deepening	 that	 neglect	 is	 unfortunate,	 but	 ought	 to	 be	more	 than	compensated	 for	by	 the	policy	progress	we	might	reasonably	hope	 for	under	 the	CACD.		Perhaps,	instead,	the	concern	is	supposed	to	be	expressive:	allowing	responsibility	for	 the	 cognitively	disabled	 to	be	outsourced	 from	society’s	principal	 lawmaking	body	might	be	thought	to	express	an	objectionable	attitude	about	the	cognitively	disabled.	 Perhaps,	 that	 their	 interests	 are	 not	 of	 sufficient	 significance	 to	 be	considered	alongside	others	persons’.	The	marginal	disvalue	of	 the	CACD	on	 this	score,	however,	is	surely	very	slight,	given	how	little	attention	the	interests	of	the	cognitively	 disabled	 command	 in	 typical	 legislatures	 at	 present.	 Moreover,	 this	disvalue	is	likely	to	be	outweighed	by	the	expressive	value	of	the	CACD,	as	outlined	above.		
																																																						151	An	 important	general	objection	to	giving	 ‘mini-publics’	a	prominent	role	 in	shaping	policy	has	been	raised	by	Lafont	(2015).	Such	institutions,	she	claims,	do	not	promote	deliberation	among	the	public	at	large.	They	may	even	crowd	out	such	deliberation,	if	citizens	blindly	defer	to	their	verdicts.	In	 response,	 we	 should	 note	 that,	 at	 most,	 Lafont’s	 concerns	 are	 grounds	 for	 ensuring	 that	deliberative	mini-publics	are	employed	as	simply	one	part	of	a	wider	deliberative	system	(Dryzek,	2017).	Moreover,	this	concern	seems	more	plausible	in	some	cases	than	others.	There	is	little	risk	of	‘crowding	out’	public	deliberation	over	policy	for	the	cognitively	disabled,	because	the	issue	typically	commands	so	little	public	attention	anyway.	
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	Perhaps,	 finally,	 the	 concern	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 democratic:	 the	 legislature’s	abrogation	of	responsibility	for	the	cognitively	disabled	might	be	thought	to	deprive	the	 public	 of	 a	 say	 over	 the	 policy	 area.	 I	 don’t	 see	 how.	 The	 CACD	 would	 not	preclude	citizens	 from	pressuring	 their	officials	 to	act	on	 these	 issues.	The	CACD	would	 also	 be	 required	 to	 consult	 with	 the	 public,	 and	 proposals	 will	 be	implemented	only	if	approved	by	referendum	–	surely	a	much	more	direct	form	of	policy	 influence	 than	 that	 typically	 afforded	 to	 citizens	 under	 ordinary	representative	democracy.			In	the	absence	of	some	alternative	basis	for	this	objection,	then,	we	can	safely	set	this	concern	aside.			5.5.2.	Limited	Resources		Alternatively,	one	might	argue	that	the	proposal	is	likely	to	work	too	well.	Overly	generous	 proposals	 might	 emerge	 from	 the	 CACD,	 and	 be	 passed	 into	 law.	Governments,	however,	have	limited	resources.	The	implementation	of	such	policies	might	detract	from	their	ability	to	attend	to	other	important	policy	areas.		The	objection,	here,	cannot	merely	be	that	the	allocation	of	increased	funds	to	the	cognitively	 disabled	 might	 lead	 to	 less	 resources	 for	 other	 areas.	 That	 is	 true	virtually	 every	 time	governments	 reallocate	 resources	 from	one	area	 to	 another.	The	 objection,	 then,	 must	 be	 that	 excessive	 resources	 will	 be	 allocated	 to	 the	cognitively	disabled,	at	the	expense	of	other	legitimate	policy	priorities.	This	worry	seems	rather	overstated.	As	noted	above,	the	cognitively	disabled	comprise	a	very	small	fraction	of	the	total	population.	Even	a	very	generous	allocation	of	resources,	then,	cannot	reasonably	be	expected	to	have	a	particularly	severe	impact	upon	other	priorities.		Moreover,	 this	 objection	 implicitly	 presupposes	 that	 the	 status	 quo	 pattern	 of	resource	allocation	is	superior	to	that	which	would	obtain	under	the	CACD.	Yet	it	is	unclear	why	we	should	accept	this.	Resources	seem	clearly	to	be	under-allocated	to	the	 cognitively	 disabled	 in	 most	 states	 under	 the	 status	 quo.	 Perhaps	 the	 CACD	
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would	lead	to	excessively	generous	outcomes.	But	it	is	by	no	means	clear	that	those	outcomes	would	thereby	be	worse	than	those	which	characteristically	obtain	under	typical	democratic	arrangements.		5.5.3.	Proliferation		Finally,	 one	 might	 object	 that	 the	 argument	 proves	 too	 much.	 If	 states	 were	 to	establish	the	CACD,	they	would	surely	also	be	required	to	establish	similar	processes	for	many	other	groups	to	whom	governments	are	under-responsive:	the	physically	disabled,	future	generations,	religious	minorities,	felons	etc…	As	stated,	the	concern	is	not	particularly	forceful.	If	it	could	be	demonstrated	that	similar	mechanisms	are	likely	 to	 realise	 better	 results	 with	 respect	 to	 other	 policy	 areas	 than	 feasible	alternatives,	 and	 if	 there	 is	 nothing	 objectionable	 about	 such	 processes	 in	themselves,	it	is	hard	to	see	what	the	objection	is	supposed	to	be.		A	 more	 sophisticated	 iteration	 of	 the	 objection,	 however,	 might	 point	 out	 that	establishing	very	many	such	processes	is	likely	to	be	self-defeating.	Citizens	are	risk-averse,	and	have	 limited	cognitive	resources	 to	devote	 to	politics.	They	might,	as	such,	be	less	willing	to	consider	each	proposal	on	its	merits	were	too	many	placed	before	them,	at	once.	Proposals	emerging	from	such	processes	are	more	likely	to	fail,	then,	where	they	are	competing	for	public	attention	against	many	other	proposals	from	similar	processes.			This	 is	 surely	 right.	 Yet,	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 end	 of	 the	 discussion.	 We	 often	 face	situations	in	which	it	is	possible	to	provide	particular	goods	to	only	a	subset	of	those	persons	who	might	plausibly	have	claims	to	the	good	in	question.	Rarely,	however,	is	 the	 appropriate	 response	 to	 ‘level	 down’,	 and	 provide	 those	 goods	 to	 no-one.	Rather,	the	appropriate	response	is	to	consider	the	relative	strength	of	each	party’s	claims,	and	allocate	the	good	in	question	in	accordance	with	the	strength	of	those	claims	(Broome,	1990-1).		There	are	several	reasons	to	think	that	the	claims	of	the	cognitively	disabled	will	be	comparatively	 strong,	 here.	 First,	 for	 many	 other	 groups,	 solutions	 of	 the	 sort	canvassed	 in	 section	 two	 may	 well	 prove	 sufficient.	 Religious	 minorities,	 for	
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example,	may	be	 sufficiently	well-served	by	 robust	 constitutional	protections	 for	their	freedom	of	religious	practice.	Second,	there	are	other,	more	standard,	means	of	exercising	influence	in	the	political	process	which	the	cognitively	disabled	face	particular	barriers	in	accessing,	given	their	more	limited	capacities	–	e.g.	publicly	campaigning	 for	 particular	 policies.	 The	 same	 obviously	 cannot	 be	 said	 of	 most	other	groups	(e.g.	 religious	minorities).	Third,	many	cognitively	disabled	persons	lack	the	capacity	to	exercise	the	franchise.	They	are,	as	such,	denied	the	benefits	of	voting	 –	 e.g.	 opportunities	 for	 the	 expression	 of	 their	moral	 attitudes.	We	might	conceive	of	the	CACD	as	a	form	of	‘compensation’	for	that	fact,	a	consideration	which	obviously	does	not	apply	in	the	case	of	other	groups.	Finally,	though	it	is	difficult	to	compare	the	various	disadvantages	incurred	by	different	social	groups,	the	evidence	presented	in	section	one	certainly	does	seem	to	suggest	that	the	cognitively	disabled	are	among	 the	most	needful	 social	 groups,	 and	 therefore	 among	 the	 groups	 that	might	benefit	the	most	from	the	establishment	of	such	a	process.			None	 of	 these	 considerations	 is	 necessarily	 decisive.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 some	 other	groups	 (e.g.	 future	 generations)	 have	 claims	 as	 strong	 –	 or	 stronger	 –	 than	 the	cognitively	disabled.	Yet,	for	two	reasons,	this	need	not	defeat	the	argument.	First,	whilst	the	considerations	discussed	above	do	suggest	that	it	would	be	inadvisable	to	 run	 an	 excessive	 number	 of	 such	 processes	 simultaneously,	 it	 is	 still	 an	 open	question	what	 the	optimum	number	of	 such	processes	might	be.	 It	 still	might	be	possible,	 without	 risking	 self-defeating	 consequences,	 to	 run	 multiple	 such	processes	at	once,	including	the	CACD.		Secondly,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 the	 fact	 that	 other	 groups	 might	 have	 claims	stronger	than	those	of	the	cognitively	disabled	does	not	show	that	the	CACD	process	should	never	be	initiated.	Rather,	what	it	is	shows	is	that	other	groups	might	initially	have	priority	over	the	cognitively	disabled.	It	is	hard	to	see	why	we	should	accept	that	 the	 cognitively	disabled	ought	 to	be	 frozen	out	entirely,	however.	We	might	envision	a	‘rotation’	system,	to	this	end.	In	one	electoral	cycle,	assemblies	might	be	convened	to	consider	the	interests	of	felons	and	future	generations.	In	the	following	cycle,	assemblies	might	be	convened	for	the	cognitively	disabled	and	refugees.	And	so	on.	This	‘turn-taking’	is,	of	course,	less	than	ideal.	But	it	is	likely	the	best	we	can	do	–	and	almost	certainly	better	than	doing	nothing.		
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	At	most,	I	think,	the	proliferation	objection	shows	that	we	must	be	strategic	in	the	way	we	 deploy	 such	 processes	 –	 not	 that	 there	 is	 anything	 objectionable	 about	deploying	such	processes	as	such.	None	of	these	lines	of	objection,	then,	seems	to	me	to	be	successful.		5.6.	Conclusion		I	 have	 argued,	 in	 this	 chapter,	 that	 the	 cognitively	 disabled	 are	 treated	 unjustly	under	the	status	quo,	that	such	injustices	are	partially	a	product	of	the	democratic	process,	and	that	they	are	unlikely	to	be	resolved	by	the	enfranchisement	of	such	persons.	 I	have	considered	a	 range	of	possible	 institutional	 reforms	which	might	improve	 democracy’s	 responsiveness	 to	 such	 persons’	 interests.	 The	 more	moderate	among	these	proposals	(e.g.	proxy	votes)	would	do	 little	 to	disrupt	the	causal	processes	which	perpetuate	the	problem	of	under-responsiveness.	The	more	radical	of	these	proposals	(e.g.	plural	voting)	might	well	prove	more	effective,	but	are	also	difficult	to	justify	on	egalitarian	grounds.	The	citizens’	assembly	offers	the	best	of	both	worlds.	 It	 is	a	policy	mechanism	that	 is	perfectly	consistent	with	the	requirements	of	political	equality,	and	has	the	potential	to	deliver	substantial	policy	advances.	This	 is	 certainly	not	 the	only	possible	way	 in	which	deliberative	mini-publics	might	be	deployed	to	valuable	effect.	But	it	is,	I	think,	one	such	way	–	and	one	which	we	have	reason	to	pursue.		***	It	is	worth	noting,	before	proceeding,	a	shift	in	focus	in	the	following	chapters.	Our	discussion	thus	far	has	presupposed	that	the	fundamental	institutions	of	democracy	as	 defined	 in	 the	 introduction	 –	 universal	 suffrage,	 and	 decision-making	 by	 the	aggregation	of	citizens’	equally	weighted	expressed	preferences	–	remain	in	place.	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 following	 two	 chapters,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 to	 defend	 those	institutions	from	objections	raised	in	recent	literature	by	proponents	of	elitist	and	chance-based	 alternatives.	 We	 begin	 with	 the	 former,	 by	 considering	 the	competence	objection	to	universal	suffrage,	advanced	by	Jason	Brennan.			 	
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6.	Universal	Suffrage	and	the	Competence	Objection		Elitist	 scepticism	 of	 democracy	 has	 a	 venerable	 history.	 Plato	 (1974,	 p.	 282)	famously	saw	democracy	as	akin	to	a	ship	taken	over	by	an	incompetent,	drunken	crew	with	no	 interest	 in	 listening	to	 the	 ‘true	navigators’	aboard.	Concerned	that	equal	voting	rights	would	lead	to	‘class	legislation’	and	deleterious	consequences,	Mill	(1861,	ch.	8)	advocated	distributing	votes	in	proportion	to	citizens’	education	levels.	Schumpeter	(1950,	p.	262)	wrote	that	“…the	typical	citizen	drops	down	to	a	lower	level	of	mental	performance	as	soon	as	he	enters	the	political	field.	He	argues	and	 analyses	 in	 a	 way	which	 he	would	 readily	 recognise	 as	 infantile	 within	 the	sphere	 of	 his	 real	 interests.”	 This	 chapter	 responds	 to	 the	 latest	 round	 of	 elitist	scepticism	–	the	competence	objection,	articulated	by	Jason	Brennan	(2011b;	2016).	The	 chapter	 is	 in	 five	 sections.	 Section	 one	 sets	 out	 the	 competence	 objection,	showing	 that	 it	potentially	 applies	 to	democratic	 government	at	 two	 levels	–	 the	individual,	and	the	collective.	Section	two	considers	the	individual	level	application,	section	three	the	collective	level.	Section	four	considers	the	comparative	merits	of	epistocracy,	 Brennan’s	 preferred	 replacement	 for	 democracy.	 Section	 five	concludes.		6.1.	The	Competence	Objection		Brennan	holds	that	universal	suffrage	is	unjust.	His	arguments	therefore	entail	that	democracy,	 as	 we	 defined	 it	 in	 the	 introduction,	 is	 also	 unjust.	 The	 nature	 of	Brennan’s	objection	is	simple	enough:	universal	suffrage	is	unjust	because	it	violates	the	competence	principle,	as	follows	(Brennan,	2011b,	p.	704);		 It	is	unjust	to	deprive	citizens	of	life,	liberty	or	property,	or	to	alter	their	life	prospects	 significantly,	 by	 force	and	 threats	of	 force	as	 a	 result	 of	decisions	made	by	an	incompetent	or	morally	unreasonable	deliberative	body,	or	 as	 a	 result	of	decisions	made	 in	 an	 incompetent	 and	morally	unreasonable	way.		The	competence	principle	is	intuitively	appealing.	Brennan	(2011b,	pp.	702-4;	2016,	pp.	151-5)	asks	us	to	imagine	a	jury	trial	in	which	the	jurors	ignore	the	evidence,	
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evaluate	the	evidence	irrationally,	or	convict	out	of	prejudice	against	the	defendant.	Even	if	the	jury’s	decision	is	correct,	it	will	intuitively	lack	authority	and	legitimacy	–	i.e.	the	defendant	will	have	no	moral	obligation	to	comply	with	the	jury’s	decision,	and	the	state	will	have	moral	no	right	to	enforce	it.	The	competence	principle	offers	an	 attractive	 explanation	 of	 these	 intuitions.	 Criminal	 proceedings	 threaten	 to	coercively	deprive	 citizens	of	 life,	 liberty,	 and	property,	 and	 to	 significantly	 alter	their	life	prospects.	The	competence	principle	requires	that	decisions	over	criminal	guilt	 and	 innocence	 be	made	 competently.	Where	 they	 are	 not,	 the	 rights	 of	 the	defendant	 are	 violated,	 and	 decisions	 will	 lack	 authority	 and	 legitimacy	 in	consequence.		Universal	 suffrage,	 Brennan	 claims,	 is	much	 the	 same	 (Brennan,	 2011b,	 700-10;	2016,	ch.s	6	&	7).	Decades	of	political	science	has	demonstrated	that	the	majority	of	citizens	are	‘rationally	ignorant’	with	respect	to	political	matters.	79%	of	Americans	cannot	name	either	of	their	state’s	senators	(Hardin,	2006,	p.	180).	75%	do	not	know	the	length	of	senators’	terms	in	office	(Caplan,	2006,	p.	95).	Only	38%	were	‘sure’	that	the	USSR	was	not	a	member	of	NATO	at	the	height	of	the	Cold	War	(Page	and	Shapiro,	1992,	p.	9).	Moreover,	many	voters	are	downright	irrational	–	cognitively	biased	in	their	acquisition	and	retention	of	information	about	politics	in	ways	that	favour	 their	 particular	 groups	 (Brennan,	 2016,	 ch.	 2).152	 Many	 others	 hold	repugnant	 moral	 views.	 The	 political	 decisions	 over	 which	 these	 ‘incompetent’	voters	 are	 permitted	 to	 exercise	 control	 under	 universal	 suffrage	 threaten	 to	coercively	deprive	 citizens	of	 life,	 liberty	 and/or	property,	 and/or	 alter	 their	 life	prospects	significantly.	This	violates	the	competence	principle.	Universal	suffrage	(and,	therefore,	democracy)	is,	as	such,	unjust.	Democratic	decisions,	as	such,	lack	authority	and	legitimacy.		The	competence	objection	might	be	thought	to	might	apply	to	universal	suffrage	in	two	 ways.	 First,	 voters	 as	 individuals	might	 make	 decisions	 in	 an	 objectionably	incompetent	 manner.	 Second,	 the	 electorate	 considered	 collectively	might	 make	decisions	in	an	objectionably	incompetent	manner.	These	amount	to	conceptually	distinct	objections.	Let	us	refer	to	the	former	as	the	individual	competence	objection,	and	 the	 latter	 as	 the	collective	 competence	objection.	 Brennan	himself	 appears	 to	
																																																						152	See	also	Caplan	(2006).	
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endorse	both	the	individual	competence	objection	(e.g.	Brennan,	2011b,	pp.	702-3,	709),	and	the	collective	competence	objection	(e.g.	Brennan,	2011b,	p.	710;	2016,	ch.s	6-7).	We	shall	consider	each	in	turn.		6.2.	The	Individual	Competence	Objection		The	individual	competence	objection	holds	that	universal	suffrage	is	unjust	because	it	empowers	voters,	considered	as	individuals,	to	exercise	power	over	decisions	of	great	 significance	 for	 others’	 interests	 in	 an	 incompetent,	 morally	 unreasonable	manner.			The	most	obvious	response	to	the	individual	competence	objection	involves	simply	denying	 that	 ignorant	voters	will	necessarily	vote	 in	an	 incompetent	manner.	An	important	 strand	 of	 empirical	 research	 shows	 that	 ignorant	 voters	 are	 able	 to	reliably	mimic	the	conduct	of	informed	voters	by	employing	informational	shortcuts	of	 various	 kinds	 –	 e.g.	 taking	 cues	 from	 opinion-leaders	 (Lupia	 and	 McCubbins,	1998).	However,	the	trouble	with	this	response	is	that	it	is	at	best	a	partial	defence.	Not	 all	 ignorant	 voters	 employ	 informational	 shortcuts.	 Some	 take	 cues	 from	persons	who	are	 themselves	 incompetent.	Universal	suffrage,	by	 the	 lights	of	 the	individual	competence	objection,	will	still	be	unjust	to	the	extent	that	it	requires	the	votes	 of	 such	 persons	 be	 counted	 alongside	 others’.	 Moreover,	 the	 competence	principle	requires	 that	political	decisions	be	made	 in	an	epistemically	competent	
and	morally	reasonable	manner.	It	is	unclear	whether	the	fact	that	individuals	can	mimic	 the	behaviour	of	 informed	voters	by	 taking	cues	 thereby	shows	 that	 their	voting	behaviour	is	morally	reasonable.		A	better	response,	I	think,	would	concede	that	many	voters	are	incompetent	in	the	way	Brennan	describes,	but	deny	that	that	fact	establishes	that	universal	suffrage	is	unjust.	To	see	this,	we	must	first	ask	why	Brennan	thinks	subjection	to	the	power	of	incompetent	 voters	 is	 unjust	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Brennan	 is	 explicit:	 subjection	 to	incompetent	 decision-making	 violates	 persons’	 claims	 against	 exposure	 to	undue	
risk.153	He	writes	(Brennan,	2011b,	p.	708);		
																																																						153	See	Brennan	(2011b,	pp.	705,	708;	2016,	pp.	154,	159,	230,	235-6).	
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The	 governed	 have	 a	 right	 not	 to	 be	 exposed	 to	 undue	 risk	 in	 the	selection	of	policy	or	of	rulers	who	will	make	policy.	When	elections	are	decided	on	the	basis	of	unreliable	epistemic	procedures	or	on	the	basis	of	unreasonable	moral	attitudes,	this	exposes	the	governed	to	undue	risk	of	serious	harm.			The	 individual	 competence	 objection,	 then,	 relies	 upon	 two	 premises.	 First,	 that	citizens	have	rights	against	the	imposition	of	undue	risk.	Secondly,	that	individual	voters	impose	such	risks	upon	others,	violating	their	rights.	I	reject	the	latter.	Voters	do	 impose	 risks	 upon	 their	 fellow	 citizens.	 But	 these	 risk-impositions	 do	 not	plausibly	amount	to	rights-violations.	To	see	why,	we	need	to	get	more	precise.	Let	us	begin	by	defining	the	imposition	of	risk	simpliciter	as	follows;		 A	 imposes	 risk	 on	 B	 by	 Φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	 A’s	 Φing	 has	 a	 non-zero	probability	of	causing	harm	to	B.154		We	can	calculate	the	magnitude	of	the	risk	imposed	by	some	action	by	multiplying	the	magnitude	of	the	possible	harm	in	question	by	the	probability	that	that	action	will	bring	it	about.	More	formally;		
Ri	=	PiHi	
i	=	a	given	person	
Ri	=	the	risk	imposed	upon	i	by	some	other	person’s	action	
Pi	=	the	probability	that	that	action	will	cause	harm	to	i	
Hi	=	the	magnitude	of	the	possible	harm	to	i.		In	 the	 political	 domain,	 persons	 are	 harmed	 via	 the	 selection	 of	 candidates	 or	policies	that	leave	them	worse	off	than	they	would	otherwise	have	been	under	some	alternative	 candidate	 or	 policy.	 Hi,	 then,	 is	 simply	 the	 difference	 between	 the	options.155	Suppose	a	vote	was	to	be	held	between	A,	which	will	impose	a	net	cost	of	$550	on	i,	and	B	which	will	impose	a	net	cost	of	$500	on	i.	Either	A	or	B	will	inevitably	
																																																						154	I	assume	the	standard	counterfactual	account	of	harm:	A	harms	B	by	Φing	if	and	only	if	A’s	Φing	leaves	B	worse	off	than	they	would	otherwise	have	been.	155	For	simplicity,	I	assume	there	are	only	two	items	on	the	agenda.		
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be	the	outcome.	Selecting	A,	then,	harms	i	to	the	tune	of	$50,	the	cost	they	would	have	avoided	under	B.	More	formally;		
Hi	=	[Ci(A)	-	Ci(B)]	
Ci(A)	=	the	net	cost	to	i	of	A’s	victory	
Ci(B)	=	the	net	cost	to	i	of	B’s	victory.		
Pi	is	given	by	the	probability	of	an	individual	voter’s	being	decisive,	and	voting	for	the	option	that	 is	worse	 for	 i.	One	 is	decisive	 if	and	only	 if	one	 is	 the	tiebreaking	voter.	Suppose	the	vote	between	A	and	B	was	to	be	taken	by	Jane	and	10	others.	If	the	vote	is	tied	5-5,	and	Jane	casts	the	final	ballot,	she	will	be	decisive.	If	the	vote	is	split	6-4	 in	 favour	of	A,	A	will	 be	victorious,	however	 Jane	votes.	One’s	 vote	will	impact	 others’	 interests	 –	 and	 potentially	 harm	 i	 –	 only	 if	 one	 is	 decisive.156	 A	decisive	vote	will	obviously	harm	i	only	if	it	is	cast	for	the	item	on	the	agenda	that	is	worse	for	i.	More	formally,	then;		
Pi	=	p(D)p(VHi)	
p(D)	=	the	probability	that	a	given	voter	will	be	decisive	
p(VHi)	=	the	probability	that	that	voter	will	vote	for	the	option	which	is	worse	for	i.				So,	to	a	first	approximation,	we	can	express	the	risk	imposed	upon	i	by	a	given	voter	as	follows;		
Ri	=	p(D)p(VHi)[Ci(A)	-	Ci(B)]		The	 trouble	 is	 that	 Ri	 will	 always	 be	 too	 trivial	 to	 amount	 to	 a	 rights	 violation	because	p(D),	even	in	close	elections,	is	always	asymptotically	close	to	zero.	Geoffrey	Brennan	and	Loren	Lomasky	(1993,	p.	57),	for	example,	estimate	that	p(D),	in	a	vote	between	A	and	B,	with	200,	001	voters	with	an	average	probability	of	voting	for	A	of	0.51,	is	1	in	12.3	million.	Even	if	Hi	is	large,	then,	Ri	will	be	trivial.	Suppose	that,	under	
																																																						156	This	does	not	mean	one	exercises	no	influence	of	any	kind	where	one	is	not	decisive	(c.f.	Goldman,	1999)	–	only	that	such	influence	has	no	impact	on	others’	interests.	
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Brennan	and	Lomasky’s	conditions,	A	was	guaranteed	to	leave	i	worse	off	than	B	by	$10	000.	A	vote	for	A,	then,	imposes	a	risk	of	the	following	magnitude	upon	i;		
Ri	=	1/12.3m	×	$10	000	=	$0.00813…		This	risk	is	already	very	minor.	Yet,	more	realistic	cases	will	yield	risks	of	a	much	lower	 magnitude.	 There	 is	 much	 uncertainty	 over	 the	 likely	 consequences	 of	electoral	 choices	 –	which	policies	 the	 candidates	will	 implement	 if	 elected,	what	their	 impact	 will	 be,	 whether	 ‘exogenous	 variables’	 (e.g.	 natural	 disasters)	 will	impact	the	political	system,	and	so	on	(c.f.	Brennan	and	Lomasky,	2000,	pp.	71-2).	Ri	must	be	discounted	in	light	of	such	uncertainty,	as	follows;		
Ri	=	p(D)p(VHi)[Ci(A)	-	Ci(B)]U	
U	=	the	discount	rate	for	uncertainty.		Furthermore,	 parties	 generally	 (though	 not	 exceptionlessly)	 propose	 relatively	similar	policy	platforms	with	respect	to	their	likely	impact	upon	voters’	interests,	given	 the	 centripetal	 pressures	 of	majority	 rule	 (Downs,	 1957).	 Suppose,	 then,	 a	more	realistic	difference	between	A	and	B	of	$1000	in	net	cost	to	i,	and	a	discount	for	uncertainty	of	40%.	The	risk	to	i	of	a	vote	for	A,	then,	will	be;		 1/12.3m	×	$1000	×	0.6	=	$0.0004878…		Citizens	surely	do	not	have	moral	rights	against	the	imposition	of	risks	as	trivial	as	this.	And,	indeed,	this	case	still	assumes	a	small	electorate	and	a	very	close	election.	A	 larger	electorate	and/or	wider	margin	would	 lower	p(D),	and	therefore	Ri,	 still	further.157	The	individual	competence	objection	fails.		Brennan	might	insist	that	citizens	do	have	claims	against	the	imposition	of	trivial	risks.158	 This	 invites	 an	 important	 objection.	 Virtually	 all	 our	 behaviour	 imposes	
																																																						157	Gelman	et	al.	 (2012),	 for	example,	 estimate	 that	an	average	voter	 in	 the	2008	US	Presidential	election	had	around	a	1	in	60	million	chance	of	decisiveness.	158	Brennan	might,	in	reply,	appeal	to	subjective	probabilities	of	decisiveness.	No	voter,	after	all,	can	be	certain	that	their	vote	will	not	be	decisive.	However,	voters	can	be	extremely	confident	that	their	votes	will	neither	be	decisive,	nor	non-trivially	affect	the	probabilities	of	the	outcomes.	Voting,	then,	should	make	no	non-trivial	difference	to	individuals’	subjective	probabilities.	
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risks	 of	 some	 kind	 upon	 others.	 If	 trivial	 risk	 impositions	 constituted	 rights	violations,	then	virtually	all	our	actions	would	be	rights-violating.	We	are	plainly	not	‘morally	 paralysed’	 in	 this	 way	 (c.f.	 Hayenhjelm	 and	Wolff,	 2012,	 pp.	 31-2).	We	should	reject	this	line	of	argument.		Alternatively,	Brennan	might	point	out	that	the	aggregate	risk	imposed	by	individual	voters	upon	the	citizenry	as	a	whole	is	non-trivial.	This,	too,	is	unpromising.	Suppose	Ronald	and	Gerald	are	 the	only	 two	people	 in	a	park.	Ronald	 is	walking	his	dog.	There	is	a	risk	that	the	dog	will	attack	Gerald.	Suppose	this	risk	is	too	trivial	to	violate	any	 right	 of	Gerald’s.	Now	 suppose	10,	 000	other	people	 enter	 the	park,	 each	of	whom	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 risk.	 For	 Ronald’s	 conduct	 to	 thereby	 be	 rendered	unjust,	it	must	be	the	case	that	the	increase	in	numbers	somehow	causes	his	conduct	to	 violates	 some	 right	 or	 rights	 held	 by	 the	 others	 in	 park.	 Yet	 that	 is	 totally	implausible.	It	does	not	seem	remotely	intuitive	to	think	that	Gerald,	say,	suffers	a	rights	violation	merely	because	others	are	now	subject	to	the	same	risks	as	he.159	Whether	agents	have	rights	against	the	imposition	of	some	risk	does	not	plausibly	depend	 upon	 how	 many	 others	 are	 subject	 to	 that	 same	 risk.	 The	 individual	competence	objection	fails.		6.3.	The	Collective	Competence	Objection		The	collective	competence	objection	holds	that	universal	suffrage	is	unjust	because	it	empowers	voters,	considered	collectively,	to	exercise	power	over	others’	interests	in	 an	 incompetent,	 morally	 unreasonable	 manner,	 thereby	 exposing	 citizens	 to	undue	risk.			One	 initially	 tempting	 strategy,	 here,	 is	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 collective	 competence	objection	 rather	 as	 we	 responded	 to	 the	 individual	 competence	 objection:	 by	claiming	that	the	risks	imposed	by	the	collective	upon	each	citizen	are	trivial.	There	are	a	 range	of	 formal	models	 showing	 that	 the	aggregation	of	 rather	 low-quality	inputs	can	constitute	an	extremely	reliable	means	of	selecting	the	highest-quality	item	on	the	agenda	–	e.g.	the	Condorcet	jury	theorem	(c.f.	List	and	Goodin,	2001),	and	 the	 diversity-trumps-ability	 theorem	 (c.f.	 Landemore,	 2013b).	 Though	 it	 is	
																																																						159	Though,	the	numbers	might	affect	Ronald’s	duties	for	other	reasons	(c.f.	Parfit,	1986,	pp.	73-5).		
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certain	that	the	collective	will	be	decisive	in	any	given	choice,	the	probability	of	the	collective	selecting	the	worse	option	(again,	unlike	the	individual	case)	is	extremely	low.	 The	 degree	 of	 risk	 imposed	 upon	 each	 citizen	 by	 decision-making	 under	universal	suffrage	is	also,	therefore,	very	low.			This	 response	 fails.160	 To	 see	 why,	 suppose	 that	 the	 electorate	 faced	 a	 choice	between	A	and	B.	A	is	better	than	B	all-things-considered.	However,	A	would	also	impose	 severe	 wrongful	 harm	 upon	 the	 members	 of	 some	 small	 minority.161	Suppose	that	B	would	not	impose	such	harms	(but	is	worse	in	some	other	respects).	These	models	show	that	a	decision	by	universal	suffrage	between	A	and	B	would	be	virtually	certain	to	yield	A.	But,	notice,	A	is	the	more	harmful	option	for	the	minority	group.	Choosing	democratically,	then,	would	impose	a	high	degree	of	risk	upon	the	members	of	that	group,	the	fact	that	A	is	superior	to	B	notwithstanding.			The	 general	 point,	 here,	 is	 simply	 that	 different	 alternatives	 on	 the	 democratic	agenda	will	 almost	 always	 be	 better	 and	worse	 for	 different	 groups.	Where	 it	 is	certain	 that	 at	 least	 one	of	 the	 items	on	 the	 agenda	will	 be	 selected,	 it	 is	 almost	always	 also	 certain	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 some	 group	 or	 other	 will	 be	 set	 back.	Political	decisions	almost	always	impose	non-trivial	risks	upon	some	group	or	other.	We	cannot,	as	such,	respond	to	the	collective	competence	objection	by	seeking	to	minimise	the	magnitude	of	the	risks	imposed.162			The	right	strategy,	I	think,	is	to	argue	that	the	impositions	of	such	risks	do	not	(in	general)	amount	to	rights-violations.	Consider;		 John	has	run	the	only	bakery	in	town	for	ten	years.	Jess	has	just	opened	a	competing	bakery.	Jess’	actions	have	a	substantial	probability	of	leaving	John	worse	off	than	he	would	otherwise	have	been.	He	may	lose	business	to	Jess,	and	his	welfare	may	decline	in	consequence.		
																																																						160	There	are	also	important	questions	as	to	whether	the	assumptions	of	these	epistemic	models	are	satisfied	in	real-world	democracies	(Brennan,	2016,	ch.	7;	Caplan,	2006;	Estlund,	2008,	ch.	12).	161	Let	us	suppose	that	these	losses	are	counterbalanced	by	substantial	gains	to	others.	162	Epistocracy	is	not	immune	from	this	concern,	either.	The	proposals	between	which	epistocracies	will	have	to	make	choices	will	also	be	better	for	some	and	worse	for	others.	Setbacks	to	some	groups’	interests	are	inevitable;	and	so	the	imposition	of	non-trivial	risks	upon	citizens	is	also	inevitable.	
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Jess’	actions	impose	non-trivial	risks	upon	John.	Yet,	it	is	surely	false	that	she	has	violated	his	rights.	 John	has	no	right	to	the	benefits	of	his	 long	 insulation	against	competition.	 This	 demonstrates	 an	 important	 point.	 Only	 where	 some	 possible	setback	to	our	interests	would,	were	it	to	eventuate,	constitute	wrongful	harm	–	i.e.	violate	some	right	of	ours	–	is	the	imposition	of	a	risk	of	such	a	setback	plausibly	wrongful.	If	an	actual	setback	to	some	interest	would	not	amount	to	wrongful	harm,	there	no	reason	to	accept	that	risks	of	such	setbacks	do	so.		Certainly,	 decisions	 made	 by	 universal	 suffrage	 can	 violate	 citizens’	 rights.	 A	decision	to	impose	a	law	banning	interracial	marriage,	for	example,	would	clearly	do	so.	I	see	no	reason	for	democrats	to	disagree	with	the	idea	that	voters,	considered	collectively,	 act	 wrongly	 where	 they	 impose	 non-trivial	 risks	 of	 such	 violations.	Democrats,	after	all,	do	not	generally	believe	that	democratic	authority	is	unlimited.	Rather,	 they	believe	democracies	may	 impose	a	 limited	range	of	 laws	–	 i.e.	 those	consistent	 with	 individuals’	 fundamental	 rights.	 For	 that	 reason,	 they	characteristically	endorse	counter-majoritarian	measures	designed	to	protect	such	rights	 (e.g.	 judicial	 review)	 against	 hostile	 majorities.	 Risk-based	 concerns	 add	weight	to	the	case	for	such	institutions.		However,	 the	 collective	 competence	objection	 is	 also	 supposed	 to	 apply	 in	other	cases.	 The	 competence	 principle	 condemns	 coercive	 subjection	 to	 incompetent	decision-making	in	any	matter	concerning	life,	liberty,	property,	and/or	significant	life	prospects	(Brennan,	2011b,	p.	704;	2016,	ch.	6).	For	the	objection	to	go	through,	then,	it	must	be	the	case	that	any	democratically	imposed	risks	of	setbacks	to	these	interests	constitute	wrongful	harms.	That,	in	turn,	would	require	it	to	be	the	case	that	any	actual	setback	to	these	interests	amounts	to	wrongful	harm.	Otherwise,	we	would	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 accept	 that	 the	 imposition	 of	 risks	 of	 such	 setbacks	 is	wrongful.	 That,	 however,	 is	 totally	 implausible.	 None	 of	 us	 has	 the	 right	 to	 be	governed	in	a	manner	maximally	conducive	to	our	wellbeing.	Many	of	our	interests	simply	do	not	ground	fundamental	rights-claims.	I	surely	am	not	wrongfully	harmed	by	 decisions	 that	 increase	my	 tax	 rate	 by	 2%	 (though	 this	would	 deprive	me	 of	property),	 lower	 the	 speed	 limit	 in	 school	 zones	 (though	 this	would	 restrict	my	liberty),	or	prohibit	me	from	becoming	a	snake	oil	salesman	(though	this	affects	my	
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life-prospects),	 for	 example.	 I	 therefore	have	no	 legitimate	 complaint	 against	 the	democratic	imposition	of	risks	of	such	setbacks.		Moreover,	democrats	 generally	deny	 that	 subjection	 to	decisions	 consistent	with	individuals’	fundamental	rights,	made	under	universal	suffrage,	is	rights-violating.	For	 a	 range	 of	 reasons,	 democrats	 hold	 that	where	 collective	 decisions	must	 be	made,	and	there	is	disagreement	over	what	the	content	of	such	decisions	ought	to	be,	citizens	have	claims	that	such	decisions	be	made	according	to	processes	which	extend	 all	 citizens	 equal	 opportunities	 for	 political	 influence	 –	 i.e.	 democratic	processes,	 including	universal	suffrage.163	Subjection	 to	 the	resultant	decisions	 is	the	 necessary	 correlate	 of	 extending	 citizens	 the	 opportunities	 for	 influence	 to	which	they	are	entitled.	After	all,	unless	citizens	were	required	to	obey	the	decisions	in	question,	 it	could	hardly	be	said	that	citizens	enjoyed	 influence	over	collective	decision-making	at	all	 (c.f.	Kolodny,	2014b,	pp.	314-7;	Shapiro,	2004,	pp.	435-9).	Democratic	decision-procedures,	in	other	words,	are	authoritative.	In	virtue	of	that	fact,	 citizens	 are	 not	 wronged	 by	 subjection	 to	 decisions	 made	 under	 universal	suffrage.		Democrats,	 then,	 can	 offer	 a	 two-part	 response	 to	 the	 collective	 competence	objection.	They	can	concede	that	the	democratic	imposition	of	risks	of	fundamental	rights-violations	is	unjust.	This	costs	democrats	nothing.	No	plausible	democratic	theory	 holds	 that	 democracies	 may	 violate	 such	 rights	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	institutions	required	to	prevent	such	risk-impositions	will	be	the	very	same	as	those	required	 to	prevent	actual	 rights-violations	 (e.g.	 judicial	 review).	With	respect	 to	decisions	 that	 do	not	violate	 fundamental	 rights,	 however,	 the	 risks	 imposed	 by	democratic	 decision-making	 are	 not	 rights	 violating.	 The	 citizenry	 might	 be	ignorant,	 irrational,	 and	morally	 unreasonable.	 But,	within	 limits,	we	 are	 simply	required	to	bear	the	risks	of	universal	suffrage.	To	the	extent	that	the	competence	principle	entails	otherwise,	democrats	should	reject	the	competence	principle.		Two	responses	suggest	 themselves.	First,	Brennan	might	argue	that	my	response	proves	 too	much.	 If	democrats	reject	 the	competence	principle,	 then	they	will	be	
																																																						163	See,	among	many	others,	Anderson	(2009),	Christiano	(2008),	Estlund	(2008),	Kolodny	(2014b),	and	Pettit	(2012).	
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unable	to	explain	what	is	wrong	with	subjection	to	incompetent	jury	decisions	and	the	like.	However,	there	is	nothing	to	prevent	democrats	from	endorsing	a	narrower	competence	 principle	 which	 applies	 to	 decisions,	 such	 as	 those	 made	 by	 juries,	which	do	not	share	the	distinctive	features	of	democratic	decisions,	as	set	out	in	the	preceding	paragraphs.		Brennan	(2016,	pp.	151-8)	thinks	that	jury	decisions	and	political	decisions	share	relevantly	 similar	 features,	 such	 that	 the	 same	 competency	 requirements	 should	apply	to	both.	It	seems	to	me,	however,	that	there	is	a	crucially	important	distinction	between	 the	 two.	Political	decisions	affect	 the	 interests	of	all	 citizens,	 since	 they	concern	 the	 general	 rules	 according	 to	 which	 our	 collective	 affairs	 are	 to	 be	structured,	including	those	according	to	which	the	state	brings	criminal	proceedings	against	 its	 citizens.	 Citizens,	 in	 virtue	 of	 that	 fact,	 have	 positive,	 equal	 claims	 to	exercise	 some	 degree	 of	 influence	 over	 those	 rules.	 Jury	 decisions	 are	 brought	
pursuant	to	political	decisions	over	which	all	persons	–	the	defendant	included	–	had	fair	opportunity	 to	exercise	 influence.	 In	effect:	political	decisions	concern	which	social	rules	we	ought	to	have,	whereas	jury	decisions	are	a	matter	of	applying	those	rules.	Citizens	have	claims	to	exercise	influence	over	the	former,	but	not	over	the	latter.	There	is	nothing	inconsistent	in	holding	that	different	principles	apply	in	each	case.		Secondly,	 Brennan	 might	 argue	 that	 democrats’	 arguments	 for	 the	 authority	 of	democratic	decision-procedures	are	wrong.	Indeed,	this	is	precisely	what	Brennan	(2016,	ch.s	3-5)	 thinks.	There	 is	much	that	might	be	said	 in	response	to	many	of	Brennan’s	 criticisms.164	 But	 even	 supposing	 he	 were	 right,	 the	 collective	competence	objection	would	not	automatically	go	through.	That	would	require	both	an	 account	 of	 citizens’	 rights	 against	 risk-impositions	 that	 Brennan	 does	 not	provide,	and	an	argument	showing	that	systems	of	universal	suffrage	impose	such	risks.	 Accounts	 of	 the	 right	 against	 risk	 impositions	 have	 proven	 extraordinarily	difficult	to	develop	(c.f.	Hayenhjelm	and	Wolff,	2012).	Still,	let	us	suppose	Brennan	could	 produce	 such	 an	 account,	 defeat	 all	 the	 arguments	 for	 the	 authority	 of	democratic	procedures,	and	show	that	universal	suffrage	wrongfully	imposes	risk.	It	is	hardly	likely,	in	that	case,	that	democracy	will	be	the	only	system	impugned.	To	
																																																						164	There	are	also	a	range	of	important	views	he	fails	to	discuss	(e.g.	Kolodny,	2014b).	
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the	extent	that	human	agency	is	to	be	involved	in	political	decision-making,	and	to	the	extent	that	humans’	decision-making	capacities	making	are	deficient	in	the	ways	Brennan	(2016,	ch.	2)	himself	catalogues,	all	means	of	political	decision-making	are	likely	to	involve	the	imposition	of	substantial	risks.	If	democracy	lacks	authority	and	legitimacy,	so	 too	(it	 is	 likely)	will	all	 the	 feasible	alternatives.	Our	choice	among	decision-procedures,	then,	will	simply	be	a	matter	of	which	is	likely	to	realise	the	best	results,	all-things-considered.	Democracy	–	in	particular,	universal	suffrage	–	has	a	very	strong	case	to	make	in	this	respect	(c.f.	Christiano,	2011;	Estlund,	2008;	Landemore,	2013b;	Sen,	1999).		6.4.	Epistocracy		Brennan	 (2016,	 ch.	 8)	 denies	 this,	 holding	 that	 epistocracy	 –	 systems	 in	 which	political	 influence	 is	 distributed	 in	 accordance	with	 citizens’	 knowledge	 levels	 –	would	 realise	 higher-quality	 results	 than	 democratic	 systems	 of	 universal	suffrage.165	This	claim	is	hard	to	evaluate.166	There	are	no	real-world	epistocracies	whose	 performance	 we	 might	 compare	 to	 democracies.	 There	 are	 also	 many	possible	 epistocratic	 systems,	 each	 of	which	 is	 likely	 to	 realise	 different	 results.	Mill’s	(1861,	ch.	8)	plural	voting	scheme,	wherein	all	citizens	receive	at	 least	one	vote,	with	better-educated	citizens	 receiving	additional	votes,	would	constitute	a	fairly	moderate	form.	A	more	extreme	form	would	disenfranchise	all	citizens	unable	to	 pass	 competency	 tests	 (c.f.	 Caplan,	 2006,	 pp.	 154-8).	 Brennan	 (2016,	 ch.	 8)	outlines	a	range	of	other	proposals.		Still,	there	are	good	reasons	to	be	sceptical	of	all	such	proposals.	Epistocracies	aim	to	 increase	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 those	 who	 are	 more	 knowledgeable,	 and	decrease	 the	 relative	 influence	 of	 those	 who	 are	 less	 knowledgeable.	 Levels	 of	political	 knowledge	 are	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 socioeconomic	 status	 (Althaus,	2003,	pp.	14-7).	In	practice,	then,	epistocracies	will	tend	to	diminish	the	influence	of	the	worse-off.	That,	I	suggest,	is	likely	to	exacerbate	elite	bias	in	political	decision-making	by	weakening	politicians’	incentives	to	attend	to	the	interests	of	the	worse-off.	
																																																						165	There	are	also	obvious	non-instrumental	objections	to	epistocracy	–	e.g.	that	it	would	establish	relations	of	unequal	political	power.	See	Kolodny	(2014b)	for	an	eloquent	argument	to	this	effect.	166	Though,	see	Hill	(2016).	
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	Brennan	denies	this	too,	appealing	to	evidence	showing	that	those	whose	influence	would	 be	 diminished	 under	 epistocracy	 generally	 (a)	 are	 systematically	misinformed	with	respect	to	the	policies	that	would	promote	their	interests,	and	(b)	in	 any	 case	 tend	 to	 vote	 sociotropically,	 rather	 than	 self-interestedly	 (Brennan,	2016,	pp.	226-8).	If	anything,	Brennan	claims,	their	disenfranchisement	should	lead	to	better	outcomes	with	respect	to	their	interests.		The	macro-level	evidence	set	out	 in	chapter	 two,	however,	 tells	a	different	story.	There	is	a	clear	relationship	between	the	rates	at	which	social	groups	participate,	and	the	rate	at	which	governments	allocate	resources	to	those	groups.	Ending	the	disenfranchisement	of	women	(Aidt	and	Dallal,	2008),	the	unwealthy	(Abou-Chadi	and	Orlowski,	2015),	and	African	Americans	(Husted	and	Kenny,	1997,	pp.	56-7,	76)	certainly	seems	to	have	caused	governments	to	attend	much	more	closely	to	such	groups’	 interests.	 Increased	political	participation	by	the	worse-off	–	with	(Birch,	2009b,	p.	131;	Carey	and	Horiuchi,	2017;	Chong	and	Olivera,	2008;	Fowler,	2013;	O'Toole	 and	 Stroble,	 1995)	 or	 without	 (Avery,	 2015;	 Carey	 and	 Horiuchi,	 2017;	Mueller	 and	 Stratmann,	 2003)	 compulsory	 voting	 –	 certainly	 appears	 to	 cause	governments	to	allocate	a	greater	proportion	of	social	resources	to	the	worse-off.	This	body	of	evidence	suggests	powerfully	that	disenfranchising	the	worse-off	en	
masse	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 substantially	more	 unequal	 outcomes	 than	 systems	 of	universal	suffrage,	however	such	individuals	behave	when	they	are	in	the	polling	booth.167			As	I	say,	there	are	no	real-world	epistocracies	from	whom	data	might	be	gathered.	The	above	evidence,	then,	is	not	definitive.	But	it	is,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	the	best	we	have	to	go	on,	and	certainly	seems	to	militate	against	epistocracy.			Equality,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 all	 that	 matters.	 Epistocracy	 would	 likely	 have	 some	comparative	virtues	(elections	might	be	cheaper	were	there	fewer	votes	to	count,	
																																																						167	This	is	not	to	deny	that	such	results	are	puzzling,	given	the	facts	concerning	voter	behaviour	to	which	Brennan	appeals.	There	are	numerous	ways	in	which	that	puzzle	might	be	resolved.	It	may	be,	for	example,	 that	politicians	erroneously	believe	 that	citizens	vote	 in	a	sufficiently	well-informed,	self-interested	manner,	and	allocate	resources	on	the	basis	of	that	belief.	Ultimately,	however,	we	need	not	resolve	such	puzzles.	My	objection	to	epistocracy	is	to	the	macro-level	results	it	is	likely	to	engender,	whatever	the	underlying	mechanisms	in	virtue	of	which	those	results	obtain.	
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for	 example).	 Still,	 equality	 is	 very	 important.	 The	 comparative	 virtues	 of	epistocracy	would	need	to	be	powerful	indeed	to	outweigh	democracy’s	apparent	advantage	on	this	score.	We	should	remain	open	to	the	possibility.	However,	a	great	deal	 more	 evidence	 of	 epistocracy’s	 instrumental	 virtues	 would	 need	 to	 be	marshalled	to	render	such	a	claim	even	remotely	plausible.			6.5.	Conclusion		I	have	argued	that	universal	suffrage	does	not	(in	general)	impose	unjustifiable	risk	upon	the	citizenry.	 Insofar	as	 the	competence	objection	relies	upon	the	 idea	 that	universal	 suffrage,	 and	 thus	 democracy,	 imposes	 such	 risks,	 the	 competence	objection	 fails.	 Perhaps	 subjection	 to	 the	 power	 of	 incompetent	 voters	 is	objectionable	for	some	other	reason.	Nothing	I	have	said	here	has	sought	to	show	otherwise.	Still,	in	the	absence	of	an	argument	to	that	effect,	I	think	democrats	can	safely	reject	the	competence	objection.			 	
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7.	Against	Lottocracy		Most	political	theorists	believe	that	democratic	systems,	in	which	(at	a	minimum)	all	adult	citizens	enjoy	the	right	to	vote,	and	decisions	are	made	via	the	aggregation	of	voters’	expressed	preferences,	constitute	the	sole	legitimate	form	of	government.	History,	along	with	results	from	the	social	sciences,	seems	to	vindicate	the	idea	that	democracy	 delivers	 higher-quality	 outcomes	 than	 alternative	 means	 of	 making	political	 decisions.168	 Democracy	 is	 also	 widely	 thought	 to	 constitute	 the	 best	feasible	expression	of	equal	respect	for	persons	in	the	political	domain.169	Yet	real-world	democracies	have	been	plagued	by	difficulties	in	recent	times:	the	corruption	of	elections,	low-quality	outcomes,	elite	bias,	and	so	on	(Gilens,	2012;	Hacker	and	Pierson,	2011).	Perhaps	as	a	result,	a	number	of	theorists	have	begun	to	challenge	the	 democratic	 orthodoxy.	 Amongst	 the	most	 interesting	 of	 these	 challenges	 are	those	which	have	been	 issued	by	proponents	of	 random	 selection	 in	 the	political	process.	‘Lottocracy’,	it	is	argued,	promises	to	retain	or	improve	upon	the	egalitarian	appeal	 of	 democracy,	 while	 realising	 higher-quality	 outcomes.170	 This	 chapter	responds	on	democracy’s	behalf,	arguing	 that	appropriately	designed	democratic	institutions	 are	 significantly	 more	 attractive	 than	 these	 proposals	 on	 both	egalitarian	and	instrumental	grounds.			As	set	out	in	chapter	one,	I	shall	understand	democracy	to	refer	to	systems	for	the	making	of	political	decisions	in	which	all	sufficiently	competent	adult	citizens	have	the	 right	 to	 vote,	 and	 decisions	 are	 made	 by	 the	 aggregation	 of	 voters’	 equally	weighted	 expressed	 preferences,	 or	 by	 their	 elected	 representatives.	 I	 will	understand	‘lottocracy’,	by	contrast,	to	refer	to	a	set	of	procedures	for	the	making	of	political	decisions	in	which,	wholly	or	partially,	aggregative	decision-making	and/or	universal	suffrage	are	substituted	for	random	selection	of	some	kind.171	I	stress	that	I	 am	 employing	 the	 terms	 ‘lottocracy’	 and	 ‘democracy’	 in	 these	ways	merely	 for	expository	convenience.	My	only	goal	is	to	defend	the	institutions	characteristic	of	contemporary	democratic	societies	against	 the	challenge	posed	by	proponents	of	
																																																						168	See,	among	many	others,	Christiano	(2011),	and	Sen	(1999).	169	See,	among	many	others,	Beitz	(1989),	Christiano	(2008),	and	Kolodny	(2014b).	170	I	borrow	the	term	‘lottocratic’	from	Guerrero	(2014).	171	Athens,	for	instance,	was	a	partial	lottocracy	on	this	definition,	insofar	as	some	important	political	officials	–	e.g.	members	of	the	council	of	500	–	were	randomly	selected,	while	generals	were	elected	(Manin,	1997,	ch.	1).	
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these	 lottocratic	 alternatives,	 by	 appeal	 to	 independent	 moral	 considerations.	 I	remain	neutral	with	respect	to	whether	these	lottocratic	proposals	are	‘democratic’	in	some	deeper	sense.		I	 have	 no	 argument	 to	 offer	 against	 all	 possible	 uses	 of	 random	 selection	 in	politics.172	My	goal	 is	 rather	 to	 argue	against	 three	 specific	 lottocratic	proposals,	each	of	which	has	received	recent,	sophisticated	defence	in	the	literature;			
Lottery	 voting:	 The	 substitution	 of	 aggregative	 decision-making	 for	 a	process	in	which	social	choices	are	made	by	the	random	selection	of	a	single	vote	from	among	those	cast.	Lottery	voting	is	compatible	with	–	though	does	not	require	–	universal	suffrage.173			
Suffrage	by	lottery:	The	substitution	of	universal	suffrage	for	the	random	selection	 and	 enfranchisement	 of	 some	 fraction	 of	 the	 population.	Suffrage	 by	 lottery	 is	 compatible	 with	 –	 though	 does	 not	 require	 –	aggregative	decision-making.174		
Representation	by	lottery:	The	substitution	of	both	universal	suffrage	and	aggregative	 decision-making	 for	 random	 selection	 as	 a	 means	 of	selecting	political	representatives.175		The	chapter	proceeds	as	follows.	Section	I	argues	that	the	egalitarian	arguments	in	favour	 of	 each	 of	 these	 models	 of	 lottocracy	 rest	 upon	 a	 series	 of	 implausible	normative	commitments,	and	that	the	comparative	egalitarian	merits	of	democracy	are	generally	superior.	Section	II	argues	that	the	instrumental	case	for	each	of	these	models	of	lottocracy	is	at	best	inconclusive	and,	at	worst,	deeply	problematic.		
																																																						172	Indeed,	in	chapter	five	I	defended	a	proposal	which	relies	upon	the	device	of	random	selection.	173	 Lottery	 voting	 is	 defended	by	Amar	 (1984)	 and	 Saunders	 (2010a).	 For	 other	 discussions,	 see	Ackerman	(1980,	pp.	285-9),	Elster	(1989,	pp.	87-92),	and	Jones	(1983,	pp.	170-3).	174	Suffrage	by	lottery	is	defended	by	López-Guerra	(2011;	2012;	2014).	See	also	Brennan	(2014,	pp.	35-9).	175	 Advocates	 of	 representation	 by	 lottery	 include	 Barnett	 and	 Carty	 (2008),	 Buchstein	 (2010),	Burnheim	 (1985),	 Callenbach	 and	 Phillips	 (1985),	 Carson	 and	 Martin	 (1999),	 Engelstad	 (1989),	Goodwin	(1984),	Guerrero	(2014),	Landemore	(2013a),	Leib	(2004),	McCormick	(2011),	Mueller	et	al.	(1972),	Sintomer	(2010),	Stone	(2011),	Sutherland	(2008),	and	Zakaras	(2010).	
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7.1.	Political	Equality	and	Lottocracy		The	distribution	of	a	good	among	a	group	of	persons	by	fair	lottery	(i.e.	a	lottery	in	which	all	outcomes	are	equiprobable)	gives	all	persons	an	equal	chance	of	enjoying	the	 good	 in	 question.	 The	 lottocratic	 proposals	 under	 consideration	 each	 give	citizens	equal	chances	of	enjoying	political	power	of	various	kinds	–	having	one’s	vote	selected	as	decisive	(lottery	voting),	holding	political	office	(representation	by	lottery),	 or	 enfranchisement	 (suffrage	 by	 lottery).	 The	most	 common	 egalitarian	arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 these	 systems	 over	 democracy,	 then,	 are	 variants	 on	 the	following;176		
The	Equal	Chances	Claim	(ECC):	That	some	version	of	lottocracy	satisfies	the	 requirements	 of	 political	 equality	 as	 well	 as,	 or	 better	 than,	democracy	because	it	affords	citizens	equal	chances	for	political	power	of	some	kind.177		
ECC	admits	of	two	interpretations	that	are	not	always	carefully	distinguished.	The	direct	 interpretation	 holds	 that	 the	 requirement	 that	 citizens	 be	 afforded	 equal	chances	 of	 enjoying	 political	 power	 of	 the	 relevant	 sort	 –	 decisiveness,	 holding	political	 office,	 or	 enfranchisement	 –	 is	 a	 fundamental	 requirement	 of	 political	equality.	 ECC	 is	 true,	 then,	 just	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 relevant	 model	 of	lottocracy	satisfies	that	requirement.	The	indirect	interpretation,	by	contrast,	holds	that	 giving	 citizens	 equal	 chances	 of	 decisiveness,	 political	 office,	 or	enfranchisement	 is	 an	 equally	 or	 more	 efficient	 means	 of	 satisfying	 some	 other	requirement	or	requirements	of	political	equality	than	democracy.	I	will	argue	that	
ECC	is	false	on	both	interpretations,	beginning	with	the	direct	interpretation.		7.1.1.	The	Direct	Interpretation		
																																																						176	Throughout	this	section,	I	shall	presuppose	that	the	requirements	of	political	equality	are	at	least	partially	non-instrumental,	since	that	is	also	the	view	also	presupposed	by	the	theorists	with	whom	I	engage.	177	Versions	of	ECC	are	advanced	by,	 among	others,	Buchstein	 (2010,	p.	 437),	Carson	and	Martin	(1999,	 p.	 34),	 Engelstad	 (1989,	 p.	 27),	 Guerrero	 (2014,	 pp.	 168-9),	 López-Guerra	 (2011,	 p.	 213),	Saunders	(2010a;	2010b),	and	Sintomer	(2010,	p.	482).	
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The	 argument	 I	 offer	 against	 the	 direct	 interpretation	 of	ECC	 is	 simple:	 political	equality	 does	 not	 fundamentally	 require	 that	 citizens	 enjoy	 equal	 chances	 of	decisiveness,	 political	 office,	 or	 enfranchisement.	 The	 fact	 that	 some	 lottocratic	proposal	would	deliver	equal	 chances	of	 any	of	 these	 forms	of	political	power	 is	therefore,	in	itself,	no	reason	to	accept	that	these	systems	satisfy	the	requirements	of	political	equality	better	than,	or	as	well	as,	democracies.		Equal	 respect	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 goods	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 distributive	 fairness.	Fairness,	 in	 turn,	 requires	distributing	 goods	by	 fair	 lottery	 only	where,	 at	 least,	these	three	conditions	hold;178		 (1) There	are	a	number	of	persons	each	with	positive	 claims	 to	 some	good,	and	(2) Each	person’s	claim	is	at	least	roughly	equal	in	strength,	and	(3) The	equal	distribution	of	that	good	among	those	persons	is,	for	some	reason,	impossible.		We	must	get	clear	on	the	notion	of	claim	invoked	here.	A	has	a	claim	against	B	for	some	good	C	if	and	only	if	A	has	a	right	against	B	for	C,	and	B	has	a	correlative	duty	to	provide	C	to	A.	Promises,	for	instance,	give	rise	to	claims.	If	Barry	promises	to	take	Andrew	to	lunch,	Andrew	has	a	right	against	Barry	that	Barry	take	him	to	lunch,	and	Barry	has	a	correlative	duty	to	do	so.	Fairness	is	concerned	only	with	the	relative	degree	to	which	individuals’	claims	are	satisfied.179	Suppose	Barry	has	promised	to	take	 Andrew	 and	 Charlie,	 but	 not	 Daniel,	 to	 lunch.	 Suppose	 he	 takes	 Andrew	 to	lunch,	but	not	Charlie	or	Daniel.	Charlie	may	complain	that	Barry	his	treated	him	unfairly	by	 satisfying	Andrew’s	 claim	but	not	his	own.	Daniel,	 by	 contrast,	might	have	an	interest	in	Barry’s	taking	him	to	lunch,	but	since	he	had	no	claim	against	Barry	that	he	do	so,	he	cannot	complain	that	Barry	has	acted	unfairly.	The	rationale	for	(1),	then,	is	simply	that	only	where	individuals	have	claims	to	some	good	is	there	potentially	an	issue	of	fairness,	at	all,	with	respect	to	its	distribution.			
																																																						178	This	much,	at	least,	is	common	ground	among	political	theorists	who	have	considered	the	issue.	See,	for	example,	Broome	(1990-1,	pp.	90-100),	Kornhauser	and	Sager	(1988,	pp.	492-5),	and	Stone	(2011,	ch.s	3-4).	179	This,	too,	is	common	ground	among	the	relevant	political	theorists.	See	Broome	(1990-1,	pp.	90-100),	Kornhauser	and	Sager	(1988,	pp.	492-5),	Stone	(2011,	ch.s	3-4),	and	Wasserman	(1996).	
	142	
The	rationale	for	(2)	is	that	fairness	requires	us	to	account	for	the	varying	strength	of	individuals’	claims.	Suppose	Joan	has	died	after	a	long	illness,	leaving	$1000	to	her	children	Jack	and	Jill,	but	no	instructions	on	how	to	divide	it	between	them.	Jack	despised	his	mother,	taking	on	no	costs	to	care	for	her	in	her	illness.	Jill	loved	her	mother	dearly,	caring	for	her	at	substantial	personal	cost	for	many	years.	Suppose	the	executor	of	Joan’s	estate	were	to	propose	distributing	the	$1000	between	Jack	and	Jill	by	the	toss	of	a	coin.	Whoever	wins	gets	to	keep	the	$1000	in	its	entirety.	Jill	might	reasonably	object	that	her	claim	to	the	$1000	is	much	stronger	than	Jack’s,	given	the	character	of	their	respective	relationships	with	Joan.	As	such,	giving	him	an	equal	chance	of	getting	the	money	is	unfair.			The	rationale	for	(3)	is	simply	that	fairness,	ideally,	requires	that	individuals’	claims	be	 satisfied	 in	proportion	 to	 their	 strength	 (Broome,	1990-1).	Where	 individuals	have	positive,	equal	claims	to	some	good,	and	it	 is	possible	to	satisfy	such	claims	equally,	fairness	therefore	requires	that	each	have	an	equal	share.	It	is	only	in	cases	where	doing	so	is	impossible	(and	where	some	unfairness	is	therefore	inevitable)	that	we	may	look	to	alternatives.	Distribution	by	lottery	is,	thus,	a	kind	of	‘second-best’.	 If	citizens	cannot	share	equally	 in	some	good,	 they	can	at	 least	enjoy	equal	chances	of	getting	the	good.		So,	 in	 order	 for	 ECC	 to	 hold,	 on	 the	 direct	 interpretation,	 for	 lottery	 voting,	representation	by	 lottery,	 or	 suffrage	by	 lottery,	 (1),	 (2),	 and	 (3)	must	be	 jointly	satisfied	 for	 the	 goods	 of	 decisiveness,	 political	 office,	 or	 enfranchisement	respectively.	My	charge	is	simply	that	(1),	(2),	and	(3)	are	not	jointly	satisfied	for	decisiveness,	political	office,	or	enfranchisement.	The	direct	interpretation	of	ECC,	therefore,	fails.		Lottery	Voting	and	Equal	Chances	for	Decisiveness		Saunders	 (2010a,	p.	 149)	holds	 that	political	 equality	 requires	 that:	 “Each	group	member	 must	 have	 an	 equal	 (chance	 of)	 influence	 over	 the	 group’s	 decisions.”	Majority	 rule	 (the	 form	 of	 aggregative	 decision-making	 against	 which	 Saunders	argues,	 in	particular)	often	 fails	 to	 satisfy	 this	 requirement	because	of	persistent	minorities	–	groups	who	are	 too	small	 to	have	any	prospect	of	ever	getting	 their	
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way.180	Under	lottery	voting,	by	contrast,	each	person	has	an	equal	chance	of	having	their	vote	selected	as	decisive.	Each,	therefore,	has	an	equal	chance	of	enjoying	the	power	of	decisive	 influence.	Saunders	(2010a,	pp.	155-60)	concludes	 that	 lottery	voting	better	satisfies	the	requirements	of	political	equality	than	democracy.	Hence;		
ECCLV:	 Lottery	 voting	 satisfies	 the	 requirements	 of	 political	 equality	better	 than	 democracy	 because	 it	 affords	 citizens	 equal	 chances	 of	decisiveness	over	political	decisions.		I	think	the	direct	interpretation	of	ECCLV	 is	false.	It	 is	implausible	that	individuals	have	positive,	equal	claims	to	decisive	influence	over	political	decisions.	Condition	(1),	therefore,	fails.	There	is	no	fundamental	requirement	of	political	equality,	then,	that	citizens	enjoy	equal	chances	of	decisiveness.		It	is	certainly	true	that	individuals	have	claims	to	decisiveness	over	some	decisions	–	e.g.	 the	decision	as	to	which	religion	they	will	adopt.	But	political	decisions	are	distinctive	in	at	least	four	respects.	First,	political	decisions	concern	the	rights	and	interests	of	all	those	who	are	subject	to	them,	not	merely	the	agent(s)	who	make	such	decisions.	Second,	such	decisions	are	enforced	by	coercion	and	threats	thereof.	Third,	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 individuals,	 subjection	 to	 political	 decisions	 is	unchosen.	 Most	 citizens	 are	 born	 into	 their	 states,	 and	 cannot	 leave	 without	incurring	very	substantial	costs.	Finally,	for	the	same	reasons,	the	effects	of	political	decisions	are	not	reasonably	avoidable	for	most	individuals.	An	agent	that	enjoyed	decisiveness	over	some	political	decision,	then,	would	enjoy	the	power	to,	over	the	domain	with	which	 that	 decision	 is	 concerned,	 unilaterally	 determine	 rules	with	which	other	citizens	will	be	forced	to	conform.	There	seems	to	me	to	be	no	intuitive	attraction	 to	 the	 idea	 that	anyone	has	a	 claim	against	 the	political	 community	 to	power	of	that	kind.	Certainly,	Saunders	himself	offers	no	argument	to	this	effect.181		Moreover,	powerful	egalitarian	considerations	militate	against	the	notion	of	claims	to	decisiveness.	A	central	insight	of	egalitarian	theorising	of	the	last	two	decades	is	
																																																						180	 It	 is	 by	 no	means	 clear	 that	 Saunders	 is	 right,	 here.	 After	 all,	 persistent	minorities’	 votes	 are	accorded	the	same	weight	as	everyone	else.	Their	complaint,	then,	is	plausibly	better	understood	in	terms	of	preference	satisfaction,	rather	than	influence.	181	Though	–	to	be	clear	–	his	argument	explicitly	relies	upon	an	appeal	to	distributive	fairness	of	the	kind	under	discussion.	
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that	equal	respect	for	persons	requires	that	citizens	relate	to	one	another	on	terms	of	social	equality.182	Precisely	what	relations	of	social	equality	consist	in	is	a	matter	of	ongoing	philosophical	dispute.	Yet,	a	point	of	convergence	between	virtually	all	accounts	 is	 that	 citizens	 must	 not	 be	 able	 to	 exercise	 asymmetric	 power	 and	authority	over	others.183			Asymmetries	 in	 power	 and	 authority	 are	 constitutive	 features	 of	 paradigmatic	relations	of	social	inequality.	The	lord	occupies	a	superior	position	to	his	servants	partially	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 enjoys	 a	 substantial	 degree	 of	 power	 and	authority	over	them.	Husbands	in	the	Victorian	era	stood	in	positions	of	superiority	over	their	wives	partially	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	they	enjoyed	a	great	deal	of	power	and	authority	over	 their	wives’	access	 to	resources,	 liberties	and	so	on.	As	Baker	(2015,	 pp.	 80-1)	 puts	 it,	 “…the	 exercise	 of	 power	 by	 one	 person	 or	 group	 over	another	 is	 clearly	 an	 unequal	 relationship…	 if	 power	 relations	 consist	 in	 some	people	 controlling	 others,	 then	 it	 seems	 contradictory	 to	 talk	 about	 egalitarian	relations	of	power.”	If	citizens	are	to	stand	in	relations	of	social	equality,	 then,	 in	Scheffler’s	 (2015,	 pp.	 25)	 phrase,	 persons’	 “…equally	 important	 interests	 –	understood	broadly	to	include	the	person’s	needs,	values,	and	preferences	–	should	play	an	equally	significant	role	in	influencing	decisions	made	within	the	context	of	the	relationship.”	Relations	wherein	some	enjoy	asymmetric	power	and	authority	over	others,	then,	are	objectionably	unequal.184		Political	 decisions,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	 involve	 the	 exercise	 of	 coercive	 power	 and	authority	over	the	citizenry.	To	the	extent	that	citizens	enjoy	power	over	political	decisions,	 they	 therefore	 enjoy	power	 and	 authority	 over	 their	 fellow	 citizens.	 If	social	equality	requires	that	citizens	stand	in	relations	of	equal	power	and	authority,	then,	 it	must	necessarily	 require	 that	citizens	stand	 in	relations	of	equal	political	power.185	Political	societies,	then,	must	respect	the	following	requirement;		
																																																						182	 We	 discussed	 this	 approach	 in	 chapter	 four.	 For	 important,	 more	 detailed	 statements,	 see	Anderson	(1999),	Kolodny	(2014b),	and	Pettit	(2012).	183	See,	for	example,	Baker	(2015,	pp.	80-5),	Kolodny	(2014b),	Pettit	(2012,	ch.s	3-4),	and	Scheffler	(2015,	pp.	34-7).	184	It	is	important	to	distinguish,	here,	between	power	and	mere	influence.	As	we	argued	in	chapter	three,	inequalities	in	latter	are	not	objectionable	from	an	egalitarian	point	of	view.		185	 This	 is,	moreover,	 a	 particularly	urgent	 requirement	 of	 social	 equality,	 given	 that	 relations	 of	political	inequality	will	tend	to	create	and	magnify	non-political	inequalities.	
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Social	 Equality:	 Citizens	 should	 stand	 in	 relations	 of	 social	 equality.	Relations	of	social	equality	consist	at	least	partially	in	relations	of	equal	political	power.			Decisiveness	 necessarily	 involves	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 power	 over	 others	 on	asymmetric	terms.	Political	decisions	involve	the	exercise	of	power	and	authority	over	others,	and	what	it	is	for	one	to	be	decisive	over	a	political	decision	is	for	that	decision	to	counterfactually	depend	upon	one’s	will,	and	one’s	will	alone.	The	idea,	then,	that	any	citizen	has	a	claim	to	decisiveness	–	to	decide	unilaterally	which	set	of	social	rules	is	to	be	coercively	enforced	upon	the	citizenry	as	a	whole	–	is	deeply	inconsistent	with	Social	Equality.	Accepting	the	(very	plausible)	idea	that	we	do	not	have	 claims	 to	 place	 others	 in	 a	 social	 position	 inferior	 to	 our	 own,	 I	 deny	 that	individuals	 have	 claims	 to	 decisiveness.	 Political	 equality,	 therefore,	 does	 not	fundamentally	require	that	citizens	be	afforded	equal	chances	of	decisiveness.	ECCLV	fails,	on	the	direct	interpretation.		Representation	by	Lottery	and	Equal	Chances	of	Political	Office		Guerrero	(2014,	pp.	169)	writes	that	though	democracies	accord	all	citizens	“…an	equal	say	in	the	electoral	process,	only	a	select	few	actually	have	political	power,	and…	not	everyone	has	anything	close	to	an	equal	chance	of	having	political	power.	[Representation	 by	 lottery]	 thus	 arguably	 better	 reflects	 egalitarian	 ideals,	 since	anyone	might	wield	political	power,	and	everyone	has	an	equal	chance	of	doing	so.”	Guerrero	seems,	clearly,	to	be	advancing	another	version	of	ECC;		
ECCRBL:	Representation	by	lottery	satisfies	the	requirements	of	political	equality	better	than	democracy	because	it	affords	citizens	equal	chances	of	holding	political	office.		The	charge	against	the	direct	 interpretation	of	ECCRBL	 is	virtually	the	same	as	the	charge	against	ECCLV.	Political	equality	does	not	fundamentally	require	that	citizens	enjoy	equal	chances	for	political	office	because	citizens	do	not	have	claims	to	hold	political	office.	Condition	(1),	 therefore,	 fails.	There	are	 two	reasons	 to	reject	 the	idea	that	citizens	have	claims	to	political	office.	First,	it	is	deeply	counterintuitive.	
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Each	 representative	 is	 one	 of	 a	 small	 number	 of	 individuals	 with	 the	 power	 to	exercise	 control	 over	decisions	 to	 be	 coercively	 imposed	upon	 the	 citizenry	 as	 a	whole.	Representatives	–	especially	under	systems	like	representation	by	lottery	in	which	 citizens	 have	 no	 means	 of	 holding	 them	 to	 account	 –	 thereby	 enjoy	substantially	 greater	 power	 and	 authority	 than	 ordinary	 citizens.	 The	 political	community	does	not	intuitively	owe	asymmetric	power	and	authority	of	that	kind	to	anyone.	 We	 do	 not	 think,	 for	 example,	 that	 losers	 in	 fair	 elections	 have	 some	legitimate	complaint	against	the	citizenry	for	failing	to	satisfy	some	claim	of	theirs.			Second,	 such	 claims	 would	 conflict	 deeply	 with	 Social	 Equality.	 Asymmetries	 of	power	 and	 authority	 are	 constitutive	 of	 relations	 of	 social	 inequality,	 and	representatives	enjoy	asymmetric	power	and	authority	over	the	citizenry.	I	think,	then,	that	it	is	implausible	that	individuals	have	positive	moral	claims	to	hold	such	offices.	 I	 do	 not,	 of	 course,	 deny	 that	 political	 systems	 must	 rely	 heavily	 upon	representatives,	 nor	 that	 citizens	 have	 a	 range	 of	 other	 claims	 with	 respect	 to	political	office	(e.g.	to	fair	opportunities	to	compete	in	elections),	nor	that	there	are	moral	reasons	in	virtue	of	which	certain	individuals	should	occupy	political	offices	(e.g.	 that	 some	 candidate	 has	won	 a	 fair	 election).	 I	 shall	 return	 to	 these	 issues	below.	All	 I	 am	arguing	 is	 that	 it	 is	 implausible	 that	 anyone	has	a	claim	 to	 those	offices.	For	that	reason,	on	the	direct	interpretation,	ECCRBL	is	false.		Proponents	of	 lottery	voting	or	 representation	by	 lottery	might	 respond	 that	 the	objection	 from	 social	 equality	 shows	 only	 that	 the	 powers	 of	 decisive	 voters	 or	representatives	 (as	 the	 case	 may	 be)	 must	 be	 limited	 by	 the	 substantive	requirements	 of	 social	 equality.	 This	misses	 the	 point.	 The	 objection	 is	 not	 that	extending	 citizens	 equal	 chances	 of	 decisiveness	 or	 political	 office	might	 lead	 to	
outcomes	 that	 are	 inconsistent	with	 citizens’	 equal	 standing	 but,	 rather,	 that	 the	relation	 between	 the	 citizenry	 and	 randomly	 selected	 decisive	 voters,	 or	representatives,	would	itself	be	one	of	objectionable	inequality.	Even	if	the	powers	of	decisive	voters	or	representatives	were	to	be	limited,	asymmetries	of	power	and	authority	would	still	obtain.		More	to	the	point,	then,	one	might	deny	that	the	relation	that	would	obtain	between	the	citizenry	and	persons	randomly	selected	to	be	decisive	voters	or	representatives	
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would	be	objectionably	unequal.	Relations	of	social	 inequality	proper,	 it	might	be	argued,	 obtain	 (a)	 for	 an	 extended	period	 of	 time	and	 (b)	 in	 virtue	 of	 particular	features	 of	 the	 agents	 in	 question.186	 Victorian-era	marriages,	 for	 example,	were	objectionably	unequal,	insofar	as	wives,	as	women,	were	subordinated	to	husbands	over	 the	 entire	 course	 of	 their	married	 life.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 relation	 that	would	obtain	 between	 randomly	 selected	 decisive	 voters	 or	 representatives	 would	 be	temporary,	and	would	not	obtain	in	virtue	of	any	particular	features	of	the	persons	in	question.			I	 deny	 that	 (a)	 or	 (b)	 are	 necessary	 features	 of	 relations	 of	 social	 inequality,	however.	Let	us	take	(b)	first.	Imagine	Edward	and	Francesca	are	both	selected	at	random	such	 that	Edward	 is	 to	be	Francesca’s	slave	 for	 life.	Edward	 is	obviously	placed	in	a	position	of	objectionable	inferiority	to	Francesca,	though	not	in	virtue	of	any	particular	features	of	either	party.	Now	consider	(a).	Imagine	a	society	in	which,	every	day,	a	single	person	is	randomly	selected	to	be	the	slave	of	another	randomly	selected	person	for	that	day	only.	These	slave-master	relations	would	hold	only	for	brief	periods	of	time.	Yet,	nevertheless,	such	relations	seem	obviously	objectionable	on	egalitarian	grounds.	Neither	(a)	nor	(b)	is	intuitively	necessary	for	relations	of	social	inequality.		One	could	insist	on	these	conditions,	anyway.	Insisting	on	(b)	would	be	extremely	costly,	insofar	as	doing	so	would	entail	that	Edward	and	Francesca’s	relationship	is	not	objectionably	unequal.	Insisting	on	(a)	would	be	to	little	avail.	The	relations	of	inequality	that	would	obtain	between	the	citizenry	and	randomly	selected	decisive	voters	or	representatives	would	hold	for	extended	periods	of	time.	Each	randomly	selected	representative	would	enjoy	power	over	all	political	decisions	taken	during	their	term	of	office;	potentially	several	years.	In	the	case	of	decisive	voters,	though	they	would	enjoy	power	over	only	a	single	decision,	the	ongoing	enforcement	of	that	decision	would	represent	the	ongoing	coercive	imposition	of	their	will	upon	other	citizens.	These	defences,	then,	are	unsuccessful.			Suffrage	by	Lottery	and	Equal	Chances	of	Enfranchisement		
																																																						186	Anderson	(2012,	pp.	42-3)	seems	to	endorse	this	view.	
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López-Guerra	(2011,	pp.	213)	writes	that	suffrage	by	lottery	“…honours	the	ideal	of	political	equality	by	giving	everyone	the	same	chance	of	being	selected…”	By	giving	each	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 enfranchisement,	 suffrage	 by	 lottery	 satisfies	 the	requirements	of	political	equality	at	least	as	well	as	democracy.	Hence;		
ECCSBL:	Suffrage	by	lottery	satisfies	the	requirements	of	political	equality	as	 well	 as	 democracy	 because	 it	 affords	 citizens	 equal	 chances	 of	enfranchisement.187		Unlike	 ECCLV	 and	 ECCRBL,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 accept	 that	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 are	satisfied	 for	 ECCSBL.	 Individuals	 have	 positive,	 equal	 claims	 to	 enfranchisement	grounded	in	their	fundamental	interests	in	access	to	the	means	of	political	power.	Instrumentally,	 political	 power	 is	 a	 valuable	means	 of	 protecting	 and	 promoting	one’s	fundamental	interests	(c.f.	Christiano,	2008,	pp.	88-95;	Christiano,	2011;	Mill,	1869,	pp.	526-7),	offers	opportunities	for	the	expression	of	one’s	political	attitudes	(c.f.	Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	p.	196),	and	affords	citizens	opportunities	for	the	development	 of	 valuable	 traits	 like	 public-spiritedness	 and	 self-esteem,	 as	 well	important	capacities	such	as	the	ability	to	weigh	the	competing	merits	of	different	proposals,	and	engage	 in	moral	 thought	and	argument	 (c.f.	Pateman,	1970,	ch.	2;	Rawls,	1971,	p.	234).		Political	 power	 is	 also	 intrinsically	 valuable	 for	 the	 contribution	 it	 makes	 to	individual	autonomy.	Autonomy	involves,	among	other	things,	enjoying	control	over	oneself.	 Social	 conditions	 can	 exert	 a	 powerful	 degree	 of	 control	over	 individual	agents.	Agents	are	therefore	more	and	less	autonomous	with	the	degree	to	which	they	 enjoy	 control	 over	 those	 conditions.	 Political	 institutions	 exercise	 a	 very	substantial	degree	of	control	over	citizens.	The	autonomy	citizens	enjoy	(at	least	in	the	political	domain)	therefore	varies	positively,	other	things	equal,	with	the	degree	of	political	influence	they	enjoy.		On	these	bases,	 then,	 I	 think	that	citizens	have	positive,	equal	claims	to	access	to	those	means	of	political	power	consistent	with	the	other	requirements	of	political	
																																																						187	ECCSBL	is	more	moderate	than	ECCLV	and	ECCRBL,	insofar	as	it	claims	only	that	suffrage	by	lottery	is	
as	good	as	democracy	from	an	egalitarian	perspective.	
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equality.188	Amongst	these	means	is	enfranchisement.	The	vote,	in	its	own	right,	is	itself	a	means	of	exercising	influence	–	affording	individuals	the	ability	to	causally	contribute	to	the	process	by	which	political	outcomes	are	realised	(Goldman,	1999).	It	also	plays	a	role	in	rendering	other	forms	of	influence	efficacious.	Governments	have	 incentives	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 political	 protestors,	 for	 example,	because	(and	where)	their	actions	threaten	to	influence	citizens’	voting	behaviour.	We	should	accept	that	citizens	have	positive,	equal	claims	to	the	franchise.	(1)	and	(2)	are	satisfied.	However,	it	is	obvious	that	(3)	is	not.	The	existence	of	systems	of	universal	suffrage	all	over	the	world	demonstrates	that	it	is	perfectly	possible	(at	least,	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases)	to	distribute	the	franchise	equally.	That	being	the	case,	distributive	fairness	requires	that	the	franchise	be	distributed	equally.	As	we	argued	above,	distributive	fairness	requires	that	claims	be	satisfied	in	proportion	to	their	strength.	Therefore,	where	citizens	each	have	positive,	equal	claims	to	some	good,	fairness	requires	that	that	good	be	distributed	equally,	provided	it	is	possible	to	do	so.	It	follows,	then,	that	we	should	accept	the	following	requirement;		
Equal	Access:	Citizens	should	have	positive,	equal	access	to	the	franchise.		Distributing	the	franchise	by	lottery	obviously	violates	Equal	Access.	Some	citizens’	claims	 to	 the	 franchise	would	be	 satisfied	where	others’	 claims,	 of	 equal	weight,	would	 not	 be.	 Suffrage	 by	 lottery	 would,	 as	 such,	 create	 avoidable	 distributive	unfairness.	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 should	 also	 reject	 the	 direct	 interpretation	 of	
ECCSBL.189		No	version	of	ECC	succeeds,	on	the	direct	interpretation.	What,	then,	of	the	indirect	interpretation?		7.1.2.	The	Indirect	Interpretation			Recall	that	the	indirect	interpretation	of	ECC	holds	that	giving	citizens	equal	chances	of	decisiveness,	political	office,	or	enfranchisement,	compared	to	democracy,	is	an	
																																																						188	This	final	clause	is	crucial,	insofar	as	it	rules	out	(for	the	reasons	outlined	above)	the	possibility	that	individuals	might	have	claims	to	decisiveness	or	political	office.	189	 One	might	 respond	 by	 arguing	 that	 suffrage	 by	 lottery	will	 yield	 an	 equal	 distribution	 of	 the	franchise	over	the	long	term.	I	discuss	this	response	below.	
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equally	or	more	efficient	means	of	satisfying	some	requirement	or	requirements	of	political	equality	other	than	a	direct	requirement	to	afford	citizens	equal	chances	of	one	 or	 other	 of	 those	 forms	 of	 political	 power.	 Responding	 to	 the	 indirect	interpretation,	 then,	 will	 require	 us	 to	 take	 a	 stand	 on	 what	 these	 other	requirements	of	political	equality	are.	Fortunately,	we	have	done	this	work	already,	in	arguing	for	Social	Equality	and	Equal	Access.	The	argument	that	follows,	then,	is	straightforward:	democracy,	at	least	when	implemented	in	concert	with	a	suitable	array	 of	 background	 institutions	 will,	 in	 general,	 more	 closely	 approximate	 the	requirements	 of	Social	 Equality	 and	Equal	 Access	 than	 representation	 by	 lottery,	suffrage	by	lottery,	or	lottery	voting.	Democracy,	as	such,	has	stronger	egalitarian	merits	than	the	lottocratic	proposals	under	consideration.			Democracy	and	Representation	by	Lottery		Democracy	straightforwardly	beats	representation	by	lottery	with	respect	to	Equal	
Access.	 Representation	 by	 lottery	 fails	 to	 extend	 the	 franchise	 (or	 anything	equivalent)	to	anyone,	whereas	democracies	secure	equal	and	positive	access	to	the	franchise	for	all	citizens	under	the	institution	of	universal	suffrage.			The	comparison	between	democracy	and	representation	by	lottery	with	respect	to	
Social	Equality	 is	more	complex.	Given	the	well-acknowledged	difficulties	of	pure	direct	 democracy,	 democrats	 must	 be	 content,	 I	 think,	 to	 leave	 the	 majority	 of	political	decisions	to	elected	representatives.	Inequalities	of	power	between	citizens	and	representatives	are	 inevitable	under	both	democracy,	 and	representation	by	lottery.	The	question,	then,	is	which	system	better	regulates	these	inequalities.			I	 also	 think	 that,	 for	 two	 reasons,	 appropriately	 structured	 democratic	arrangements	better	satisfy	Social	Equality.190	First,	following	Kolodny	(2014b,	pp.	317-8),	we	might	 argue	 that	democracy	affords	 citizens	 the	 capacity	 to	 see	 their	elected	 representatives	 as	 their	delegates,	 rather	 than	 as	 agents	 exercising	 some	superior	 form	 of	 power	 over	 them.	 The	 idea	 is	 familiar	 from	 the	 interpersonal	domain.	 Joan	might	delegate	 the	power	 to	make	medical	decisions	 to	her	doctor	without	thereby	subordinating	herself	to	her	doctor,	for	example.	Representatives	
																																																						190	We	take	up	the	issue	of	how	democracies	ought	to	be	structured	in	the	following	section.	
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held	 to	 account	 at	 regular	 elections	 might,	 in	 a	 similar	 fashion,	 be	 seen	 as	 the	citizenry’s	delegates,	insofar	as	they	are	subject	to	the	citizenry’s	control.	We	cannot	plausibly	 view	 representatives	 selected	 by	 lot	 in	 this	manner.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	elections,	citizens	have	no	means	of	exercising	control	over	their	representatives.	We	should	hardly	think,	by	analogy,	that	if	Joan	were	to	have	a	doctor	selected	at	random	 to	make	medical	 decisions	 for	her,	 over	whom	she	 lacked	 any	means	of	control,	that	she	has	delegated	authority	to	that	doctor.		A	second,	more	modest	line	of	argument	would	hold	simply	that	the	magnitude	of	the	asymmetries	that	obtain	between	elected	representatives	and	citizens	is	smaller	under	(suitably	designed)	democratic	arrangements	than	under	representation	by	lottery.	The	relation	between	elected	representatives	and	citizens	is	therefore	less	objectionable	 on	 egalitarian	 grounds	 than	 that	 which	 would	 obtain	 between	randomly	 selected	 representatives	 and	 citizens.	 Electoral	 systems	 afford	 the	citizenry	a	measure	of	control	over	their	representatives	at	the	ballot	box	(and	via	those	 forms	of	 influence	 that	depend	upon	universal	 suffrage	–	 e.g.	 protest)	 that	representation	 by	 lottery	 does	 not.	 These	 mechanisms	 are,	 of	 course,	 deeply	imperfect.	 Yet	 no	 such	mechanisms	 obtain	 under	 representation	 by	 lottery.	 The	inequalities	of	political	power	that	obtain	between	citizens	and	representatives	will,	as	such,	generally	be	worse	under	representation	by	lottery.191		Democracy	and	Suffrage	by	Lottery		Democracy	obviously	 beats	 suffrage	by	 lottery	with	 respect	 to	Equal	Access.	 The	point	of	suffrage	by	lottery	is	to	enfranchise	only	that	fraction	of	the	citizenry	that	is	randomly	selected.	Democracies,	by	contrast,	enfranchise	all	citizens	(or,	at	 least,	ought	 to	 do	 so).	Moreover,	 since	 the	 franchise	 constitutes	 a	 form	of	 power	 over	political	 decisions,	 and	 since	 (as	we	have	 argued)	power	over	political	 decisions	
																																																						191	 Proponents	 of	 representation	 by	 lottery	 will	 respond	 by	 arguing,	 as	 many	 have	 done	 (e.g.	Guerrero,	 2014;	 McCormick,	 2011;	 Zakaras,	 2010),	 that	 elections	 engender	 elite	 bias,	 creating	enormous	inequalities	of	informal	political	power	in	favour	of	social	elites.	This	is	an	unconvincing	reply.	 Even	 if	we	 grant	 that	 elite	 bias	would	 be	worse	 under	 democracy	 than	 representation	 by	lottery,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 democracy	 is	 worse,	 from	 an	 egalitarian	 perspective	 than	representation	by	lottery.	After	all,	even	where	elite	bias	is	fairly	severe,	citizens	nevertheless	retain	some	 degree	 of	 influence	 in	 the	 political	 process	 under	 democratic	 arrangements.	 Under	representation	by	 lottery,	on	the	other	hand,	citizens	enjoy	no	 influence	at	all.	By	necessity,	 then,	inequalities	are	greater	in	magnitude	under	the	latter	than	under	the	former.	We	shall	engage	more	directly	with	this	line	of	argument	in	the	following	section.	
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constitutes	a	form	of	power	and	authority	over	others,	the	unequal	distribution	of	the	franchise	establishes	a	relation	of	objectionable	social	inequality.	Democracies,	by	distributing	the	franchise	equally,	establish	no	such	relations.	For	that	reason,	democracy	also	better	satisfies	the	requirements	of	Social	Equality	than	suffrage	by	lottery.		The	 proponent	 of	 suffrage	 by	 lottery	 might	 respond	 that	 the	 repeated,	 random	reassignment	 of	 voting	 rights	 ought	 to	 yield	 approximately	 equal	 access	 to	 the	franchise	over	the	long	term.	There	are	important	reasons	to	be	sceptical	of	appeals	to	 long	 term	equality	 (c.f.	McKerlie,	1989;	Temkin,	1993,	 ch.	8).	But	even	setting	these	aside,	the	appeal	to	long	term	equality	does	nothing	to	address	the	objection	from	 social	 inequality.	 The	 fact	 that	 suffrage	 by	 lottery	might	 lead	 to	 long	 term	equality	of	access	to	the	franchise	does	not	show	that	the	short-term	inequalities	in	access	to	the	franchise	it	would	engender	would	not	constitute	relations	of	social	inequality.	Rather,	 it	simply	shows	that	citizens	can	expect	to	occupy	positions	of	superiority	and	inferiority	for	roughly	equal	amounts	of	time	across	the	course	of	their	 lives.	Better,	 surely,	 to	eliminate	social	 inequality	of	 this	kind	altogether	by	distributing	access	to	the	franchise	equally	over	the	short	and	long	term.		Democracy	and	Lottery	Voting		I	am	inclined	to	think	that	democracy	and	lottery	voting	(provided	it	is	coupled	with	universal	suffrage)	do	equally	well	with	respect	to	Equal	Access.	Both	would	extend	voting	rights	to	all	citizens.	Both	would	also	afford	citizens	a	form	of	positive,	equal	political	 power.	 Democracy,	 via	 suitably	 egalitarian	 aggregation	 methods	 (e.g.	majority	rule),	gives	each	the	opportunity	to	causally	contribute	to	the	production	of	political	outcomes	by	casting	an	equally	weighted	vote.	Lottery	voting	allows	each	to	affect	the	probabilities	of	the	various	outcomes	being	adopted	to	an	equal	degree.	Moreover,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 citizens	 would	 derive	 any	 more	 or	 less	participatory	benefits	from	voting	under	either	system.		Democracy,	however,	does	substantially	better	with	respect	to	Social	Equality.	We	have	already	argued	that	the	relation	between	the	decisive	voter	and	the	citizenry	at	large	would	constitute	a	relation	of	objectionable	social	inequality.	Lottery	voting	
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guarantees	that,	for	each	political	decision,	someone	will	occupy	the	position	of	the	decisive	voter.	Of	course,	aggregative	methods	such	as	majority	rule	leave	open	the	possibility	of	a	single	voter’s	being	decisive	–	though	the	probability	of	this	occurring	is	 always	 asymptotically	 close	 to	 zero	 (Brennan	 and	 Lomasky,	 1993,	 ch.	 4).	Moreover,	under	aggregative	decision-making,	decisiveness	is	a	mere	by-product	of	the	 equal	 and	 positive	weighting	 of	 all	 citizens’	 votes.	 The	 decisive	 voter	 simply	happens	to	cast	 the	ballot	 that	 tips	 the	scale	one	way	or	 the	other.	Under	 lottery	voting,	 by	 contrast,	 only	 the	 decisive	 individual’s	 preferences	 are	 accorded	 any	weight	at	all	in	determining	the	social	choice.			***		I	 have	 not	 sought	 to	 defend	 the	 idea	 that	 real-world	 democracies,	 even	 under	favourable	 conditions,	 perfectly	 satisfy	 either	 Social	 Equality,	 or	 Equal	 Access.	Indeed,	they	fall	short	in	many	ways.	All	I	have	sought	to	defend	is	the	claim	that	democracies	will	in	general	do	better	than	the	three	models	of	lottocracy	considered	in	this	chapter.	That	is	a	powerful	reason	to	hold	that	democracy	is	better	justified	than	 these	 lottocratic	 alternatives.	 It	 is	 not	 decisive,	 however.	 The	 comparative	instrumental	merits	of	lottocracy	might	be	so	overwhelming	as	to	outweigh	these	considerations.	Let	us,	then,	consider	the	instrumental	case	for	lottocracy.		7.2.	The	Instrumental	Case	for	Lottocracy		In	this	section,	I	challenge	the	idea	that	any	of	the	three	versions	of	lottocracy	under	discussion	would	reliably	yield	higher-quality	outcomes	than	democracy.	This	will	not	 be	 straightforward.	There	 are	no	 real-world	 lottocracies.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	only	limited	empirical	evidence	to	draw	on.192	There	are	many	ways	in	which	each	of	 these	 proposals	 might	 be	 implemented,	 and	 very	 different	 conditions	 under	which	 their	 implementation	 might	 be	 attempted.	 Our	 discussion,	 then,	 must	necessarily	be	somewhat	speculative.	My	aim	is	to	establish	two	relatively	modest	claims,	each	of	which	undermines	the	 instrumental	case	for	 lottocracy.	First,	 that	there	are	reasons	to	doubt	whether	many	of	the	most	important	benefits	claimed	
																																																						192	Though,	of	course,	there	have	been	empirical	studies	of	similar	institutions	–	e.g.	deliberative	mini-publics	(c.f.	Dryzek,	2010,	ch.	8;	Goodin	and	Dryzek,	2006).	
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for	these	proposals	are	likely	to	materialise.	Second,	that	each	of	these	proposals	is	likely	to	entail	costs	that	appropriately	structured	democracies	avoid.		7.2.1.	Lottery	Voting		The	 most	 important	 instrumental	 argument	 for	 lottery	 voting	 is	 that	 it	 would	promote	deliberation	(Saunders,	2010a,	pp.	161,	174-5).	Political	actors	would	have	stronger	 incentives	 to	 maximise	 their	 share	 of	 the	 vote	 under	 lottery	 voting.	Aggregative	decision-making	mechanisms	guarantee	victory	to	items	on	the	agenda	that	receive	some	threshold	level	of	popular	support	–	50%+1,	for	example,	under	simple	majority	rule.	Under	lottery	voting,	however,	the	outcome	is	never	certain.	Each	item’s	probability	of	emerging	as	the	social	choice	is	simply	the	proportion	of	the	vote	it	receives.	A	candidate	polling	at	60%	is	certain	to	win	under	majority	rule,	but	has	only	a	60%	chance	of	victory	under	lottery	voting.	This,	Saunders	argues,	means	that	political	actors	would	be	more	likely	to	engage	deliberatively	with	the	citizenry,	in	an	attempt	to	maximise	their	vote-share.			The	benefits	of	deliberation,	 to	be	sure,	are	substantial	 (Curato	et	al.,	2017).	The	trouble,	however,	is	that	society-wide	deliberation	is,	in	general,	a	highly	inefficient	strategy	for	attracting	mass	support,	for	the	simple	reason	that	citizens	have	little	interest	in	engaging	in	it.193	Gathering	information	and	engaging	in	deliberation	over	political	matters	is	costly	in	time	and	effort.	Most	citizens,	then,	rationally	take	very	little	 interest	 in	 political	 activities	 like	 deliberation,	 given	 their	 very	 minimal	capacity	to	make	any	difference	to	political	outcomes	by	doing	so	(Fishkin,	2009,	ch.s	 2-3).194	 Politicians,	 thus,	 have	 little	 incentive	 to	 seek	 to	 engage	 citizens	 in	deliberation,	for	the	simple	reason	that	citizens	have	little	incentive	to	engage	with	any	such	attempt.	It	is	hard	to	see	quite	how	lottery	voting	is	supposed	to	make	any	
																																																						193	It	is	important	to	distinguish,	here,	between	society-wide	deliberation	of	the	kind	Saunders	seems	to	have	in	mind,	and	deliberation	in	mini-publics.	As	we	discussed	in	chapter	five,	the	latter	form	of	deliberation	can	have	–	and,	 indeed,	has	had	–	substantial	effects	upon	citizens’	voting	behaviour.	Moreover,	where	citizens	are	extended	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	mini-publics,	a	substantial	proportion	characteristically	take	up	the	opportunity	to	do	so	(Smith,	2009,	pp.	82-3).		194	We	should	not	overstate	 the	point.	Survey	evidence	 indicates	 that	most	citizens	do	 talk	about	politics.	 Steiner	 (2012,	 pp.	 38-49)	makes	 two	 critical	 points,	 however.	 First,	 that	 citizens	 almost	certainly	over-report	the	degree	of	political	discussion	they	engage	in	on	such	surveys.	Second,	even	taking	 survey	 results	 at	 face	 value,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 such	 talk	 does	 not	 plausibly	 amount	 to	
deliberation.	Though,	it	may	be	that	‘talk’	of	this	sort,	while	not	deliberative	in	itself,	might	plausibly	contribute	to	the	wider	‘deliberative	system’	(Mansbridge	et	al.,	2013)	
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difference	here.	Citizens’	chances	of	making	a	difference	to	the	final	outcome,	though	they	will	sometimes	be	higher	than	they	would	have	been	under	majority	rule,	will	remain	vanishingly	small	under	lottery	voting	(Elster,	1989,	pp.	87-8).	It	is	hard	to	see,	then,	why	citizens	would	have	any	greater	incentives	to	engage	in	deliberation	under	 lottery	voting,	and	still	harder	 to	see	why	political	actors	should	have	any	greater	incentive	to	try	and	get	them	to	do	so.		It	 is	 worth	 noting,	 as	 well,	 that	 political	 parties	 have	 a	 range	 of	 less	 desirable,	counter-deliberative	 strategies	 they	 regularly	 employ	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	maximise	their	 proportion	 of	 the	 vote	 under	 aggregative	 decision-making.	 Negative	advertising	 campaigns,	 for	 instance,	 which	 aim	 to	 depress	 opposition	 turnout.	Lottery	 voting	 would,	 presumably,	 intensify	 parties’	 incentives	 to	 employ	 these	strategies.			There	 are	 reasons,	 moreover,	 to	 expect	 lottery	 voting	 to	 yield	 poorer	 quality	decisions	 than	 aggregative	 decision-making.	 Aggregative	 decision-making	 in	general	–	and	majority	rule	in	particular	–	tends	to	encourage	competition	among	a	relatively	small	number	of	alternatives.	An	agent	has	little	incentive	to	place	an	item	on	the	agenda	they	believe	has	insufficient	chance	of	securing	the	level	of	support	necessary	for	victory.195	As	noted	already,	the	chance	of	an	option	being	selected	as	the	social	choice	under	lottery	voting	is	simply	the	proportion	of	the	vote	it	receives.	Incentives	to	place	items	on	the	agenda	likely	to	gain	only	limited	support	would	therefore	be	substantially	more	powerful	under	lottery	voting.	We	should	therefore	expect	 the	 number	 of	 alternatives	 on	 the	 agenda	 to	 substantially	 increase	 –	 and	lower-quality	decisions	to	follow.	Evidence	suggests	that	as	the	number	of	items	on	the	 agenda	 increases,	 citizens’	 competency	 for	 choosing	 between	 those	 items	declines	(Lau	et	al.,	2014,	pp.	241-3).	Moreover,	many	of	these	‘new’	options	(be	they	legislative	 proposals,	 or	 candidates	 for	 office)	 will	 be	 more	 extreme	 than	 those	which	 would	 have	 made	 their	 way	 onto	 the	 agenda	 under	 majority	 rule.	 Such	options	almost	never	attract	majority	support,	and	so	have	virtually	no	chance	of	success	 under	 aggregative	 decision-making.	 Not	 so	 under	 lottery	 voting.	 Indeed,	options	of	this	sort	are	statistically	certain	to	be	selected	eventually.	Lottery	voting,	then,	seems	unlikely	to	produce	higher-quality	outcomes	than	democracy.	
																																																						195	Setting	aside	the	very	rare	phenomenon	of	agenda	manipulation.	See	Mackie	(2003,	ch.s	7-8).	
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	7.2.2.	Suffrage	by	Lottery		The	principal	instrumental	argument	for	suffrage	by	lottery	is	that	it	would	realise	higher-quality	decisions	 (López-Guerra,	2014,	pp.	29-37).196	López-Guerra	claims	that,	given	widespread	voter	ignorance,	universal	suffrage	frequently	results	in	low-quality	decisions.197	Shrinking	the	number	of	voters	might	 increase	the	epistemic	competency	of	the	electorate,	and	thereby	improve	the	quality	political	decisions,	in	three	 ways.	 First,	 programmes	 of	 voter	 education	 which	 might	 improve	 the	competency	of	the	electorate	would	be	excessively	costly	to	operate	under	universal	suffrage.	Shrinking	the	size	of	the	electorate,	however,	would	drastically	lower	the	costs	 of	 operating	 such	 programmes.	 Suffrage	 by	 lottery,	 then,	 would	 enable	governments	to	take	steps	to	increase	the	amount	of	political	knowledge	possessed	by	voters.	Second,	shrinking	the	size	of	the	electorate,	other	things	equal,	increases	the	probability	of	each	voter’s	being	decisive.	That	increases	the	expected	value	of	voting	and,	in	turn,	the	expected	value	of	gathering	information.	Suffrage	by	lottery,	then,	 might	 be	 expected	 to	 mitigate	 the	 problem	 of	 rational	 ignorance.	 Finally,	selecting	a	subset	of	 the	population	and	charging	 them	with	 the	responsibility	of	choosing	 the	 next	 government	 might	 induce	 a	 sense	 of	 civic	 duty	 among	 these	persons,	causing	them	to	vote	in	a	more	epistemically	responsible	manner.		These	 arguments	 do	 not	 withstand	 scrutiny.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 risks	 of	unacceptable	 demographic	 bias,	 López-Guerra	 (2011,	 pp.	 214-5)	 insists	 that	 the	group	of	 citizens	 to	be	enfranchised	must	be	 large	enough	 to	yield	a	 statistically	representative	sample	of	the	population	at	large.	Each	social	group,	he	insists,	must	be	 demographically	 represented	 as	 well	 as	 it	 would	 have	 been	 under	 universal	suffrage.	Given	the	diversity	of	modern	states,	this	will	require	the	enfranchisement	of	fairly	sizeable	proportion	of	the	population.	This,	in	turn,	means	that	voters	will	still	have	a	very	minimal	probability	of	decisiveness.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	 for	 example,	 Brennan	 and	 Lomasky	 (1993,	 pp.	 57)	 show	 that	 in	 a	 two-option	choice	between	A	and	B,	where	voters	are	on	average	0.51	likely	to	vote	for	
																																																						196	López-Guerra	is	more	and	less	forthright	about	the	prospect	of	these	decisions	translating	into	higher-quality	outcomes	in	different	pieces.	Compare	López-Guerra	(2011),	and	López-Guerra	(2014,	ch.	2).	197	This	is	by	no	means	uncontroversial,	given	voters’	ability	to	employ	informational	shortcuts,	as	discussed	in	previous	chapters.	
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A,	 if	 there	 are	 200,	 001	 voters	 (around	 0.137%	of	 the	 146,	 311,	 000	Americans	currently	registered	to	vote),	the	probability	of	any	voter’s	being	decisive	is	around	1	in	12.3	million.	The	payoffs	to	 individual	voters	of	getting	their	way	would	still	need	to	be	utterly	enormous	for	it	to	be	instrumentally	rational	for	individuals	to	consent	to	 incur	the	costs	of	undergoing	voter	education,	or	expend	independent	effort	to	become	better	informed.198		Being	 singled	 out	 as	 among	 the	 select	 few	with	 the	 civic	 duty	 to	 elect	 the	 next	government	 would	 perhaps	 motivate	 some	 persons	 to	 act	 in	 an	 epistemically	responsible	manner.	Yet	‘civic	duty’	norms	of	this	kind	generally	enjoy	widespread	compliance	only	where	individual	noncompliance	is	likely	to	have	a	direct	impact	on	the	group,	is	easily	observable,	and	can	be	readily	sanctioned	(c.f.	Olson,	1965,	pp.	60-5).	One	has	no	interest	in	bearing	the	costs	of	compliance	if	noncompliance	makes	no	difference	 to	 the	group,	or	will	not	be	punished.	Needless	 to	 say,	 such	conditions	will	not	be	satisfied	under	suffrage	by	lottery.	The	same	result	will	still	be	virtually	certain	to	emerge	however	much	information	any	 individual	gathers,	the	 diminished	 size	 of	 the	 electorate	 notwithstanding.	 Without	 some	 extremely	draconian	 system	of	 surveillance,	 it	would	be	 impossible	 to	detect	 and	 therefore	deter	failures	to	gather	information.			There	is,	as	such,	little	reason	to	expect	that	suffrage	by	lottery	would	make	much	appreciable	 difference	 to	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 electorate.	 Moreover,	 suffrage	 by	lottery	would	also	entail	important	costs.199	Diminishing	citizens’	opportunities	for	political	 participation	diminishes	 their	 access	 to	 the	 goods	political	 participation	affords,	as	discussed	above.	I	think	it	doubtful,	then,	that	suffrage	by	lottery	would	produce	higher-quality	outcomes	than	democracy.		7.2.3.	Representation	by	Lottery	
																																																						198	Even	 if	we	 suppose	 an	 electorate	one	 tenth	 the	 size	 (20,	 001	persons),	 the	probability	 of	 any	voter’s	being	decisive	(holding	our	other	assumptions	fixed)	is	still	a	very	distant	1	in	481	(Brennan	and	Lomasky,	1993,	pp.	57).	The	payoffs	to	individual	voters	of	getting	their	way	would	still	need	to	be	very	substantial	for	it	to	be	instrumentally	rational	for	them	to	bother	gathering	information.	One	could	insist	on	compulsory	voter	education,	but	only	at	the	cost	of	a	severe	demandingness	objection.	199	We	might	appeal	to	the	Condorcet	Jury	Theorem	to	show	that	shrinking	the	total	number	of	voters	would	diminish	the	epistemic	competency	of	the	electorate	(List	and	Goodin,	2001).	Whether	this	is	so	will	depend	upon	whether	the	assumptions	of	the	theorem	are	satisfied,	over	which	there	is	much	controversy.		
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	The	most	important	instrumental	argument	in	favour	of	representation	by	lottery	is	that	 it	 would	 produce	 higher-quality	 decisions	 by	 mitigating	 elite	 bias.	 Two	arguments	to	this	effect	have	been	presented.	First,	given	the	costs	of	running	for	election,	 democracies	 tend	 to	 disproportionately	 select	 for	 social	 and	 economic	elites	 as	 officeholders.	 Selecting	 representatives	 randomly	 would	 eliminate	 this	effect	(McCormick,	2011,	pp.	170-88;	Zakaras,	2010,	pp.	460-1).	Second,	elections	afford	 social	 and	 economic	 elites	 opportunities	 to	 ‘capture’	 –	 i.e.	 exert	disproportionate	 influence	over	–	politicians.	These	opportunities	are	numerous:	manipulating	 pre-selection	 processes,	 manipulating	 candidates’	 media	presentation,	 campaign	 finance	 contributions,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 elimination	 of	elections	 would	 close	 off	 these	 avenues	 of	 influence	 (Guerrero,	 2014).	 The	 end	result,	it	is	argued,	should	be	decisions	that	attend	more	closely	to	the	interests	of	the	citizenry	as	a	whole,	rather	than	social	elites.		Yet	 there	 is	much	 that	 could	 be	 done	 to	 limit	 elite	 bias	 in	 democracies	 short	 of	abolishing	 elections.	 The	 most	 obvious	 measures	 would	 involve	 regulating	campaign	finance	more	closely.	Donors,	particularly	those	who	give	large	amounts,	are	overwhelmingly	 from	wealthier	social	groups	(Gilens,	2012,	ch.	8).	Campaign	contribution	limits,	then,	give	candidates	incentives	to	seek	donations	from	a	more	socio-economically	 diverse	 pool	 of	 persons,	 and	 have	 been	 linked	 to	 more	redistributive	policy	outcomes	 (Eom	and	Gross,	2007;	Flavin,	2015).200	Similarly,	the	public	financing	of	elections	provides	the	means	for	persons	whose	candidacy	would	otherwise	have	been	unviable	to	enter	electoral	contests.	This	has	the	effect	of	diminishing	incumbency	advantage,	and	providing	more	powerful	incentives	for	elected	 officials	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 constituents,	 rather	 than	 their	campaign	donors	(Donnay	and	Ramsden,	1995;	Eom	and	Gross,	2006;	Mayer	et	al.,	2007).	There	are	a	range	of	other	possibilities.	As	discussed	in	detail	in	chapter,	two,	there	is	substantial	evidence	that	compulsory	voting	mitigates	elite	bias	in	decision-making	 by	 virtually	 eliminating	 socioeconomic	 bias	 in	 turnout.	 Other	 possible	measures	 include	 giving	 control	 of	 electoral	 districting	 to	 independent	bodies	 to	
																																																						200	We	might	 also	 look	 to	 donor	matching	 programmes.	 In	 some	 elections	 in	 New	 York	 City,	 for	example,	each	dollar	given	by	an	individual	donor	under	$175	is	matched	by	a	factor	of	6	to	1	by	government.	 Early	 indications	 suggest	 that	 poorer	 citizens	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 donate,	 and	 that	candidates	are	more	likely	to	attempt	to	appeal	to	such	persons,	where	such	arrangements	are	in	place	(Genn	et	al.,	2012).	
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prevent	gerrymandering,	banning	representatives	from	owning	shares	in,	or	taking	up	 positions	with,	 corporations	while	 in	 office	 and	 for	 a	 suitable	 period	 of	 time	afterwards,	funding	high-quality	public	media,	and	so	on.		Admittedly,	 none	 of	 these	 measures	 can	 hope	 to	 eliminate	 elite	 bias.	 Yet	representation	by	 lottery	would	 leave	 crucial	 avenues	of	 elite	 influence	open.	As	Lindblom	(1982)	points	out,	politicians	are	bound	to	give	a	substantial	degree	of	influence	 over	 policymaking	 to	 the	 preferences	 and	 interests	 of	 elites,	 given	 the	degree	to	which	the	realisation	of	other	important	social	goods	depends	upon	elites’	behaviour.201	 This,	 simply,	 is	 because	 of	 the	 economic	 power	 elites	 command.	Suppose	some	government	wishes	to	raise	corporate	taxes.	Their	doing	so	would	give	corporations	incentives	to,	inter	alia,	take	jobs	offshore,	lay	off	staff,	withdraw	investment,	and	so	on.	Governments	of	all	kinds	are	bound	to	(and,	surely,	ought)	take	such	consequences	seriously,	given	the	potential	gravity	of	the	consequences	for	their	citizens.	They	are,	as	such,	simply	bound	to	accommodate	the	preferences	and	interests	of	elites	to	a	substantial	degree.	The	selection	of	representatives	by	lottery	would	do	little	to	undermine	this	dynamic.			Moreover,	 powerful	 actors	 would	 retain	 their	 ability	 to	 lobby	 representatives.	Lobbying	 involves	 the	 transfer	 of	 “…information	 in	 private	meetings	 and	 venues	between	 interest	groups	and	politicians,	 their	staffs,	and	agents”	 (Figueiredo	and	Richter,	 2014,	 p.	 164).	 This	 is	 an	 avenue	 of	 influence	 that	 favours	 social	 and	economic	elites,	given	that	they	are	substantially	more	likely	to	have	the	resources	and	organisational	 capacity	 to	 form	and	 finance	 the	operations	of	 lobby/interest	groups.	Certainly,	this	is	true	of	the	status	quo.	Expenditures	by	corporations	and	trade	 associations	 presently	 comprise	 around	 84%	 of	 overall	 interest	 group	lobbying	expenditures	 in	 the	United	States,	 for	example	 (Figueiredo	and	Richter,	2014,	pp.	165-6).	A	broad	range	of	empirical	evidence	suggests	that	lobbying	is	an	effective	means	of	exercising	 influence	 in	a	wide	range	of	policy	areas,	over	both	elected	and	(importantly,	for	our	purposes)	unelected	officials.202	Indeed,	lobbying	is	 debatably	 the	 primary	 means	 by	 which	 elites	 seek	 to	 influence	 the	 political	process.	Evidence	indicates	that,	at	least	the	United	States,	 lobbying	expenditures	
																																																						201	See	also	Dryzek	(2000,	ch.	4).	202	See	Figueiredo	and	Richter	(2014,	pp.	163-9)	On	unelected	officials,	see	McKay	and	Yackee	(2007),	and	Yackee	and	Yackee	(2006).	
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outstrip	campaign	finance	expenditures	by	a	factor	of	5	to	1	(Figueiredo	and	Richter,	2014,	pp.	163-9).			There	is	reason,	moreover,	to	expect	that	representatives	selected	by	lot	would	be	susceptible	to	elites’	attempts	to	influence	their	conduct.	Incumbents	cannot	be	re-elected	under	representation	by	lottery,	unless	they	are	randomly	selected	a	second	time.	 That,	 in	 turn,	 would	 create	 a	 situation	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 created	 by	 the	imposition	 of	 term	 limits	 in	 elective	 bodies.	 Term	 limits	 radically	 decrease	 the	number	 of	 incumbents,	 and	 radically	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 new	 appointees.	Evidence	 suggests	 that,	 where	 term	 limits	 are	 imposed,	 the	 relative	 power	 of	lobby/interest	 groups	 increases	 (Miller	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Sarbaugh-Thompson	 et	 al.,	2004,	 ch.s	 3,	 9).	 This,	 generally,	 is	 because	 newly	 appointed	 representatives	typically	possess	less	information	than	incumbents,	and	are	therefore	forced	–	or	are	at	least	substantially	more	likely	–	to	rely	upon	information	provided	to	them	by	lobbyists.	 There	 is	 a	 clear	 risk,	 it	 seems	 to	 me,	 of	 a	 similar	 dynamic	 under	representation	 by	 lottery.	 It	 is	 unclear,	 then,	 whether	 representation	 by	 lottery	enjoys	any	substantial	advantage	over	appropriately	structured	democracies	with	respect	to	elite	bias.		An	important	secondary	line	of	argument,	pursued	most	prominently	by	Landemore	(2013a),	 appeals	 to	 the	 deliberative	 benefits	 of	 representation	 by	 lottery.203	 The	legislative	bodies	convened	under	representation	by	lottery	would	constitute	a	kind	of	 ‘mini-public’,	similar	to	those	discussed	in	chapter	five.	There	is	 little	evidence	that	mini-publics	tend	to	suffer	seriously	from	elite	bias.204	The	evidence	discussed	in	chapter	five	shows	that	such	groups	appear	to	have	the	capacity	to	deliberate	in	a	well-informed,	impartial	manner,	devise	novel	and	effective	policy	proposals,	and	so	on.	Indeed,	on	many	metrics,	the	quality	of	deliberation	which	takes	place	within	well-structured	 mini-publics	 is	 substantially	 better	 than	 that	 which	 takes	 place	within	 elective	 legislatures	 (Steiner,	 2012,	 ch.	 9).	 Landemore	 (2013a,	 p.	 1227)	declares	that	we	can	“…extrapolate	from	the	performance	of	regular	citizens	in	these	deliberative	 contexts	 to	what	 the	epistemic	performance	of	 an	actual	Parliament	
																																																						203	See	also	Leib	(2004),	Sintomer	(2010),	and	Zakaras	(2010,	pp.	465-7).	204	This	is	not	entirely	uncontroversial.	Such	exercises	frequently	suffer	from	socioeconomic	bias	in	their	membership	which,	debatably,	impacts	upon	the	outcomes	produced	(Fung,	2007b,	pp.	162).		
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based	 on	 random	 selection	 would	 be	 like.”	 On	 that	 basis,	 she	 claims	 that	representation	by	lottery	ought	to	deliver	higher-quality	decisions	than	democracy.		I	am	much	 impressed	by	deliberative	mini-publics.	 I	am	sceptical,	however,	as	 to	whether	 the	 evidence	 gathered	 from	 studies	 of	 mini-publics	 provides	 much	indication	at	all	as	to	the	quality	of	deliberation	likely	to	take	place	in	the	legislative	bodies	that	would	be	convened	under	representation	by	lottery.	There	is	a	crucial	difference	between	such	bodies	and	other	mini-publics.	Namely,	participants	in	the	former	would	enjoy	direct	lawmaking	power.	That	is	likely	to	adversely	impact	the	quality	 of	 deliberation	 in	 two	 ways.205	 First,	 such	 bodies	 would	 be	 a	 target	 for	outside	 intervention	 (i.e.	 lobbying)	 in	 a	 way	 that	 deliberative	 polls,	 citizens’	assemblies	and	so	on	are	not.	The	latter,	after	all,	do	not	wield	direct	power	of	any	sort.	There	is,	as	such,	little	reason	for	outside	actors	to	seek	to	intervene	upon	their	proceedings.	 Second,	 citizens	 are	 likely	 to	 deliberate	 in	 a	 more	 self-interested	manner.	Deliberating	in	an	altruistic	manner	is	‘cheap’	in	deliberative	polls	and	the	like,	 for	the	simple	reason	that	the	outputs	of	such	bodies	have	no	direct	bearing	upon	 real-world	 policy	 and,	 therefore,	 upon	 participants’	 material	 interests.206	Things	would	be	very	different	under	representation	by	lottery.	The	outputs	of	such	bodies	 would	 have	 real	 legal	 consequences,	 and	 thus	 impact	 directly	 upon	participants’	interests.		The	degree	to	which	these	factors	are	likely	to	undermine	the	quality	of	deliberation	is,	 admittedly,	 hard	 to	 estimate.	 There	 are	 no	 (contemporary)	 instances	 of	deliberative	mini-publics	having	been	endowed	with	lawmaking	authority.207	There	is,	as	such,	little	empirical	evidence	to	draw	upon.	Whatever	the	extent	of	these	risks,	however,	 there	 are	 other	 means	 of	 leveraging	 the	 benefits	 of	 small-group	deliberation	 which	 avoid	 these	 concerns	 almost	 entirely	 (together	 with	 the	egalitarian	 concerns	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section).	 Many	 have	 argued	 for	holding	 regular	 deliberative	mini-publics	whose	 role	would	 be	 to	 advise	 elected	officials	on	matters	of	public	policy	(e.g.	Dahl,	1989,	pp.	340-1;	Dryzek,	2010,	ch.	3;	
																																																						205	As	a	general	matter,	there	is	substantial	evidence	that	the	quality	of	deliberation	which	occurs	within	such	fora	is	highly	sensitive	to	way	in	which	those	fora	are	structured	(Fung,	2007b).	206	 Brennan	 and	 Lomasky	 (1993,	 pp.	 22-4)	 make	 a	 very	 similar	 point	 in	 relation	 to	 voting.	 The	infinitesimally	 small	 probability	 of	 one’s	 vote	 being	decisive	 lowers	 the	 relative	 cost	 of	 voting	 in	accordance	with	one’s	moral	attitudes	rather	than	one’s	interests.	207	Though	some	have	played	an	important	role	in	the	policy	process	–	e.g.	the	BCCA.	
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Fishkin,	2009).	Others,	myself	included,	have	defended	citizens’	assembly	processes	with	the	power	to	put	policy	proposals	 to	public	referenda	(e.g.	Fung,	2007a,	pp.	451-3;	Pettit,	2012,	pp.	231-2;	Thompson,	2008b).	I	am	also	unpersuaded,	then,	of	the	 deliberative	 case	 for	 representation	 by	 lottery.	 There	 are	 good	 grounds	 for	scepticism	 as	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 deliberation	 likely	 to	 take	 place	 within	 such	bodies,	 and	 there	 are	 better	 means	 of	 leveraging	 the	 benefits	 of	 small-group	deliberation.		Representation	 by	 lottery	 would	 undeniably	 have	 some	 advantages.	 It	 would	eliminate	the	monetary	costs	of	elections	and	incentives	for	representatives	to	pork-barrel,	 for	 example	 (Mueller	 et	 al.,	 1972).	 However,	 it	 also	 carries	 a	 number	 of	serious	costs,	several	of	which	have	been	set	out	by	Pettit	(2012,	pp.	200-5).	I	do	not	agree	with	all	of	Pettit’s	claims.	Two,	however,	 strike	me	as	plausible.	First,	 such	arrangements	would	threaten	a	range	of	basic	liberties	by	diminishing	their	role	in	social	life.	Electoral	systems	provide	individuals	with	valuable	opportunities	for	the	exercise	 of	 those	 liberties	 necessary	 for	 political	 organisation	 –	 speech,	 thought,	travel	and	so	on.	Abolishing	elections	would	diminish	the	role	of	these	liberties	in	public	life,	lowering	the	barrier	to	their	curtailment.	Second,	such	systems	are	likely	to	 fail	 to	 address	 important	 policy	 concerns.	 Electoral	 competition	 creates	incentives	for	representatives	to	ascertain	and	address	the	concerns	of	the	citizenry.	Such	incentives	do	not	obtain	under	representation	by	lottery.		I	would	add	two	further	costs.	First,	eliminating	elections	would	eliminate	a	range	of	important	opportunities	for	political	participation,	limiting	citizens’	access	to	the	goods	 such	opportunities	 afford.	 Second,	 and	more	pressingly,	 such	 systems	 risk	unsuitable	 persons	 being	 selected	 to	 wield	 power	 over	 their	 fellow	 citizens.	Democracies,	of	 course,	 sometimes	also	 select	persons	unsuitable	 for	power.	But	there	 are	 countervailing	 pressures	 in	 favour	 of	 competence	 in	 democracies.	Politicians	have	powerful	incentives	to	perform	at	least	minimally	competently	to	promote	 their	 chances	 of	 re-election.	 Parties	 have	 interests	 in	 promoting	 the	perception	 that	 they	 are	 competent	 to	 govern.	 Voters	 exercise	 some	 degree	 of	judgement	as	to	the	quality	of	their	elected	officials.	No	such	pressures	obtain	under	representation	 by	 lottery.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 then,	 I	 think	 that	 there	 is	 also	
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substantial	reason	to	doubt	the	instrumental	merits	of	representation	by	lottery,	all	things	considered.			7.3.	Conclusion		We	are	now	in	a	position	to	state	our	conclusions.	First,	the	positive	egalitarian	case	advanced	in	favour	of	the	models	of	lottocracy	defended	in	recent	literature	–	lottery	voting,	representation	by	lottery,	and	suffrage	by	lottery	–	depends	upon	a	series	of	implausible	normative	commitments.	Second,	the	comparative	egalitarian	merits	of	appropriately	 structured	democracies	are,	 in	general,	 substantially	 stronger	 than	those	 of	 any	 of	 the	 models	 of	 lottocracy	 under	 consideration.	 Finally,	 the	instrumental	merits	of	lottocracy	are	generally	weaker	than	those	of	democracy	(or,	at	least,	of	universal	suffrage	and	aggregative	decision-making).	Most	of	the	positive	benefits	claimed	for	these	systems	seem	unlikely	to	materialise.	And	each	of	these	systems	 seems	 likely	 to	 entail	 costs	which	appropriately	 structured	democracies	would	avoid.208		No-one	should	deny	that	contemporary	democracies	are	problematic	in	very	many	respects.	But,	 I	 think,	 the	solutions	 lie	 in	 the	reform	of	democratic	 institutions	 to	better	respect	the	political	equality	of	citizens	and	improve	the	quality	of	outcomes	realised.		 	
																																																						208	This	is	not	to	deny	that	randomness	has	any	role	to	play	in	contemporary	democratic	societies	–	indeed,	 in	 chapter	 five,	 I	 defended	 a	 proposal	 which	 relies	 crucially	 upon	 the	 device	 of	 random	selection.	My	only	claim	is	that	the	proposals	discussed	in	this	chapter	are	unattractive.	
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8.	Conclusion		It	 is	 surely	 uncontroversial	 that	 contemporary	 democratic	 societies	 are	incompletely	just.	It	is	no	surprise,	then,	that	on	the	basis	of	the	arguments	defended	in	the	preceding	chapters,	some	democratic	institutions	are	in	need	of	fairly	radical	reform,	while	others	are	defensible	more	or	less	as	they	are.		Its	critics’	many	protestations	notwithstanding,	societies	are	justified	in	imposing	compulsory	voting	as	a	means	of	preventing	non-voters	 from	unfairly	 free-riding	upon	the	efforts	of	citizens	who	choose	to	vote.	Bans	on	vote	buying	are	justified	as	a	 means	 of	 preventing	 persons	 from	 expressing	 objectionably	 disrespectful	attitudes	towards	their	fellow	citizens.	Universal	suffrage,	and	decision-making	by	the	aggregation	of	citizens	equally	weighted	expressed	preferences,	are	superior	to	the	alternatives	on	offer	from	elitists	and	lottocrats.		The	blanket	exclusion	of	children	from	the	franchise,	by	contrast,	is	in	need	of	fairly	radical	 reform.	 No	 good	 argument	 is	 to	 be	 found	 which	 might	 legitimate	 the	exclusion	 of	 children	much	 above	 the	 age	 of	 twelve.	 Important	 reforms	 are	 also	needed	 to	 the	way	 in	which	 democratic	 institutions	 account	 for	 the	 interests	 of	groups	 to	 whom	 elected	 officials	 are	 characteristically	 under-responsive.	 The	creation	of	a	citizens’	assembly	for	the	cognitively	disabled	is	one	possible	reform	which	might	be	valuable	in	this	respect.			I	noted	in	the	introduction	that	democratic	theorists	have,	with	notable	exceptions,	tended	to	neglect	institution-level	questions,	preferring	to	focus	upon	more	abstract	issues.	It	is	my	hope	that	the	essays	in	this	dissertation	have	gone	some	distance	to	redressing	 that	 imbalance.	 Yet	 the	 issues	 considered	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapters	represent	just	a	fraction	of	those	which	merit	closer	investigation.	Recent	political	events	have	thrown	two	such	issues	into	particularly	sharp	relief.		First,	 gerrymandering.	 The	 practice	 of	 manipulating	 electoral	 boundaries	 for	partisan	advantage	has	become	widespread	in	many	democracies,	particularly	the	United	States.	Most	of	us	believe	the	practice	to	be	wrong,	as	a	matter	of	principle.	But	is	this	so?	Is	gerrymandering	always	wrong?	If	so,	why?	Might	there	be	some	
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purposes	(e.g.	to	ensure	the	representation	of	minority	groups	in	legislatures)	for	which	manipulating	electoral	boundaries	 is	 justified?	Philosophers	have	had	very	little	to	say	on	these	questions,	despite	increasing	interest	in	the	social	sciences,	and	their	obvious	real-world	significance.		Second,	pre-selection	processes.	Particularly,	primary	elections	in	the	United	States.	It	 is	 generally	 acknowledged	 that	 such	 processes	 lead	 to	 bads	 of	 various	 kinds.	Highly	intense	partisans	substantially	over-participate	(relative	to	other	groups)	in	such	 elections.	 This,	 very	 plausibly,	 leads	 to	 the	 selection	 of	 more	 extreme	candidates,	and	gives	rise	 to	unfortunate	 incentives	 for	elected	officials.	Yet	such	processes	do	apparently	have	desirable	democratic	qualities.	Democracy	requires	that	the	people	have	control	not	merely	over	which	items	on	the	political	agenda	are	selected,	but	also	over	the	composition	of	the	agenda	itself.	This	is	precisely	what	primaries	aim	to	provide	with	regards	to	the	candidates	on	the	ballot	at	elections	for	political	office.	There	would	be	value	in	sorting	through	the	various	goods	and	bads	of	primary	elections	(and	similar	processes),	and	considering	whether	there	might	 be	 alternatives	 which	 retain	 the	 democratic	 appeal	 of	 primaries,	 while	minimising	the	costs.			I	hope,	in	the	future,	to	work	on	both	these	issues.	Doubtless,	there	are	a	great	many	other	such	issues	with	which	it	would	also	be	worth	engaging.	 	
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